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Preface 
Whenever we act in accordance with current goals – induced endogenously by intentions or 
exogenously through instructions – cognitive control allows us to focus on the task at hand, 
overcome habits, or apply newly learned rules and associations. At the same time, it enables us to 
flexibly shift between goals and modify actions when the need for switching arises. In cognitive 
psychology this ability to shift is mostly studied using the task switching paradigm, where subjects 
are instructed to switch between two or more simple tasks. Their performance is usually slower and 
more error-prone on a switch of task than on a repetition. This switch cost is sometimes believed to 
reflect an endogenous control process (Rogers & Monsell, 1995), while others attribute it to 
persisting activation of the preceding task and/or lingering inhibition of the current task (e.g. Allport, 
Styles, & Hsieh, 1994). In any case, switching between tasks is associated with a robust cost. In 2007, 
Dreisbach, Goschke, and Haider were able to show that this cost disappears if subjects respond 
based on a number of stimulus-response mappings (SR mappings) rather than two alternating rules. 
That is, with an alternative strategy the switch cost can be avoided. Still, even when the use of 
separate mappings was implicitly suggested by introducing targets two at a time, subjects opted for 
rule use. Thus, the question arose why the use of task rules seems to be preferred over SR mappings 
(as indicated by the existence of switch costs), despite being associated with a cost. In 2008, 
Dreisbach and Haider found an appealing answer to this question: When the use of separate SR 
mappings was compared to applying a single rule instead of two rules, a benefit of rule application 
emerged. The use of rules prevented interference by irrelevant stimulus features. More precisely, 
Dreisbach and Haider looked into binding effects between an irrelevant target feature (stimulus 
color) and the response. Typically, response repetitions are faster when they are accompanied by a 
feature repetition, whereas a feature switch benefits a response switch (e.g. Notebaert & Soetens, 
2003). Dreisbach and Haider found this effect only when subjects applied eight separate SR mappings 
instead of a single categorization rule. They termed the fact that task rules prevented such binding 
effects the shielding function of task sets. In 2009 they extended their findings by showing that the 
shielding function does not only affect binding effects but also prevents interference from spatially 
oriented distracters. In sum, using task rules may result in costs when the need to switch arises. But 
it also offers the advantage of shielding from irrelevant information.  
With the presence of the shielding function being established, questions regarding its 
underlying processes must be addressed. The absence of interference due to the use of 
categorization rules might be achieved by the suppression of distracters, by a preference for 
information related to the task, or by a combination of both factors. In the experiments presented 
here, shielding was investigated in the presence of task-related distracters. Moreover, results 
  
 
indicating a relaxation of shielding on task switches (Dreisbach & Wenke, 2011) were utilized while 
studying shielding in the context of predictable and unpredictable task switching. The aim of the 
present thesis was to shed more light on the shielding function of task sets and its underlying 
mechanism. It was hypothesized that the shielding function reflects a preference for task-related 
information.  
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ABSTRACT 
The flexibility of the human mind is often studied using the task switching paradigm. Subjects 
are instructed to alternate between two or more tasks and typically perform worse on a task switch 
than on a repetition. Dreisbach and colleagues (Dreisbach et al., 2007; Dreisbach & Haider, 2008, 
2009) investigated whether rule use is only associated with this detrimental effect – the cost of 
switching – or also offers benefits. They found that applying categorization rules instead of seemingly 
arbitrary stimulus-response mappings results in reduced susceptibility to distraction and termed this 
effect the shielding function of task sets. The present thesis addressed open questions regarding this 
shielding function. I investigated how shielding affects task-related distraction as compared to the 
irrelevant distracters Dreisbach and Haider had used. In addition, shielding was studied in the 
context of unpredictable and predictable task switching in order to further investigate its underlying 
mechanism. Results show that using task rules enables subjects to avoid distraction by focusing on 
task-related information. This was deduced from the facts that a) stimuli that fit the instructed 
categories were automatically categorized and b) a reduction of shielding did not result in an overall 
increased distractibility but led to attenuated interference by task-related distracters. Overall, 
shielding seems to be possible because – in contrast to arbitrary SR mappings – rules offer a single 
and common response-defining stimulus feature. The observed preference for such task-related 
information is modulated by task activation, as evidenced by a reduction of shielding on 
unpredictable but not on predictable task switches.  
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COGNITIVE CONTROL 
AN INTRODUCTION TO COGNITIVE CONTROL 
Imagine a sunny Sunday afternoon. You are sitting in your back yard with some friends, 
drinking cold beverages, talking and playing a game of cards. Reaching for your glass and taking a sip 
or shuffling the deck of cards are both actions that are easily done and require no mental effort. 
Others appear just as trivial from the outside but may in fact be more demanding. For instance, you 
might put milk in your coffee and – because you are on a diet – refrain from adding sugar although 
you typically do. In order to win the game you must keep track of which cards have been played or 
which suit currently trumps. Moreover, you may play different games with different rules and have 
to adapt accordingly. All these actions seem trivial and yet they are subject to some form of control 
because they reflect your current goals or present circumstances. The study of what this control is 
and how it operates, has a long history in psychology (Ach, 1910; James, 1890). The psychological 
construct is addressed with terms such as the will (Ach, 1910; James, 1890) or executive control (e.g. 
A.-L. Cohen, Bayer, Jaudas, & Gollwitzer, 2008; Logan, 1985; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001) over 
executive functions (e.g. Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Davidson, Amso, Anderson, & Diamond, 2006; 
Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012; Phillips, Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002). The question asked is 
always the same: How do we manage to do the things we do the way we are instructed to do them 
or want to do them in the presence of distractions, temptations, or competing response tendencies? 
How can we pursue our goals in spite of, for instance, habits or currently more appealing 
alternatives? To illustrate the importance of control, authors often resort to reports of patients who 
seem to have lost some aspect of it. One of the most often cited examples is the very memorable 
utilization behavior (Lhermitte, 1983). Patients suffering from frontal lesions sometimes seem unable 
to inhibit habitual responses to everyday objects, even if they have no intention of using them. For 
instance, the presentation of a cigarette and a match would trigger using the match to light the 
cigarette, although the patient might not even be a smoker. It seems as though the objects evoke an 
automated response that cannot be controlled by the patient’s will.  
Cognitive control allows us to overcome such habitual tendencies and govern our behavior 
according to current intentions, goals, or circumstances. Complex cognitive tasks can only be 
mastered when the necessary processes are sequenced and coordinated. In cognitive psychology, 
this controlled processing is often contrasted with actions that can be carried out in a purely 
automatic fashion. This distinction suggests that there is a clear dichotomy between automatic and 
controlled behavior: On the one hand, there are automatic processes that are triggered by external 
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stimuli and can be seen through fast and effortlessly, without consciousness or attention. For 
example, you could easily scratch your itching arm while reading these lines without having to 
interrupt your ongoing activity or think about how to move your fingers. On the other hand, there 
are actions that serve an intention and need to be directed in one way or the other. Stopping the 
scratching motion because you do not want the mosquito bite to turn into a scar would be an 
instance of such behavior. Yet, although the distinction between automatic and controlled processes 
might be appealing, Goschke (2003) notes that it does not do the complexity of behavior justice. He 
refers to instances, where newly learned (and therefore necessarily controlled) actions seem to be 
carried out in an automatic fashion, such as in priming studies. In contrast, even highly automatic 
behavior is not carried out whenever circumstances suggest it (a notable exception is the utilization 
behavior mentioned above). It partly depends on current goals and sometimes must be initiated 
deliberately. Although you might be excellent at shuffling cards, you would not shuffle any deck of 
cards you encounter. Only if you intended to play would you take the cards and (maybe 
automatically) shuffle the deck.  
Overall, how behavior is controlled is a complex issue and only 16 years ago still was – as 
Monsell (1996) beautifully put it – “a somewhat embarrassing zone of almost total ignorance – a 
heart of darkness” (Monsell, 1996, p. 93). This has changed, especially in view of new techniques, 
such as functional magnetic resonance imaging. A lot has been done to uncover this heart of 
darkness, and some of the light that has been shed will be presented here.  
The number of possible situations, where behavior is in need of adjustments, modifications, 
or some other form of cognitive control is infinite. Three main functions (Miyake et al., 2000) are 
illustrated by the examples in the very first paragraph of this chapter: inhibition of prepotent 
responses (not putting sugar in your coffee), monitoring and updating of information in working 
memory (keeping track of the cards), and shifting between mental sets (switching to another card 
game). Others include planning, problem solving, and novel situations where stimuli are associated 
with newly instructed or to-be-learned responses (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Norman & Shallice, 1986). 
It is evident that the number of cognitive control functions is vast. So how exactly do they work? Is 
cognitive control a unitary agent, situated somewhere in the brain – a homunculus that always just 
knows how to act? Or is it a distributed network of functions, a non-unitary system that has multiple 
components for a variety of control demands? 
COGNITIVE CONTROL AND THE PREFRONTAL CORTEX 
It has been attempted repeatedly to answer this question. Influential models have been 
proposed to account for phenomena associated with cognitive control. In their model of working 
memory, for instance, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) postulated a central executive that coordinates two 
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subordinate slave systems: the phonological loop and the visuo-spatial sketchpad (later a third 
system, the episodic buffer was added; Baddeley, 2000). The former controls flow of information to 
and from the latter, where verbal and visuo-spatial information, respectively, are stored for short-
term use. In a similar vein but on a more general level, Norman and Shallice (1986) proposed the 
existence of a supervisory attentional system (SAS) that controls the activation and selection of more 
basic components called schemas. According to Norman and Shallice, automatic behavior is served 
by schemas that are activated by external triggers and – once they reach a specific threshold of 
activation – are selected and seen through unless they are actively switched off. Schemas can be 
rather basic (e.g. closing your fingers in order to grab a card) or more refined source schemas that 
activate a group of supporting schemas (e.g. the source schema playing a card would activate the 
correct hand- and finger-motions, aiming and grasping schemas etc.). In order to avoid conflict, the 
selection of schemas for simple and well-learned acts is supported by contention scheduling: lateral 
activation or inhibition of supporting and conflicting schemas, respectively, reduces competition. 
Importantly, according to this model, whenever external schema activation is not sufficient for the 
fulfillment of current goals, attention and motivation can influence behavior through the SAS, the 
central agent of control. They do so indirectly by increasing or decreasing schema activation values. 
That is, attention affects the selection of appropriate schemas but not their execution. Both Baddeley 
and Hitch’s model and Norman and Shallice’s model seem to favor a unitary approach: A central 
system or executive is responsible for administering control. This view is often mirrored in 
neuroimaging studies. The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is widely assumed to be the anatomical equivalent 
to a supervisory control system. Compelling evidence for the involvement of this structure in 
executive control first came from neuropsychological studies with patients suffering from lesions of 
the PFC. Such lesions usually lead to impairments in tests that commonly are assumed to tap 
executive functions. However, a recent review highlights the importance of distinguishing between 
specificity and sensitivity of such tasks to frontal lobe lesions (Alvarez & Emory, 2006). Alvarez and 
Emory put forward that their three tested tasks (the Wisconsin Card Sorting test, phonemic verbal 
fluency, and the Stroop Color Word Interference test) are sensitive to frontal lobe lesions because 
patients typically perform more poorly than healthy controls (although there are exceptions to this 
rule). However, they are not specific to lesions of the PFC because diffuse non-frontal lesions can 
lead to the same impairments. Still, even with doubts about its sufficiency for controlled behavior, 
the PFC is considered to be a necessary component of any goal-directed or intention-based behavior. 
Miller and Cohen (2001) argued that it has all the necessary prerequisites a superordinate control 
system might require. It is widely connected to other areas of the brain, efferently as well as 
afferently. Information converges and is integrated in the PFC. Miller and Cohen suggest that 
sustained activation of the PFC reflects the representation of current goals and biases brain 
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structures that are necessary for the completion of these goals. Its purpose is “the active 
maintenance of patterns of activity that represent goals and the means to achieve them” (Miller & 
Cohen, 2001, p.171). Of course, in order to fulfill more basic task demands such as perceiving and 
processing the relevant stimuli or initiating motor responses other areas of the brain are necessarily 
involved. The PFC is presumable merely the source of modulating influences on more posterior 
regions. For instance, Egner and Hirsch (2005) found that following response conflict (in this case a 
target face superimposed with an incongruent distracter name), activity in the task-relevant regions 
(the face-selective fusiform face area, FFA) was increased. This amplification was accompanied by an 
increase in connectivity between the FFA and the dorsolateral PFC. Egner and Hirsch interpreted the 
findings in terms of the recruitment of control following conflict (dorsolateral PFC activation), which 
signals the need for increased activity in task-relevant areas (FFA activation). In a similar vein, it has 
been found that greater activity in the supposedly conflict-sensitive anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; 
Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) was followed by increased activity in the PFC and 
behavioral adjustments in the subsequent trial (Kerns et al., 2004). In sum, various parts of the PFC 
may be recruited when the need for control arises. These, in turn, might bias the brain structures 
that are necessary for carrying out the tasks or pursuing the goals at hand (e.g. Brass, Ullsperger, 
Knoesche, Von Cramon, & Phillips, 2005).  
THE REPRESENTATION OF TASK SETS 
The purpose of cognitive control is to allow behavior to be governed by goals and intentions 
rather than environmental stimulation only. These goals and intentions may range from short term 
(play a card that trumps your opponent’s card) to long term (become an expert at the game), and 
from specific (win the game) to vague (socialize with people). As a consequence, one action might be 
attributed to a varying set of goals. Writing these sentences might serve my goal to finish at least 
three pages today. Alternatively (or additionally) writing could be construed to serve my wishes to 
finish this thesis, make the last three years’ work worthwhile, make my parents proud or promote 
my chances for getting a good job afterwards.  
In cognitive psychology, the goals that are induced and studied in participants are – for 
reasons of convenience and clarity – often simple tasks. Subjects are instructed to act according to a 
specific rule or set of rules that might be new (e.g. press keys in response to certain targets) or rather 
familiar (e.g. naming objects), simple (e.g. always perform the same operation) or more complex (e.g. 
switch tasks depending on context or cues). The locus and nature of cognitive control is then inferred 
from measures such as reaction times, error rates, or neuroimaging results.  
The notion that – once again – the PFC is vital to the representation of tasks and goals is 
emphasized in a review by Sakai (2008). Single-cell studies on monkeys as well as neuroimaging 
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studies with human subjects show that activation of regions in the PFC is essential to task 
representation, maintenance, and execution. Depending on the sensory modality, the specific 
operation to be performed, or the abstractness of the task, different frontal regions might be 
relevant. For instance, Sakai suggests a rostro-caudal gradient concerning abstractness. That is, the 
more abstract the task is, the more frontal the corresponding activation within the PFC will be. This 
account is also elaborated on by Bunge and Zelazo (2006), who suggest that children’s ability to use 
increasingly complex rules depends on developmental changes within the PFC. The orbitofrontal 
cortex, which the authors assume to represent simple associations between stimuli and 
corresponding rewards, is subject to structural changes very early in life. The ability to use more 
complex rules (e.g. rules that depend on context or may offer different responses for a single 
stimulus) increases between the ages of 2 and 5 years and may represent changes in the dorso- and 
ventrolateral PFC. Finally, the comparatively late development of the rostrolateral PFC allows the 
representation of higher-order rules like selection between multiple task sets. The ability to 
represent tasks abstractly seems to be especially important when it comes to generalization to new 
targets. Kharitonova, Chien, Colunga, and Munakata (2009) divided children into two groups, 
depending on their ability to switch rules. Switchers had no problem sorting cards by object first and 
by color afterwards. Perseverators stuck with the first rule they learned but performed that task 
equally well as switchers. Yet, when the same rule had to be used on new stimuli (e.g. cards had still 
to be sorted by color, but new colors were used), switchers had no difficulty generalizing, whereas 
perseverators – albeit using their preferred, first rule – performed poorly. Kharitonova et al. 
suggested that switchers and perseverators represented the rules differently. Switchers used active 
representations through sustained firing of neurons in the PFC, whereas perseverators’ latent rule 
representations relied on changed neuronal connections in more posterior regions. Importantly, only 
the former seemed to allow generalization and switching between tasks.  
THE STABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY OF BEHAVIOR 
The ability to select between multiple tasks and switch if necessary illustrates a challenge for 
cognitive control that I have not addressed so far: the cognitive system faces the problem of having 
to reconcile two antagonistic demands (Goschke, 2003). On the one hand, controlled action implies 
that goals must be pursued in the face of distraction. Otherwise, behavior would be solely governed 
by incidental environmental stimulation or predominant habits. Easy tasks like completing a game of 
cards would then be interrupted by any occurring event that might demand a response, for instance 
your cat begging for food. On the other hand, goals and intentions are subject to change and 
behavior must be adjusted accordingly. Such flexibility warrants that – although your goal might 
currently be to win a game of cards – you could interrupt the activity to rise and leave the table when 
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the doorbell rings. The balance between flexibility and stability is crucial to cognitive control but by 
no means constant. An influential theory proposes that affective states can modulate behavior to 
favor stability over flexibility or vice versa (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999). For instance, positive affect 
is assumed to improve cognitive flexibility, possibly through an increase in dopamine levels. Likewise, 
and in the case of this thesis more importantly, task representations affect the stability of 
performance. Findings from social psychology show that representing future goals as context 
dependent if-then plans helps achieve these goals (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999). According to this theory, 
implementation intentions link a desired outcome to a specific situational cue. As soon as the cue 
(the if-part) is encountered, the response (the then-part of the plan) is automatically activated. While 
sitting with your friends, you might remind yourself to make new ice cubes. But it is not unlikely that 
you would forget to do so the next time you entered the kitchen. Forming an implementation 
intention, for instance, if I open the fridge to get out a beer then I will also fill the ice tray with water, 
would increase the chances of actually ending up with ice cubes. Along these lines, Wieber, Von 
Suchodoletz, Heikamp, Trommsdorff, and Gollwitzer (2011) showed that school-aged children who 
used implementation intentions (e.g. “if a distraction comes up I will ignore it”) rather than simple 
goal intentions (e.g. “I will ignore distractions”) performed better under conditions of moderately or 
highly attractive distractions.  
Differences in the representation of tasks are fundamental to this thesis. Its main focus is the 
interplay of two aspects from the wide and fascinating field of cognitive control discussed here: task 
representations and shielding from distraction. As will be outlined in more detail later, the way a task 
is represented affects distractibility by irrelevant information. Especially with regard to new 
associations between stimuli and responses instructions can differ in abstractness and 
generalizability. As will be elaborated on later, the distinction between abstract task representations 
in terms of categorization rules and simple stimulus-response mappings affects the stability of 
performance. Abstract tasks can be applied to a range of different stimuli that share a relevant 
feature or enable the same operation. In contrast, stimulus-response mappings are simpler, linking a 
specific object or event to a response without necessarily allowing for transfer or generalization. 
Going back to the game of cards you are playing with your friends (remember, it is a sunny Sunday 
afternoon), you might be told that the two of Hearts trumps, the five of Hearts trumps, the seven of 
Hearts trumps and so on. Alternatively – and in this example also obviously and less inexpertly – you 
could apply the categorization rule that all Hearts trump. There is evidence that such abstract task 
rules which highlight the feature that is important for determining a response (in this case suit of 
cards), reduce the influence of irrelevant information. In contrast, exemplar-based learning of new 
mappings between stimuli and responses has no such effect. But before commencing with 
introductory findings on this topic, I will introduce the paradigm that first sparked interest in the 
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question of how the representation of tasks in terms of categorization rules might benefit 
performance: the task switching paradigm.  
TASK SWITCHING 
There are a vast number of tasks that have been used to study various aspects of cognitive 
control. According to Norman and Shallice (1986) they involve planning, decision making, trouble-
shooting, overcoming strong habitual responses, novelty, or danger and difficulty. For this thesis, one 
paradigm in particular is relevant. It was developed to study the ability to shift between different 
tasks and has been popular and fruitful for almost two decades. In the task switching paradigm, 
subjects usually switch between two or more different task sets (Rogers & Monsell, 1995), rules, 
mental sets (Jersild, 1927) or operations (Shaffer, 1965). The most typical finding is that performance 
on a task switch (i.e. the task in the current trial is different from the task in the previous trial) is 
slower and more error-prone than performance on task repetitions (i.e. performing the same task in 
two consecutive trials). Returning to the example from the beginning of the introduction, when 
having to take beverages outside to your friends you might have to prepare different kinds of drinks. 
According to findings from the task switching literature, preparing two iced coffees in a row should 
be easier than first preparing a cocktail and then turning to the iced coffee.  
The task switching paradigm has been used frequently since 1994. The results are manifold, 
as are the interpretations. Giving a detailed review would be beyond the scope of this thesis. For 
comprehensive and current reviews the reader is referred to Vandierendonck et al. (2010) and Kiesel 
et al. (2010). Here, the history of the paradigm as well as selected current results will be discussed. 
The review of current results will focus on effects that are potentially relevant to the studies 
conducted for the present thesis.  
THE HISTORY OF TASK SWITCHING 
THE PIONEER (1927) 
Most reviews on task switching cite Arthur T. Jersild’s Mental Set and Shift (1927) as the first 
work to use the task switching paradigm (Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2002; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; 
Stoet & Snyder, 2007; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 
2003; Wylie, Javitt, & Foxe, 2006). The title Mental Set and Shift was borrowed from a book by 
Hollingworth and Poffenberger (1919, cited by Jersild, 1927) who – according to Jersild – were the 
first to comment on the ineffectiveness of frequently shifting between sets. Although at the time 
research on shifting tasks was already existent, Jersild claimed to be the first to study the effects of 
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switching back and forth between elements of uncompleted tasks. Until then, shift paradigms had 
subjects switch from one already completed task to a new task and were used to study practice and 
interference or perseveration effects. Based on the reasonable assumption that frequent switching 
leads to performance costs Jersild set out to systematically study specific questions concerning these 
proposed detrimental effects: do costs occur irrespective of the nature of the tasks to be performed? 
Are these costs affected by task difficulty or practice? Is there a special ability to shift or is shifting 
performance related to general intelligence or other factors? 
Jersild presented his participants with tasks of varying difficulty and relatedness. Subjects 
received lists of targets and had to work through these lists using a single task (pure condition; task A 
only or task B only) or using alternating tasks (shift condition; e.g. ABAB). For instance, a given subject 
might have had to add 6 to every number in a first list of double-digit numbers, subtract 3 from every 
number in second list, and then alternate between adding 6 and subtracting 3 in the remaining two 
lists. This setup allowed Jersild to measure performance in a single task context and in an alternating 
task context and compare these two conditions. He took the difference in time between the pure 
condition and the shift condition. This difference was then divided by the time needed to complete 
the pure condition. That way, the loss associated with shifting was directly related to the time it took 
to perform the tasks separately. This measure was called per cent shift loss.  
Jersild varied the type and difficulty of tasks. In the first experiments, subjects had to perform 
mathematical operations on double-digit numbers. Some of these were easier than others. For 
instance, in Experiment 5 subjects had to add 1 to or subtract 1 from every number, while in 
Experiment 4 the tasks were add 17 and subtract 13. Later, Jersild used additional tasks such as 
controlled associations, color naming, form naming, and simple counting. 
His results can be summarized as follows: (a) In most experiments shifting caused costs that – 
at least for the calculation tasks – were inversely related to the difficulty of the tasks. The easier the 
task, the higher the per cent shift loss. The costs associated with shifting were measured for whole 
lists, but breaking them down by dividing them by the number of targets per list often resulted in a 
shift loss of several hundred milliseconds per item. (b) A shift loss was not always observed. If the 
targets were easily distinguishable, for instance, when subjects had to switch between calculations 
and associations (i.e. numbers and words), shifting caused a slight gain. Likewise, introducing 
external cues that directly indicated the task reduced the shift loss to only 2 %. When the stimuli in 
the shift condition were not presented in one uniform list but disambiguated by position (the targets 
of task A were presented on the left and the targets of task B on the right) the median shift loss was 
reduced to almost zero.  
Jersild’s choice of measurement and presentation would nowadays be considered 
inadequate for studying what has been termed the task switch cost (for reviews see Monsell, 2003; 
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Vandierendonck et al., 2010). He did not present the targets one by one, thus allowing for preview 
and consequently overlap in processing of the current and the following target. Moreover, reaction 
times were not measured individually for each item. Instead, the times needed to complete entire 
lists were collected. This procedure gave way to problems like the correction for errors in the two 
conditions or confounding the actual cost of a switch with factors such as remembering two tasks 
and keeping track of which one to perform (shift condition) vs. remembering only one tasks (pure 
condition). Jersild himself acknowledged that overlap and interference between tasks contributed to 
his results. In most current studies on task switching, this would be referred to as a mixed-list cost 
(e.g. Koch, Prinz, & Allport, 2005), that is, a drop in performance that is not solely caused by the 
process of shifting, but also by other factors.  
Yet, Jersild is correctly cited as one of the earliest researchers to use a task switching 
paradigm. Although it might be doubted that he was actually the first [for instance, Meiran (2009) 
suggests that it was Jones (1915, cited by Meiran, 2009)], it was Jersild’s research on which Allport, 
Styles, and Hsieh based their reintroduction of the task switching paradigm in 1994. Up until the last 
decade of the 20th century, research using the task switching paradigm was scarce to say the least. In 
this short historic review, I will focus on two studies that were conducted before 1994 (for more 
information on earlier studies see Meiran, 1996). The first study I chose, because it directly relates to 
Jersild’s results. The second study – to the best of my knowledge – was the first to measure the 
difference between discrete task repetition and task switch trials within a single mixed task block.  
SPECTOR AND BIEDERMAN (1976)  
In 1976, Spector and Biederman set out to validate Arthur Jersild’s results. For switching 
between calculation and association Jersild had found an advantage for the shift condition over the 
pure condition. Spector and Biederman intended to replicate this result and further identify the 
conditions under which shifting causes a drop in performance. However, the authors were not able 
to replicate the shift gain with Jersild’s procedure. When subjects worked through lists of numbers 
and words, alternating between subtracting 3 and naming opposites, they were a little faster in the 
mixed condition but the difference was not statistically reliable. When the same targets were 
presented on separate cards instead of sheets (thereby essentially preventing preview) no shift gain 
was found. Yet, with the card procedure some preview was still possible when subjects turned the 
next card while still giving the answer for the current card. Therefore, in a second experiment, 
Spector and Biederman used a projector to show numbers and words in completely random order. A 
voice key measured the response time on every trial and the termination of the response led to the 
presentation of the next slide. This made preview impossible and led to a small but non-significant 
shift loss. The authors concluded that it was mainly the possibility of processing the next stimulus, 
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while still responding to the current target that caused the shift gain in Jersild’s experiments. In two 
additional experiments, Spector and Biederman replicated Jersild’s finding that shift loss was greatly 
increased when the targets did not unambiguously cue the task. With only numbers as targets and 
subjects shifting between two calculation tasks a significant shift loss was found. This loss was still 
significant but greatly reduced when cues were added. These latter results are in line with Jersild’s 
findings that external cuing improves performance and attenuates the switch cost.  
In sum, Spector and Biederman replicated Jersild’s findings for the most part. In one 
experiment (Experiment 2), the procedure was improved by using a projector and measuring discrete 
reaction times rather than the time it takes to complete an entire list. Still, the exact difference 
between repetition trials and switch trials within a block of task shift was not reported.  
SHAFFER (1965) 
To the best of my knowledge, the first psychologist to study the difference between single 
task repetition and task switch trials within a mixed task block was Shaffer (1965). Like Spector and 
Biederman, Shaffer referenced Jersild and his finding that shifting between similar operations (e.g. 
calculations) resulted in costs. Shaffer used an approach that is similar to today’s task cuing 
paradigm. Tasks had to be applied in random order. The ambiguous targets were accompanied by 
cues that indicated which task had to be performed. The timing of cue and target presentation was 
varied and reaction time was measured on every trial. Targets were two horizontally arranged lights; 
two correspondingly arranged buttons served as response panel. There were two different 
mappings: a homolateral mapping, where the button corresponding to the side of the light had to be 
pressed, and a contralateral mapping, where subjects had to respond by pressing the opposite 
button. An illuminated cross located between the two lights served as cue. Two groups of subjects 
used the homolateral or contralateral mapping only, resembling Jersild’s pure condition. The other 
subjects were allocated to one of four shift groups that differed in the relative timing of the onset of 
target and cue. Shaffer found that reactions times were faster in the pure conditions, thereby 
replicating Jersild’s results of a general shift loss with ambiguous targets. In addition, he showed that 
within an alternation session, there was a main effect of task transition. Task shift trials were 
responded to more slowly than repetitions trials. This cost was found irrespective of the timing 
between cue and target.  
Shaffer’s results for the first time nicely demonstrated the difference between mixing costs 
and task switch costs. Overall, even for task repetitions in the shift condition subjects took about 
300 ms longer than for trials in the pure condition (mixing cost). In addition to this overall cost of 
shifting came an extra cost associated specifically with switching the task, or in this case, the 
stimulus-response mapping.  
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It is interesting to note that although he did not specifically report it, Shaffer's results – in 
addition to the task switch cost – show another effect that is now commonly found in task switching 
studies: In his statistical analyses Shaffer only included stimulus transitions (repetition/switch of the 
target light) and task transitions (repetition/switch of the mapping rule). He found that the two types 
of transition did not interact. However, from the data reported one can easily extract reaction times 
for response repetitions and response switches. This shows that in all shift groups, response 
transition numerically interacted with task transition. For task repetitions, there was a response 
repetition benefit, whereas on task switches, response repetitions were slower than response 
switches. Unfortunately, from the data reported by Shaffer it is not possible to deduce whether this 
interaction was statistically reliable. Yet, this is an early illustration of a noteworthy result not 
specifically connected to the switch cost, which has since been found repeatedly. It implies a strong 
connection between a task, its stimuli and responses. Repeating a response might ordinarily be 
considered advantageous to performance, yet changing the context (in this case the mapping) 
reverses the benefit and sometimes even results in costs.  
Today, the findings from the early studies on task switching discussed here are still 
investigated and debated upon. Especially the task switch cost – albeit assessed differently today – is 
a frequent source of dispute. Others focus on the effects factors such as preparation or cuing have on 
the switch cost. In addition, effects other than the switch cost, for instance Shaffer’s unmentioned 
interaction between response and task are subject to investigation. 
REDISCOVERY OF THE TASK SWITCHING PARADIGM 
The three studies reported above constitute a selective review on task switching between 
the years 1927 and 1994. In general, studies on the topic were few and infrequent at that point. 
Therefore, to choose the term rediscovery for what happened to the task switching paradigm in the 
year 1994 seems warranted. Two studies employed the paradigm in different ways and came to 
different conclusions concerning switch costs. Research on the topic started to surge and typing the 
term task switching in databases now yields more than 1.000 results. Before typical findings from a 
selection of these studies are discussed, the pioneering work of Allport et al. (1994) and Rogers and 
Monsell (1995) will be presented shortly, as it lay the groundwork for current research on task 
switching.  
THE TASK SET INERTIA ACCOUNT 
In 1994 Allport and colleagues revived the task switching paradigm. Their study was the first 
in a line of published papers that led to a surge of experiments on different aspects and different 
interpretations of switching and the associated costs. Since by the 1990s research on the task 
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switching paradigm had not been extensive, Allport et al.’s hypotheses concerning the switch cost 
were guided by assumptions rather than theory-grounded. Their initial goal was to study voluntary 
shifts of mental set as a marker of cognitive control operations. The rationale was based on theories 
of cognitive control that postulate a unitary system with limited resources. Therefore, additional 
demands on control such as increased difficulty of task or number of components to be switched 
between were expected to increase switch costs. These switch costs, in turn, should help gain more 
insight into the mechanisms of cognitive control.  
Like Spector and Biederman (1976), Allport and colleagues started by using variations of 
Jersild’s original paradigm. Reaction times for the completion of whole blocks were taken. Allport et 
al. used Stroop-like number and word stimuli. Number stimuli were identical numerals presented 
inside a rectangular frame (e.g. six times the numeral 3). They were multidimensional in that 
numerical decisions could either be based on the value of the numeral (three) or on the number of 
numerals inside the frame (six). Word stimuli were incongruent Stroop stimuli, that is, color words 
were printed in a color that did not match the word’s meaning (e.g. the word GREEN printed in red 
ink). Different switch conditions were used: Subjects switched between operations (e.g. switching 
between a parity task and a magnitude task on numeral values), between stimulus dimensions (e.g. 
performing the parity task on the value of the numeral vs. the number of numerals within a frame), 
or between both (e.g. switching from the parity task on the numeral value to the magnitude task on 
the number of numerals). When word stimuli were introduced in Experiment 3, additional switch 
conditions were possible, including switching between dominant tasks (i.e. switching between word 
reading and naming the value of the numeral) and non-dominant tasks (i.e. switching between color 
naming and naming the number of numerals). Moreover, in Experiment 5, Allport et al. discarded the 
list method and introduced discrete, experimenter-paced trials that allowed manipulation of the 
inter-trial interval (ITI). 
Starting out with the assumption that switching mental set is a characteristic of cognitive 
control, Allport and colleagues had expected to find that changing task difficulty and/or complexity 
of the switch (i.e. switching only the operation vs. additionally switching stimulus dimension) would 
result in increased switch costs. Based on theoretical models of cognitive control that emphasize 
capacity limitation and unity of the control system, factors such as number of features to be switched 
should have increased the demand for control and thus prolonged response times. Yet, to the 
authors’ surprise, many manipulations had an overall effect on reaction times but did not interact 
with the switch cost. The additional time needed to complete shift lists compared to pure lists was 
unaffected by most factors. 
These results made Allport et al. radically change their presuppositions about the connection 
between the costs associated with shifting and cognitive control. They argued that the switch cost 
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could not reflect an intentional shift of set that precedes execution of a subsequent task or trial. 
Instead, they introduced the term task set inertia (TSI) to account for the difference in results 
between switch and repeat conditions. TSI refers to the notion that it is persisting activation of the 
preceding trial or – on a more general level – a task previously associated with a stimulus that leads 
to the costs associated with switching. Allport and colleagues based their suggestion on several 
results that seemed to be at odds with the idea of intentional advance task preparation. First and 
foremost, preparation time of up to 1100 ms (Experiment 5) did not eliminate and not even reliably 
reduce the switch cost. Yet, with a predictable task sequence, introducing ITIs that were larger than 
the average switch cost should have eliminated any costs if they purely reflected a cognitively 
controlled shift operation. Moreover, Allport et al. found almost symmetrical Stroop interference for 
word reading and color naming in a shift condition. The Stroop effect (for a review see MacLeod, 
1991) is usually found to be asymmetrical, that is, interference is reliable in the non-dominant task 
(e.g. word meaning interferes during color naming) but not in the dominant task (print color does not 
interfere with reading). Thus, interference during word reading points at persisting activation of the 
color naming task. Another prominent result that the authors found hard to reconcile with an 
account of advance preparation is the asymmetrical switch cost observed for switching between 
word reading and color naming. Subjects showed large switch costs when shifting from the non-
dominant task (color naming) to the dominant task (word reading), but not vice versa. This result is 
somewhat counterintuitive. If the switch cost reflects a cognitive control mechanism responsible for 
shifting, then surely disengaging from the non-dominant task and activating the dominant task 
should be easier then the reverse condition. Consequently, this result poses a problem for an 
advance preparation account. However, with TSI, Allport and colleagues managed to find an 
explanation: the non-dominant task requires a more strongly imposed set in order to prevent 
interference from the dominant task. In turn, the dominant task might have to be inhibited for the 
same reason. As a consequence, TSI from the non-dominant task is stronger resulting in larger switch 
costs.  
It must be noted though, that although Allport et al. attributed the switch cost to retroactive 
adjustments in terms of TSI rather than to a proactive control process, they did not deny that such a 
control mechanism exists. Rather, they assumed that switch costs do not directly measure cognitive 
control, since TSI is sufficient to account for them.  
THE RECONFIGURATION VIEW 
In 1995, Rogers and Monsell disagreed. They chose a different approach to the task switching 
paradigm. Unlike Allport et al. (1994) or Spector and Biederman (1976), Rogers and Monsell (1995) 
used discrete reaction times and refrained from applying the list procedure because of its many 
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disadvantages. Instead, they introduced the alternating runs paradigm: Subjects predictably switched 
between pairs of tasks (e.g. AABBAA etc.). Additional external cues in terms of spatial location (the 
target’s position in a 2 X 2 grid) were used. Within a run of four trials, two task repetitions and two 
switches occurred. The tasks were to decide whether a numeral was odd or even (task A) or whether 
a letter was a consonant or a vowel (task B). In most trials, one numeral and one letter were 
presented side by side. This resulted in crosstalk between the tasks, because the target from the 
relevant task was accompanied by a target from the competing task. In some trials, the irrelevant 
character (i.e. the numeral in the letter task or the letter in the numeral task, respectively) was 
replaced by a neutral character (e.g. %) creating a condition without crosstalk. 
Rogers and Monsell conducted six experiments. Their results mirror many aspects of previous 
task switching studies: They found that switch trials were responded to more slowly than repeat 
trials (Spector & Biederman, 1976; Shaffer, 1965). Moreover, the cost associated with switching was 
smaller for univalent targets, that is, targets that unambiguously cued the task (Jersild, 1927; Allport 
et al., 1994). Also, preparation reduced the switch cost but did not eliminate it (Allport et al., 1994). 
However, considering all 6 experiments, Rogers and Monsell’s interpretation differed profoundly 
from Allport et al.’s TSI account. Specifically, they interpreted their results as being non-consistent 
with TSI. One of the main arguments against the idea of a purely passive carryover effect of the 
previous task is that only the first trial following a switch was slowed. After that, a considerable 
improvement occurred from the first to the second trial and no further improvement was found for 
the second and third repetition. Rogers and Monsell argued that a process like TSI should have 
persisted over more than one trial, gradually exerting less influence. Moreover, the authors found 
that preparation reduced switch cost reliably, yet only when the response-stimulus-interval (RSI) was 
varied between blocks (as opposed to within a single block). A passive process like TSI, they argued, 
should not be affected by whether the time for dissipation is varied within or between blocks. 
Therefore, they proposed that switch costs reflect the reconfiguration of the cognitive system which 
enables the implementation of the relevant task that has to be switched to.  
Overall, both Allport et al. and Rogers and Monsell found that preparation reduces the switch 
cost. Yet, they reached different conclusions regarding the interpretation of this result. Allport et al. 
found the reduction to be non-significant and took this as a point against the idea of advance 
endogenous preparation. In contrast, Rogers and Monsell found the difference in switch cost for 
short and long preparation intervals to be significant and hence indicative of a controlled, 
preparatory process. In sum, the studies by Allport and colleagues and Rogers and Monsell differ in 
many aspects including the tasks, the paradigm, time measurement and most important, the 
interpretation of the results concerning the mechanisms responsible for the switch cost. To date, 
almost 20 years of research on the task switching paradigm later, it is still debated what process 
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exactly the costs reflect. To be clear, Allport et al. did not deny that reconfiguration was necessary, 
and neither did Rogers and Monsell refute the idea of proactive interference from the previous trial 
[Monsell (1996) even acknowledges that the exogenous component they postulated might in fact 
resemble TSI]. However, the authors disagree on what is measured by the switch cost: TSI or 
reconfiguration.  
TYPICAL EFFECTS IN THE TASK SWITCHING PARADIGM 
The debate on the switch cost continues, and with it research using the task switching 
paradigm. This has led to a number of additional findings that are worth further investigation. Task 
switching has proven to be more than the study of switch costs. Some of the most prominent 
findings which are relevant with respect to Part III and Part IV of the present thesis will be presented 
below.  
THE TASK RULE CONGRUENCY EFFECT 
Task switching studies are usually designed to study flexible behavior. Yet, they also allow 
one to draw conclusions concerning the stability of task representations or intentions. Crosstalk 
effects (e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 1995) illustrate how currently inactive but still potentially relevant 
tasks affect performance. Although subjects usually successfully switch and settle for one task at a 
time, competing associations or tasks are a potential source of interference. In 1987, Sudevan and 
Taylor provided evidence that the influence of mappings from a competing task is not confined to 
switch trials. They let participants switch between two digit categorization tasks (odd/even vs. 
low/high). Responses were given manually with one of two response keys. For odd and low numbers 
the left-hand key had to be pressed. Even and high numbers were mapped to the right-hand key. This 
way, compatible and incompatible stimuli were created: Compatible stimuli were digits that were 
mapped to the same response in both tasks, whereas incompatible stimuli were mapped to different 
responses. For instance, the digit 3 is odd and low and therefore would always require a left-hand 
key press. In contrast, the digit 7 is odd and high, which would indicate the left key in the odd/even 
task but the right key in the low/high task. Sudevan and Taylor found that in the odd/even task, 
responses in compatible trials were faster than responses in incompatible trials. This effect was 
somewhat reduced by practice but only with inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs) of 1200 ms and more. 
With small ISIs, even after 20 days of practice the effect was still pronounced.  
The compatibility effect Sudevan and Taylor described in 1987 is a robust finding in task 
switching experiments. It is mostly referred to as the task rule congruency effect (TRCE). When 
subjects switch between tasks, mappings form the currently irrelevant task affect performance in the 
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relevant task such that congruent1 trials are typically responded to faster than incongruent trials. The 
TRCE might be seen as reflecting the activation of two competing rules in working memory where the 
currently irrelevant rule interferes with the execution of the relevant rule. However, it does not seem 
to be affected by concurrent working memory load (Kessler & Meiran, 2010; Kiesel, Wendt, & Peters, 
2007; Meiran & Kessler, 2008). Kiesel et al. (2007) provided evidence that loading working memory 
(WM) does not reduce the TRCE. Memorizing a list of two (low WM demand) or five (high WM 
demand) letters while switching between two digit categorization tasks (odd/even vs. low/high), had 
an effect on overall response times but did not interact with the congruency effect. That is, overall, 
subjects’ responses were slower when they had to memorize five letters but the congruency effect 
was not affected by this increase in WM load. Kiesel and colleagues reasoned that the high load 
condition should have affected the size of the TRCE if the effect was due to the active representation 
of the competing task in WM. This was clearly not the case. Kessler and Meiran (2010) extended 
these findings by showing that even loading WM with additional task rules (as opposed to the simple 
memorizing of task-unrelated letters) did not affect the TRCE. In addition to shifting between a color 
and a shape judgment task subjects either also had to perform one to three numerical tasks 
(Experiments 1 and 2) or additional visual tasks (Experiment 3). Like Kiesel et al. (2007) the authors 
found no effect of WM load on the TRCE. Therefore, Meiran and Kessler (2008) proposed that the 
TRCE results from activated codes in long term memory (LTM). The authors found a TRCE with 
existing response codes (e.g. up/down), but not with novel response categories. More specifically, 
subjects had to respond to the location of a target in a 2 X 2 grid. Arrows served as cues and 
indicated along which axis a spatial judgment had to be made. When participants switched between 
the two classical spatial tasks up vs. down and left vs. right, a robust TRCE was found. For instance, 
when up and left were mapped to the same response key a target in the upper left corner was 
responded to faster than a target in the upper right corner. However, when the display was slightly 
rotated, the well-known response codes up, down, left, and right could no longer be used. Instead, 
novel response codes had to be generated and the TRCE disappeared. This led Meiran and Kessler to 
propose that the existence of abstract response category codes in activated LTM is a prerequisite for 
                                                          
1 The match or mismatch of targets, distracters and/or responses is sometimes referred to as 
compatibility, at other times as congruence or congruency. Hommel (1997) uses the term 
congruence to describe a match/mismatch between two stimuli (stimulus-stimulus congruence; e.g. 
the STROOP effect) whereas compatibility implies that the match or mismatch is found between 
stimuli and responses (stimulus-response compatibility; e.g. the Simon effect). However, this 
terminology is not consistently applied in the studies discussed here. This usually does not pose a 
problem, since only one source of interference due to match/mismatch is present, thus making the 
meaning apparent from context. For reasons of consistency, I chose the term congruency in all 
experiments conducted for this thesis (because a separate stimulus served as distracter). However, in 
the introduction, I report the term as given by the authors of the cited study. Thus, compatibility and 
congruency/congruence are used interchangeably.  
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the TRCE. Activated LTM thereby refers to a model of working memory (Cowan, 1988; Oberauer, 
2001) that distinguishes between a capacity-limited focus of attention (FOA), and activated 
representations in LTM, which are not subject to severe capacity-limitations. In a similar vein, Mayr 
and Kliegl (2000) suggested that the TRCE arises from the retrieval of response codes from LTM 
rather than simultaneous activation of task rules in WM. When the stimulus is presented it cues the 
retrieval of the corresponding relevant and (currently) irrelevant responses. This retrieval results in 
interference if the responses do not match. Results from Yamaguchi and Proctor (2011) fit well with 
this account. These authors posit that active maintenance of the competing SR mappings is not 
necessary for the TRCE. They found that even in a condition where subjects did not randomly switch 
between tasks but performed the tasks in a blocked sequence one at a time a TRCE occurred. This is 
in line with the assumption that the interfering rules need not necessarily be kept active in WM 
(presumably, in the blocked task condition the irrelevant rules were unloaded from capacity-limited 
working memory), in order for congruency effects to occur.  
However, the degree of activity of the competing task or mappings, respectively, seems to 
have some influence on the TRCE seeing as the effect is sometimes larger on switch trials than on 
repetition trials (e.g. Koch & Allport, 2006; Meiran & Kessler, 2008) On the other hand, competing 
task sets need not have been carried out recently in order to result in congruency effects. The mere 
instruction of a task can result in a TRCE, provided that subjects expect that task to be relevant at 
some point (e.g. Liefooghe, Wenke, & De Houwer, 2012).  
INHIBITION 
The task set inertia account first proposed by Allport et al. (1994) implies that in order to 
successfully perform the current task, the competing task must be inhibited to some degree to 
overcome the persisting activation. As soon as the subject has to switch back to the previously 
suppressed task, this inhibition should contribute to the switch cost. However, comparing 
performance on switch and repeat trials makes it impossible to disentangle priming effects from 
inhibition. When subjects perform better on a task repetition than on a task switch this could be due 
to priming of the relevant task on repetition trials or impeded reactivation of the previously inhibited 
task on switch trials. Mayr and Keele (2000) introduced a paradigm that cleverly deals with this issue. 
In order to investigate the inhibition of an abandoned task rule, they compared performance on trials 
where the same task had been performed recently to performance on trials where that task had 
been performed less recently. The authors reasoned that inhibition should decay with time, so the 
more recently a task had been abandoned (and hence suppressed) the more strongly it should be 
inhibited. Subjects in Mayr and Keele’s experiments switched between three tasks A, B, and C. The 
third trial in one of two possible sequences was studied. In an ABA sequence, subjects had to switch 
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from task A to task B, and then back to task A. In contrast, in a CBA sequence, the last execution of 
task A took place longer ago. Consequently, task A was expected to be less inhibited than in an ABA 
sequence. Mayr and Keele predicted worse performance on the third trial in an ABA sequence 
compared to a CBA sequence. The results fit this prediction. The supposed inhibition of a previously 
abandoned task set was called backward inhibition. It is sometimes more descriptively referred to as 
lag-2 repetition cost. Mayr and Keele found that backward inhibition is an endogenously driven 
control process. Only when cues informed participants about the upcoming task were ABA trials 
responded to more slowly than CBA trials. With a bottom-up setting where the relevant dimension 
was directly indicated by the target and task sequence was not predicted by cues, no backward 
inhibition was found. This fits well with results from Dreisbach, Haider, and Kluwe (2002, 
Expermients 4 and 5), who used cues to indicate the probability of a task repetition or a task shift 
(e.g. 75% probability for a task shift, 25% probability for a task repetition). They found that the 
improbable task was inhibited (as indexed by slow reaction times to unexpected tasks), but only if 
subjects knew which task to activate instead (there were four possible tasks). More precisely, if 
subjects knew that a switch was probable, and also knew which task they would (probably) have to 
switch to, the preceding task was inhibited and the expected task was activated. However, if a switch 
was probable but no information was given as to which task would be switched to, no inhibition 
occurred. This latter condition resembles the stimulus-driven switching procedure studied by Mayr 
and Keele.  
The term lag-2 repetition cost implies that inhibition of the previously executed task is 
detrimental to performance. However, Hübner, Dreisbach, Haider, and Kluwe (2003) showed that 
backward inhibition can also enhance performance. They applied a task switching paradigm with 
three tasks. The setup resembled the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), that is, the target 
stimulus was always flanked by two distracters from one of the competing tasks. Hübner and 
colleagues reasoned that backward inhibition of the previous task should reduce interference by that 
task in the current trial. Distracter interference should be low if the flanker stimuli were associated 
with the just abandoned task because that task would still be inhibited. Results were as predicted: 
On switch trials, flanking stimuli from the preceding task interfered less than flanking stimuli from 
the control task. This indicates that the preceding task set was inhibited when a switch was required. 
Moreover, like Mayr and Keele (2000) and Dreisbach et al. (2002), Hübner et al. report that inhibition 
of the preceding task set was only found if informative cues were used. Without indication as to the 
identity of the upcoming task interference from flankers from the preceding task was higher than 
interference from control task flankers.  
In sum, although the matter is still disputed (see e.g. Lien, Ruthruff, & Kuhns, 2006), it seems 
probable, that a task switch is supported by the inhibition of the previously relevant task. However, 
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this backward inhibition depends on the availability information indicating the identity of the 
upcoming task.  
For the sake of completeness it must be noted that in task switching inhibition is not only 
found as a consequence of the switch per se. While Mayr and Keele (2000) as well as Hübner et al. 
(2003) studied task set inhibition resulting purely from task sequence (inhibition due to a switch of 
task), Meiran, Hsieh, and Dimov (2010) showed that a task need not be abandoned (i.e. switched 
from) in order to be inhibited. If a competing task generates response conflict in an incompatible 
trial, this task is inhibited. If the previously interfering task then becomes relevant, this inhibition 
results in response slowing. Meiran et al. termed this effect competitor rule suppression. Unlike the 
TRCE it is not assessed in a single trial but relies on response-interference in the preceding trial. 
Moreover, unlike backward inhibition, competitor rule suppression is only found if the response 
generated by the competing task is incompatible with the response of the currently relevant task. 
The idea that the strength of inhibition depends on the amount of interference caused by a task was 
also put forward by Goschke (2000). He reported that switch costs were increased following 
incongruent trials, indicating that the response conflict led to selective inhibition of the interfering 
stimulus dimension or task. 
PREPARATION EFFECTS 
Prolonging the time to prepare for an upcoming trial often reduces the switch cost (Meiran, 
1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), although it is seldom completely eliminated (for exceptions see Hunt 
& Klein, 2002; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Vandierendonck, & Demanet, 2007). Carryover accounts can 
easily explain preparation effects as well as the residual cost by assuming that activation dissipates 
with time but there is still some interference to be overcome when the target is presented (but see 
e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 1995, for preparation effects that are problematic to explain for carryover 
accounts). In contrast, residual costs are not easily explained by an active process of preparation. It is 
not easy to see why prolonging preparation time beyond the usual switch cost should not completely 
eliminate this cost. Additional assumptions have to be made in order to account for the lack of 
complete elimination of the switch cost. Some authors explain the reduction of switch cost in terms 
of an endogenous act of reconfiguration (Rogers & Monsell, 1995), for instance by loading the 
current goal into working memory (goal shifting; Rubinstein et al., 2001) or biasing the input in favor 
of currently relevant features (Meiran, 2000). The remaining residual cost is assumed to be caused by 
the inability to fully prepare for a switch endogenously. More specifically, a second component of 
task switching, for instance retrieving the relevant stimulus-response translations (rule activation; 
Rubinstein et al., 2001) or biasing the response set (Meiran, 2000) can only be completed after 
stimulus presentation. The residual costs are attributed to this additional component of task 
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switching. Others do not assume that complete preparation is impossible. For example, the failure-
to-engage hypothesis put forward by De Jong (2000; for a similar account see Lien, Ruthruff, 
Remington, & Johnston, 2005) proposes, that preparation is successful on some trials, but not on 
others. Performance on task switches reflects fully prepared switches as well as switches where 
preparation failed. The latter are the cause of the small residual cost. 
Importantly and notwithstanding the residual cost, time to prepare does have beneficial 
effects on switch trials. Of course, preparation depends on the subjects’ knowing which task to 
perform next. This prior knowledge can either be conveyed through cues (e.g. Meiran, 1996) or by 
informing subjects about task sequence, for instance by using alternating runs (e.g. Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995). Both, prolonging the RSI (with alternating runs) as well as prolonging the cue-
stimulus interval (CSI) when cues are used reduces the switch cost.  
On a side note concerning the use of cues, caution is warranted when interpreting the switch 
cost. Logan and Bundesen (2003) suggested that in the case of cued task switching the switch cost 
might not reflect an endogenous effect of preparation but rather a repetition benefit for the cue. On 
task repetitions cue and task are repeated, whereas on task switches both change. As a consequence, 
with only two cues, switch of cue and switch of task are perfectly confounded. Using four cues (two 
cues per task), Logan and Bundesen found that subjects benefited from a task repetition only when 
the cue was repeated, too. A mere task repetition that was accompanied by a cue change did not 
lead to a significantly improved performance over task switches (and consequently also cue 
switches). The authors proposed that in the case of cued task switching it is not necessary to 
postulate a shifting process. Rather, results can be explained by assuming that subjects use a 
compound cue-stimulus-response retrieval strategy. The combination of cue and target uniquely 
defines the response and makes switching unnecessary. Logan and Bundesen’s results have been 
replicated and extended (Arrington & Logan, 2004), however, some studies provide evidence that 
there might be more to switch costs than a mere switch of cue after all (e.g. Altmann, 2006; Mayr & 
Kliegl, 2003). In any case, results show that caution is necessary in the interpretation of results from 
the cued task switching paradigm. 
Although the effects of preparation are most often discussed with respect to switch trials, 
there is reason to believe that task repetitions also benefit from long preparatory intervals (e.g. 
Poljac, Haan, & van Galen, 2006). Rogers and Monsell (1995) reported that prolonging the RSI 
reduced RTs in switch and repeat trials alike. Moreover, using the cuing paradigm, Altmann (2004) 
found that only a manipulation of the CSI within subjects reduced the switch cost. Manipulating 
preparation between subjects affected both switch and repeat trials, that is, with a between subjects 
manipulation length of CSI and size of the switch cost did not interact. Apparently, the often reported 
strong effects of preparation time on switch trials are dependent upon the specific experimental 
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design. Moreover, concerning preparation, task repetitions seem to have an advantage over switch 
trials in that subjects implicitly expect them. Dreisbach et al. (2002) manipulated expectancies by 
showing cues that indicated whether a task switch or a task repetition was more probable. They 
found that RTs were slower in switch trials than in repetition trials and that probable transitions were 
answered faster than improbable transitions. However and importantly, probability and transition 
type (switch vs. repetition) did not interact. This fits well with results from a study by Sohn & Carlson 
(2000) who found that switch costs and effects of foreknowledge of a task were additive. 
Foreknowledge decreased response latencies but had no effect on the size of the switch cost per se.  
In sum, it seems that the benefits of preparation are not specific to task switches. That is not 
to say that switch-specific processes are non-existent or not affected by preparation. However, the 
reduction of switch costs with preparation cannot be fully attributed to a switch specific process that 
can be configured in advance. Moreover, when cues are used, preparation effects should be 
interpreted with care.  
RESPONSE REPETITION AND RESPONSE ALTERNATION EFFECTS 
In simple choice RT tasks responses are typically faster when the response (Bertelson, 1965) 
or the stimulus category (e.g. Campbell & Proctor, 1993; Pashler & Baylis, 1991) is repeated in two 
consecutive trials. Apparently, all other things being equal, subjects’ performance benefits from 
repetitions. However, this benefit is easily reduced or even reversed by changes in relevant or 
irrelevant stimulus features or shifts of task (e.g. Kleinsorge, 1999; Notebaert & Soetens, 2003; 
Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Rogers and Monsell (1995) reported that in all but one experiment, a task 
switch abolished and sometimes reversed the benefit of a response repetition. They offered three 
explanations for this surprising result.  
The first explanation is a learning mechanism that affects the associative strength between 
stimulus attributes and responses. Responding to an attribute increases the associative strength 
between that attribute and the response, whereas the associative strength between any other 
attribute and the response is decreased. These changes in associative strength are subject to decay 
but they affect performance on the immediately following trial: Giving the same response is 
facilitated when the relevant attribute repeats (response repetition benefit on task repetitions), but 
it is impeded when the relevant attribute is now the one for which the link to the response was 
weakened (no response repetition benefit on task switches). As an example consider subjects 
switching between a parity task and a magnitude task where odd and high are mapped to the left 
response key. Responding to an odd number in the parity task strengthens the link between odd and 
left, while at the same time the link between high and left is weakened. When the task repeats 
another odd number would benefit from this strong link, whereas with a change of task the 
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temporarily weakened link between high and left would impede performance. In the same vein, the 
theory of event coding (TEC) proposed by Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, and Prinz (2001; see also 
Hommel, 1998) suggests that co-occuring perceptual and action features (i.e. stimuli and responses) 
are bound into an event file. When the same features are repeated, this binding helps retrieve the 
correct response. In contrast, when the same response is required with another stimulus or feature, 
it first has to be unbound from the previous event file, which imposes a cost. According to TEC, the 
likelihood for a stimulus to be integrated in an event file depends on task relevance (Hommel et al., 
2001; Hommel, 2005). Task-relevance is thereby not easily defined and may include features sharing 
a dimension with the target or the responses or even simply the saliency of a given stimulus. In any 
case, this task-dependent intentional weighting keeps the likelihood for some stimuli or features to 
be included in an event file low.  
The second explanation Rogers and Monsell suggest attributes the lack of a response 
repetition benefit on task switches to a control mechanism that – in the course of a task switch – 
suppresses all active responses. That is, with a shift of task the response that was just executed is 
inhibited, such that performance on a trial that requires a response repetition suffers interference.  
The third account is very similar to this idea but it assumes a general response suppression 
mechanism rather than shift-specific inhibition. In order to prevent erroneous re-execution of the 
same response every response is inhibited after it has been executed. On a repetition trial inhibition 
of the response and the benefit of the repetition of the identical category-response mapping sum up 
to a repetition benefit. In contrast, on a task switch response suppression is not compensated for by 
a repetition of the mappings, and so performance on a response repetition trial is impeded (see also 
R. Hübner & Druey, 2006, 2008).  
The abolishment or reversal of response repetition benefits is not confined to shifts of task. 
Response repetitions can also induce costs when the response category (Campbell & Proctor, 1993; 
Kleinsorge, 1999) or even an irrelevant stimulus feature is changed (Notebaert & Soetens, 2003). In a 
serial reaction time task Notebaert and Soetens (2003) let participants react to the color of a target 
stimulus, while spatial location (Experiment 1) or the target’s shape (Experiment 2) served as 
irrelevant stimulus information. They found a response alternation effect in both experiments. A 
switch of the irrelevant feature was accompanied by an advantage for response alternations. 
However, in Experiment 2 this effect was confined to error rates. The authors explained the response 
alternation affect by assuming that a change in an irrelevant feature triggers a response switch. They 
argued that spatial location is a more salient feature than shape and a switch thus should affect the 
bias to alternate the response more strongly. 
For response alternation effects the overlap between trials need not necessarily be physical, 
such as in the study just described. There is also evidence for interactions between an internally 
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represented dimension and the response. Kleinsorge (1999, Experiments 1 and 2) let participants 
react to symbols and letters. There were no rules to be switched between, just single stimulus-
response mappings (e.g. diamond  right-hand key; H  left-hand key). A category switch (a letter 
following a symbol or vice versa) was accompanied by a response repetition cost that was especially 
pronounced in error rates (see also Rogers and Monsell, 1995). Kleinsorge concluded that a switch in 
any dimension that is part of participants’ task representation negatively affects the response 
repetition benefit and can turn it into costs.  
Interestingly, what is part of participants’ task representation and what is not is not easily 
predictable. As will be outlined in the next section the specific task representation seems to be 
crucial. Depending on the instruction subjects are affected differently by irrelevant features. If the 
instruction enables a categorical task representation, features deemed irrelevant by this instruction 
do not interact with the response. In contrast, when the instructions are given in terms of separate 
stimulus-response mappings without highlighting specific relevant features, the entire stimulus 
seems to become part of the task-representation such that response alternation effects are observed 
even for irrelevant features.  
TASK SWITCHING: A SUMMARY 
The controversy started by Allport et al. and Rogers and Monsell, whether switch costs 
measure proactive control or priming processes is still not solved. Most researchers would agree that 
the switch cost has more than one cause, very probably including carryover effects from previous 
trials, stimulus-specific priming, and the advance setting of parameters. However, the weight of the 
contribution of these factors in the eventually observed cost is still debated upon.  
Likewise, other task switching phenomena, like the effects of preparation, the TRCE, or 
response alternation effects are still not unequivocally explained, nor even consistently found. The 
present thesis is not aimed at contributing to solving these controversies. However, the questions 
that spurred research on the current issue are grounded in the literature on task switching. It 
provides the background to the research that motivated this thesis, as will be outlined below. 
THE SHIELDING FUNCTION OF TASK SETS 
A question that inevitably emerges when one uses the task switching paradigm is why 
something as adaptive as using a task results in costs. This question goes beyond merely asking what 
causes the switch cost. Irrespective of whether it is the consequence of persisting task activation or 
reconfiguration, it seems odd that there is such a robust negative side effect of adopting more than 
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one task set. After all, in everyday life not switching between tasks is the exception. Think of the last 
time you dedicated your time to one task only, without interruption, for a long period of time. If 
something comes to mind, I congratulate you: You might have found the exception that proves the 
rule. It is more common to frequently disrupt or change activities, for example for basic urges like 
hunger, or for environmental stimulation like a ringing telephone. Why then does switching come at 
a (very robust) cost? Looking back at the phenomenon of backward inhibition, one might infer that 
the cost is only one side of the coin. Remember that backward inhibition results in slowed 
responding in an ABA sequence compared to a CBA sequence due to persisting inhibition of task A. 
On the other hand, as shown by M. Hübner et al. (2003), backward inhibition has the positive effect 
of reduced interference by distracters from task A. Along the same line, one might conclude that the 
cost induced by switching tasks is merely a negative side effect of an otherwise advantageous 
strategy. Do task representations in terms of rules (as expected in task switching studies) offer some 
sort of benefit in spite of the switch cost? In order to assess the consequences of using and switching 
between rules, one must compare the use of task sets to alternative strategies. Only then can the 
advantages and disadvantages of rules be understood. For instance, might these representations be 
particularly stable (which usually a desirable state) and thereby possibly contribute to the switch cost 
when they have to be abandoned? 
TASK SETS VS. STIMULUS-RESPONSE-MAPPINGS 
Task switching studies are seldom equipped to answer question concerning such positive 
effects of task sets. For many years switch costs have been studied without looking into the task 
representations that enable them in the first place. In task switching studies it is assumed that 
subjects adopt two or more task sets/rules that are represented separately and consequently 
switched between. Yet, there are alternative approaches. In most experiments the number of 
potential target stimuli and responses is small, introducing the possibility of applying single stimulus-
response mappings (SR mappings) instead of two alternating rules. For instance, if the tasks were to 
decide whether a number was odd or even and whether a letter was a consonant or a vowel, the 
targets might be 1, 2, 8, and 9 and A, B, O, and P respectively. In task switching, it is assumed that 
subjects comply with the instruction and use the rules, meaning the letter A would be identified as 
indicating the consonant/vowel task, and would then be categorized as a vowel, which in turn would 
lead to the activation of the appropriate response, for instance pressing the left response key. 
However, with such a small number of target stimuli subjects might just as well adopt a different 
strategy, namely learning eight separate SR mappings (see Figure 1). This would result in skipping the 
categorization process and directly associating the letter A with the left response key. The 
assumption that subjects switch between tasks is usually right (but see Logan & Bundesen, 2003, 
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2004), since switch costs are a robust phenomenon. But the question remains why subjects do not 
resort to the SR strategy and what would change in their performance if they did. In sum, the critical 
distinction here is between learning associations between stimuli and responses by heart, and 
learning a rule which provides information about the relevant response feature (as is assumed in 
most task switching studies). Returning to the example from the beginning, your friends might need 
a refill on their drinks. Suppose all women are having white wine, whereas all men are drinking beer 
(admittedly, this is example plays on stereotypes). This would correspond to a categorization 
process: you categorize your friend as male/female and then serve the appropriate drink. 
Alternatively, you could memorize a number of separate associations between names and preferred 
drinks (e.g. Alex  beer, Susi  wine, Peter  beer etc.), without noticing that gender is the 
important factor.  
 
 
Figure 1. Examples for task representations in terms of single mappings (SR mappings) or two task 
rules (adapted from Dreisbach, 2012). The SR representation consists of eight stimulus-response 
mappings, whereas the task rule representation offers four category-response mappings. (L = left 
response key, R = right response key). 
Of course there are obvious reasons, why – outside the context of experimental paradigms – 
abstract rules are preferable over arbitrary SR mappings. Jersild stated „that a mental set makes for 
economy of effort, that it serves to induce relevant, and exclude irrelevant reactions[…].” (Jersild, 
1927, p. 49). A rule can be applied to a large number of stimuli, whereas memorizing single SR 
mappings would soon overcharge working memory capacity. Put differently, a rule highlights a 
relevant feature and can therefore easily be transferred to new stimuli and different contexts. An SR 
strategy would require every new stimulus to be memorized and would thus be the more effortful 
way of learning.  
Yet, although rules most certainly offer an advantage over SR learning in real life situations, 
apparently they do not do so in the task switching paradigm. Consider a child reaching for a green 
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cherry on a tree. A parent might tell the child that this specific cherry will not taste good because it is 
not ripe (SR) or it might say that most green fruit are not ripe and therefore not edible (TS). In this 
case, there is a probability that the child will encounter other green fruit and then make use of the 
rule. Hence, the rule is preferable over the SR approach. On the other hand, in an experimental 
context there is mostly no need to be prepared for transfer. The targets are known and a strategy 
can be chosen accordingly. So the question remains: why do subjects opt for rule use? What are the 
differences in performance with these two kinds of representations? For instance, one would not 
expect switch costs for the SR approach. There are no rules to be switched between so switch costs 
should disappear. Are subjects in task switching studies using rules because they are merely strictly 
following instructions? Can rules – once they are learned – not be un-learned? Or is there an 
advantage of rule use that might be concealed by the setup of task switching studies?  
In 2007, Dreisbach et al. addressed these questions and for the first time directly compared 
groups of subjects that used either task rules or SR mappings. The study’s main concern was whether 
rules would be applied if the experimental setup implicitly invited subjects to use an SR strategy 
instead. In addition, it addressed the question whether subjects would prefer rule use even if they 
had already learned the underlying SR mappings by heart. The author’s approach was simple: Targets 
were four green and four red words. Each target word was uniquely associated with one of two 
response keys. This allowed the use of eight separate SR mappings for the task. Alternatively, the 
words could be associated with the responses according to two rules: If the target was printed in red, 
words starting with a consonant afforded a left key press and words starting with a vowel afforded a 
right key press. If the word was printed in green, animals were associated with the left key and non-
animals with the right key (see Table 1).  
Table 1. Stimuli and tasks used in Experiment 1 of the study by Dreisbach et al. (2007). Words were 
introduced stepwise, two per block (adapted from Dreisbach et al., 2007).Translations are added in 
parentheses in the last column.  
Task Response Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Blocks 4-6 
consonant/vowel 
Left 
Bett 
- 
Bett 
- 
Bett 
Sieb 
Bett (bed) 
Sieb (colander) 
Right 
- 
- 
Arm 
- 
Arm 
- 
Arm (arm) 
Eis (ice) 
animal/no animal 
Left 
- 
- 
Rabe 
- 
Rabe 
- 
Rabe (raven) 
Igel (hedgehog) 
Right 
Haus 
- 
Haus 
- 
Haus 
Uhr 
Haus (house) 
Uhr (clock) 
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One group of subjects was informed about the rules from the beginning (early information 
condition). A second group started by learning the SR mappings and practiced these for four blocks. 
After block 4, they were informed about the underlying rules (late information condition). This 
information was given casually without explicitly asking the subjects to start using the rules. After 
this, the subjects completed the two last blocks. A third group of subjects was never told about the 
rules but used the separate mappings throughout the experiment (uninformed condition). Overall, all 
subjects responded to the same targets with the same mappings but they represented the tasks 
differently (rules vs. individual SR mappings). In order to suggest the use of SR mappings even to the 
subjects informed about the rules the words were introduced stepwise, two at a time. This slow 
introduction of words was chosen to maximally encourage participants to learn separate mappings 
instead of applying the rules, without explicitly telling them to do so.  
Dreisbach et al. (2007) studied the effects of information condition (early information, late 
information, uninformed) and block (1-6) on switch costs. Switch trials were defined as trials in which 
the color of the target changed. In the early information condition this color switch indicated a task 
switch, whereas to subjects using SR mappings the color should convey no information. If subjects in 
the early information condition used the rules despite the possibility to learn SR mappings instead, 
switch costs would be expected. For subjects using SR mappings no switching and hence no costs 
should occur.  
The results were straightforward and left little doubt that rules are applied once they are 
known. First, subjects in the early information condition showed switch costs, indicating that they 
alternated between the instructed rules instead of basing their responses on eight individual 
mappings. Second, this was done although it was clearly possible to learn the mappings by heart, as 
indexed by the successful performance of the uninformed group. In fact, in Experiment 1 subjects in 
the late information and uninformed conditions were significantly faster than subjects in the early 
information condition. Experiment 2 revealed that this advantage disappeared when long target 
words (four syllables) were used. The use of short words might have made the experiment simple 
enough to give an advantage to the SR strategy over the more complex switching strategy. The third 
result concerns the late information condition. Here, subjects had already practiced the SR mappings 
and successfully applied them in four blocks. Only after block 4 did they receive information about 
the rules. Interestingly, they showed significant switch costs in block 5 which disappeared again in 
block 6. This was taken as evidence that, although subjects had previously successfully based their 
performance on SR mappings and were not specifically instructed to start using the rules, they still 
did. This can be inferred from the switch cost, since subjectively when questioned after the 
experiment subjects in the late information condition reported not having used the rules about 
which they had been informed casually.  
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The findings from this study show that using rules seems preferable over applying separate 
mappings even if subjects are implicitly invited to adopt a different strategy. The authors themselves 
give some explanations as to why this might be the case in the specific experimental setup. For 
instance, subjects in the early information condition did not know how many stimuli to expect, which 
might have prompted them to continue using the rules in case memorizing individual mappings 
would become too much with increasing set size. From this perspective, rule use might underlie 
intentional control, that is, participants in the informative condition used the rule because they were 
hoping to benefit from it but they could also have intentionally refrained from doing so. In contrast, 
participants in the late information and uninformed conditions had no choice but to learn every 
mapping separately. An alternative explanation refers to episodic retrieval of rules. When a stimulus 
is first presented and a rule is applied to it this information is stored in episodic memory. As soon as 
the stimulus is presented again this first encounter, including the rule, is automatically retrieved 
(Allport & Wylie, 2000; Waszak et al., 2003). Therefore, once a target has become connected to a 
task rule (by instruction, practice, or chance) the rule is used, not because of the subject’s intention 
or strategy but because of automatic retrieval.  
In any case, performance of subjects using task rules differed from performance of subjects 
basing their responses on SR mappings. Only the former showed switch costs. The latter performed 
well without being affected by color switches or repetitions. Despite their (in this case) apparent 
disadvantage, subjects who knew the rules applied them. This indicates that the assumption that 
subjects actually switch between rules in task switching studies is right. So the question remains: why 
are rules preferred? This preference would only seem adaptive if it came with a benefit.  
DEFINITIONS 
Before commencing with studies on the shielding function of task sets and the supposed 
benefit of rule use, I would like to insert some general comments on the definition of task set and the 
terminology used in this thesis. One of the core assumptions of the task switching paradigm is that 
subjects apply two or more tasks. Yet, the terms task or task set evade a straightforward definition. 
Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, and Verbruggen (2010) argue that the definition of task set ideally 
includes all parameters that have been shown to affect performance in task switching. They propose 
that based on empirical evidence, these parameters are “[…] stimulus-category rules, category-
response rules, orientation of attention (attentional bias), response threshold, and response 
modality” (Vandierendonck et al., 2010; p. 612). Of course, future research might unveil additional 
parameters. Likewise, not all listed parameters are of equal importance in all tasks. For instance, few 
task switching studies require subjects to shift response modalities (e.g. switch between oral and 
manual responses). One might say that, in sum, a task set provides a subject with all the information 
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necessary to successfully perform a given task. However, instructions may vary concerning specificity 
or generalizability. With respect to the present thesis, the distinction between tasks that include 
categorization rules and tasks based on separate SR mappings (Dreisbach et al., 2007) is crucial. 
According to some definitions, both would constitute a task set. On the other hand, Mayr and Keele 
(2000, p.5) state that “The critical feature that distinguishes task sets from representations of simple 
actions and, thus, that makes them representative of ‘high-level constraints on action selection’ is 
their abstractness. That is, they contain specifications that are relevant for all possible realizations of 
a particular task (e.g., ‘attend to color’) instead of information that would be critical for the 
implementation of simple actions (e.g., ‘red’).” Most task switching studies use rules that fit this 
definition. Subjects are commonly instructed to categorize stimuli according to different rules (e.g. 
consonant/vowel, odd/even etc.), rather than use a number of single mappings. However, there are 
exceptions (e.g. Waszak, Wenke, & Brass, 2008). 
 In their first studies, Dreisbach and colleagues refer to the shielding function of task sets. 
Still, this – theoretically – might include the application of SR mappings according to some 
definitions. Yet, as will be outlined below, the shielding function is a consequence of using 
categorization rules rather than arbitrary mappings. Therefore in this thesis, the term task set is used 
to describe task representations in terms of (mostly binary) categorization rules. Alternatively, these 
will also be referred to as task rules, categorization rules, or simply rules. Separate, arbitrary 
mappings will be referred to as stimulus-response (SR) mappings. These establish an association 
between a specific stimulus and a response, without an intervening process of categorization. 
Although these mappings also constitute a task, the term task set as used in this thesis will not 
include them. In reference to Dreisbach and Haider (2009) conditions in which subjects are instructed 
to use categorization rule will be referred to as task set (TS) condition or TS group. Subjects 
instructed to use separate mappings will be referred to as being part of the SR condition or SR group. 
FIRST FINDINGS ON THE SHIELDING FUNCTION 
The results from Dreisbach et al. (2007) show that rules are – at least to some degree – 
preferred over arbitrary mappings. However, this was assessed via costs that were caused by the 
application of rules. Participants who had completed the task using rules were slower on color switch 
trials (i.e. task switches) than on color repetition trials (i.e. task repetitions). Put differently, 
participants apparently opted for rule use although it was the less effective and sometimes even the 
slower approach. Dreisbach and colleagues reasoned that comparing an SR strategy with a switching 
strategy might not be suited to uncover potential benefits offered by task rules. Apparently, 
switching back and forth induces a cost but the use of a single rule might lead to superior 
performance over both switching and applying SR mappings. Based on unpublished results from a 
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previous study, Dreisbach and Haider (2008) already had specific expectations regarding the nature 
of the advantage of using a single rule. They suggested that the implementation of a task rule helps 
shield from irrelevant information. That is, the performance of subjects who apply a stable 
categorization rule rather than arbitrary mappings should not be affected by irrelevant stimulus 
features. This was the first time the shielding function of task sets was proposed. The authors directly 
compared the use of one vs. two rules with performance based on SR mappings. The experimental 
setup was similar to that used by Dreisbach et al. (2007) but the late information condition was 
replaced by a group of subjects applying only one rule. Thus, again, three groups of subjects 
responded to the same targets with the same response keys. Like in the previous study they differed 
in the way the task was represented: One group switched between two rules (2TS), one group 
applied only one rule (1TS), and the third group based their performance on separate SR mappings 
(SR). The stimuli and mappings that were used are displayed in Table 2.  
Table 2. Stimuli and tasks used in Experiment 1 of the study by Dreisbach and Haider (2008; adapted 
from Dreisbach & Haider, 2008).Translations are added in parentheses. 
   2 Task Sets 
   Animal No animal Consonant Vowel    
          
1
 T
as
k 
Se
t 
Moving  
Laus 
(louse) 
Iltis 
(polecat) 
 
Bein 
(leg) 
Pendel 
(pendulum) 
  Left 
R
e
sp
o
n
se
 ke
y Non-moving   
Sofa 
(sofa) 
Ulm 
(Ulm) 
 
Anker 
(anchor) 
Eis 
(ice) 
 Right 
 
Dreisbach and Haider looked into sequential interactions between the color of the target 
stimulus and the response. In the 2TS condition the color was relevant insofar as it was the cue that 
indicated which task to perform. A color switch indicated a task switch, whereas if the color 
repeated, so did the task. In contrast, in the 1TS and the SR conditions stimulus color was an 
irrelevant feature that conveyed no information. Dreisbach and Haider expected to find an 
interaction between color and response in the 2TS and SR condition. In contrast, the irrelevant 
feature should not affect performance in the 1TS condition due to the shielding quality of the task 
set.  
The results were as predicted. For subjects in the 2TS and SR conditions, there was a 
response repetition benefit on color repetitions, whereas on color switch trials response repetitions 
resulted in a cost. Subjects in the 1TS group showed a small overall response repetition benefit but 
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this was not affected by color changes. This was attributed to the proposed shielding function of task 
sets. Information without relevance to the task was supposedly shielded against. Dreisbach and 
Haider proposed that in a switching context this shielding function might even contribute to the 
switch cost because on a switch the previously irrelevant but now relevant information is still 
shielded from to some degree. Although there were alternative explanations to the results, 
attributing the lack of an influence of target color to rule use was the most plausible.  
The study by Dreisbach and Haider (2008) for the first time directly showed that applying 
task rules does not only result in the costs that are usually the subject of task switching experiments. 
Rather, using a rule might be beneficial whenever there is the possibility of distraction. Rules help 
shield against irrelevant information. Irrelevant, in this case, refers to any stimulus or stimulus 
attribute that does not provide task-related information. Yet, claiming that shielding is such a global 
function seemed somewhat premature. After all, evidence for the shielding function was very 
specific: a lack of binding effects between an irrelevant stimulus dimension and the response. In a 
follow-up study, Dreisbach and Haider (2009) therefore introduced a different kind of distraction to 
assess the shielding function of task sets. Instead of looking into binding effects they now used 
spatial compatibility effects caused by distracters in a word-picture Stroop-like paradigm. Subjects 
had to respond to eight target words by either using a rule (TS group) or separate SR mappings (SR 
group). So, again, the critical manipulation was the instruction condition. Target words were articles 
of clothing. The rule was to decide whether the object covered part of the leg or not. This 
categorization rule was helpful yet arbitrary enough to prevent participants in the SR group from 
guessing it.  
 
  
 
  
Compatible Incompatible  Compatible Incompatible 
Related distracters  Unrelated distracters 
Figure 2. Compound stimuli used by Dreisbach and Haider (2009). Semantically related distracters are 
line drawings of objects that also serve as targets (words). Unrelated distracters are spatially oriented 
animals. In this example, the word “Bluse” (blouse) was associated with the right response key, and 
the word “Stiefel” (boot) was associated with the left response key (adapted from Dreisbach & 
Haider, 2009).  
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This time, all words were presented in black color but superimposed on distracter pictures. 
Half of the pictures were semantically related to the words in that they were line drawings that 
depicted the objects from the target set (related distracters). The other distracters were line 
drawings of animals looking to the left or to the right (unrelated distracters). Both types of distracters 
could be compatible or incompatible. For the semantically related pictures compatibility resulted 
from the mappings given in the instruction. If target and distracter were mapped to the same 
response the compound stimulus was compatible. If they were mapped to different responses the 
stimulus was incompatible. Unrelated distracters were compatible if their spatial orientation 
matched the response, and they were incompatible if the spatial orientation did not match the target 
response. For instance, if clothes that cover parts of the leg were associated with the right response 
key, the word ‘Bluse’ (blouse) superimposed on the picture of a sweater would be compatible, while 
the same word superimposed on the picture of a boot would be incompatible. Likewise, an animal 
looking to the right would be compatible with blouse, whereas an animal looking to the left would be 
incompatible (see Figure 2)  
Spatial compatibility effects are most typically found when target- and response-features 
overlap (Simon-effect; e.g. Simon & Rudell, 1967). For instance, if subjects use a left or right response 
key to respond to a non-spatial feature of a target (e.g. color), presenting the target to the left or the 
right of fixation results in compatibility effects. Responses are faster when the localizations of target 
and response match than when they mismatch, although target location is irrelevant to the task. This 
effect is not only found if the target is actually spatially located. Spatial information can also be 
conveyed via arrows (Pellicano, Lugli, Baroni, & Nicoletti, 2009) or gaze direction (e.g. Ansorge, 
2003). Adapting the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) for children, Rueda et al. (2004) 
found that even spatially oriented drawings of animals can successfully interfere. In flanker tasks, a 
centrally presented target is flanked by two identical stimuli which are either response-congruent or 
incongruent with the target. Responses are slower when target and flankers are mapped to the same 
response than when they are not. Using colored line drawings of fish looking to the left or to the 
right, Rueda et al. (2004) found a significant flanker effect. This prompted the idea of Dreisbach and 
Haider (2009) to use spatially oriented animals as distracters.  
The results from this second study on the shielding function were remarkably clear. 
Instruction condition (SR vs. TS), Compatibility, and Distracter relatedness (related vs. unrelated) 
interacted significantly. Line drawings that were semantically related to the targets interfered in both 
groups. Subjects were faster and made fewer errors when target and distracter were mapped to the 
same response. In addition, line drawings of spatially oriented animals interfered in the SR condition: 
Subjects using SR mappings were affected by whether response location and the spatial orientation 
of the distracter matched or mismatched. In contrast, there was no compatibility effect for spatial 
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distracters in the TS condition. The general pattern of these results is displayed in Figure 3. It is 
typical for task shielding: the SR group is affected by all types of distracters, whereas in the TS group, 
only distracters with task-related features interfere.  
In a second Experiment, Dreisbach and Haider (2009) found that it is not the instruction per 
se, but rather the eventual task representation that results in shielding. In Experiment 2 all subjects 
received SR instructions. In contrast to Experiment 1, words were not introduced stepwise but all at 
once. That way some participants were expected to form their own task rule. In a post-experimental 
questionnaire subjects were asked how they had memorized the mappings. Based on their answers 
the between-subjects factor task representation was determined post hoc. Subjects who had created 
their own rule were now part of group TS, whereas subjects who reported having used the separate 
mappings constituted the SR group. With this procedure, the same general pattern of interference as 
in Experiment 1 was found. In the SR group compatibility effects were significant for all distracters, 
whereas in the TS group only semantically related distracters interfered. This was taken as evidence 
that the shielding function is not a consequence of task instruction but of how subjects eventually 
represent the task.  
 
 
Figure 3. Typical pattern of interference results displaying the shielding function of task sets (adapted 
from Dreisbach & Haider, 2009).Related distracters are semantically congruent/incongruent with the 
target. Unrelated distracters are spatially oriented and thus match/mismatch the response. 
Interestingly, in the SR group the susceptibility to interference by spatial distracters 
disappeared when subjects practiced the mappings without distracting pictures. Dreisbach and 
Haider (2009; Experiment 3) found no compatibility effect for the SR group when no line drawings 
were shown during the introduction of the target words and in a first practice block. This might imply 
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that it is indeed the reduction of information to relevant attributes that makes shielding possible. In 
her review on the shielding function of task sets Dreisbach (2012) emphasizes that task rules define 
the features of a target that are important with respect to the response. One could assume that 
practicing SR mappings without distracters also highlights the important features. When distracters 
are introduced later they can more easily be discarded as irrelevant. 
In the experiments reported so far there is a factor confounded with rule use. Remember 
that subjects in the TS group had to memorize only two category-response mappings, whereas 
subjects in the SR group learned eight separate mappings by heart. Lavie, Hirst, De Fockert, and 
Viding (2004) proposed that perceptual load should decrease the impact of distracting information, 
whereas high WM load should lead to increased susceptibility to distracters. Perceptual load was 
identical in both groups since the targets did not differ. However, working memory load was 
supposedly higher in the SR group. This could account for the difference in interference: load was 
higher in the SR group, which therefore was more susceptible to interference. However, Dreisbach 
and Haider state that with low WM load, the TS group should have shown attenuated interference 
for all distracters. Yet, only interference from spatial distracters was absent.  
For the sake of completeness it must be noted that shielding does not prevent interference 
from spatial information in general. The Simon effect is actually increased in subjects using a 
categorization rule (Metzker & Dreisbach, 2009, 2011). That is, if the spatial information is not 
conveyed via separate distracters (like line drawings of animals) but is inherent in the target (i.e. the 
target is presented at different spatial locations) congruency effects are larger for the TS group than 
for the SR group. Metzker and Dreisbach explained this effect by proposing a third processing route 
for the Simon effect (see also General Discussion). This route causes the location of the target to 
prime the response category associated with that location. More precisely, if subjects are instructed 
to respond to odd numbers by pressing the left response key, then odd numbers activate the 
response left (controlled route) while at the same time, left activates the response category odd 
(third route). That is, if an odd target is presented on the left hand side of the screen, the stimulus 
category is primed by the position. On the other hand, if it were an even number, the competing 
stimulus category would be primed by the position, which in turn would negatively affect 
performance. The effect of this third route on response times supposedly is particularly prominent 
for the TS group because there are only two response categories. Consequently, each location only 
(and hence strongly) primes one category. In contrast, with an SR approach each location is 
associated with four different stimuli rather than one category, resulting in comparatively little 
priming and hence less influence on the overall Simon effect.  
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RELAXATION OF THE SHIELDING FUNCTION 
So far, results showed that task representations in terms of binary categorization rules help 
shield against irrelevant information. This shielding function of task sets was found by comparing 
performance of subjects in a single task condition to that of subjects using arbitrary mappings. 
Dreisbach and colleagues had abandoned the switching paradigm, in order to find evidence for the 
beneficial effects of rule use. With this knowledge, in 2011, Dreisbach and Wenke returned to the 
switching paradigm. The authors for the first time specifically studied the shielding function in a 
switching context.  
Previously, it had already been suggested that the shielding function might contribute to 
switch costs (Dreisbach & Haider, 2009). The fact that the preceding task is still active to some 
degree on a task switch, whereas previously ignored information becomes relevant could contribute 
to the cost associated with switching. So, in order to minimize detrimental effects on task 
performance shielding should be relaxed on task switches. Otherwise, subjects might tend to 
persevere and performance would become rigid. This is in line with the assumption that the cognitive 
system must find a balance between stability and flexibility of behavior (e.g. Goschke, 2003). The 
shielding function contributes to stable task performance but shielding would impede flexibility if it 
was not adjustable to changing requirements. In sum, shielding should be adaptive on task 
repetitions. However, as soon as task demands change (e.g. on a switch trial) shielding should be 
relaxed. This assumption was tested by Dreisbach and Wenke (2011). The lack of binding effects 
found in a previous study (Dreisbach & Haider, 2008) was taken as an indication of intact shielding. 
On the other hand, relaxed shielding was expected to result in the usually observed binding effects 
between the response and an irrelevant target feature. Subjects had to switch between two 
categorization tasks: They had to classify digits as odd or even, and letters as being a consonant or a 
vowel. The stimulus itself indicated the task so that no further cues were needed. Targets were 
presented with two different irrelevant surface features (Experiment 1: color; Experiment 2: font). 
This feature varied randomly from trial to trial. 2 (task: repetition vs. switch) X 2 (response: repetition 
vs. switch) X 2 (irrelevant feature: repetition vs. switch) analyses of variance revealed that indeed, on 
task repetitions the interaction between response and feature was non-significant. Thus, results from 
the study by Dreisbach and Haider (2008) were replicated. With shielding being intact irrelevant 
feature changes did not affect performance. In contrast, on task switches response and color 
(Experiment 1) or font (Experiment 2) interacted. The response switch benefit that is usually 
observed on task switches (e.g. Hübner & Druey, 2006; Kleinsorge, 1999; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) 
was present for feature repetitions but not for switches. In sum, the irrelevant color or font of the 
target affected performance on task switches but not on task repetitions. The authors interpreted 
this result in terms of intact shielding on task repetitions, and a relaxation of the shielding function 
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on task switches. For this interpretation the exact nature of the interaction on task switches is 
extraneous. Only the fact that the irrelevant feature affected response repetitions and switches 
differentially is important with respect to the proposed relaxation of shielding. Still, Dreisbach and 
Wenke offered an explanation for their results: A learning mechanism was most suited to account for 
the specific findings on switch trials. According to this account, responding to a target strengthens 
the association between the given stimulus category and the response at the cost of the competing 
category associated with that response. On task repetitions, a response repetition results in a benefit 
because the now strongly associated category and response are repeated. In contrast, on a task 
switch, a response repetition would result from the presentation of a target from the weakly 
associated category. This would result in the observed cost (or lack of benefit) for task repetitions. As 
for the irrelevant feature: a repetition of the feature would not interrupt and might even increase 
this effect. However, a feature change – although irrelevant – might loosen the strong association 
between the previous category and response, thereby eliminating or even reversing response 
repetition costs on task switches (Spapé & Hommel, 2008).  
SCOPE OF THE PRESENT WORK 
The results of the four studies on the benefits of rule use can be summarized as follows:  
 Subjects prefer the use of categorization rules over learning separate SR mappings. Even if 
separate mappings have already been practiced or are implicitly suggested by the 
experimental setup, rules are applied when they are known. This preference is indexed by 
the presence of switch costs (Dreisbach et al., 2007).  
 Comparing performance of subjects using a single rule with that of subjects using separate 
SR mappings reveals a potential benefit of rule use. Subjects using an SR strategy show 
binding effects between an irrelevant stimulus feature and the response. This binding 
effect is not found in the TS group. Apparently, task rules help shield against this irrelevant 
information (Dreisbach & Haider, 2008). 
 The shielding function is not restricted to binding effects but is also found with irrelevant 
spatial distracters. When target words are superimposed on pictures of spatially oriented 
animals a compatibility effect is found for subjects using SR mappings but not for subjects 
using a categorization rule (Dreisbach & Haider, 2009). 
 Shielding is only adaptive on task repetitions. As soon as task demands change, for 
instance on a task switch, the shielding function is relaxed. This relaxation is evidenced by 
binding effects on task switches (Dreisbach & Wenke, 2011). It prevents perseveration but 
at the same time might increase distractibility on task switches.  
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In sum, the shielding function seems to be a global control function that results from 
representing a task as a binary categorization rule. It is global in the sense that – as long as the task 
does not change – it does not vary from trial to trial, and applies to more than one kind of distraction 
unrelated to the task. It must be noted that the shielding function need not necessarily be an 
independent mechanism. It might be a simple byproduct of task representation. In any case, the 
robust effects of task representation on distractibility are worth a closer look. Although shielding has 
now repeatedly been found it is still not clear what processes underlie the function. In early studies, 
Dreisbach and colleague proposed that it might be attentional bias (Dreisbach & Haider, 2008, 2009). 
Yet, more recent results suggest that the distracting information is processed but might be prevented 
from entering the response system (Dreisbach & Wenke, 2011). The aim of the present thesis was to 
further investigate the shielding function of task sets and shed some light on its causes and effects.  
The first set of studies addressed the question, whether shielding is found with distracters 
that are related to the instruction. Dreisbach and Haider showed that completely irrelevant 
information such as spatially oriented animals or target color was shielded against, whereas related 
information interfered. However, related distracters were a very specific type of task-related in that 
they were pictorial equivalents of target words and as such part of the instruction. Therefore, 
interference might have arisen for more than one possible reason, such as retrieval of event files 
(Hommel et al., 2001) or an instruction-induced bias. Yet, from an economical point of view it is 
reasonable to assume that any information with task-related features would not be shielded against. 
If shielding is a result of categorical task representation it seems likely that information matching the 
relevant categories would be processed because it most probably is relevant. In contrast, information 
not pertaining to those categories should be shielded against. This hypothesis was tested in a first set 
of studies in a setup similar to that of Dreisbach and Haider (2009). I expected distracter pictures that 
were related to the task (i.e. could be categorized according to the rule) to interfere even if they 
were not pictorial equivalents of the distracter words. Interference from such task-related distracters 
implies that the shielding function is supported by preferred processing of task-related material 
rather than distracter inhibition. This implication was tested more directly in the second set of 
studies.  
In Part III of the present thesis the shielding function was studied in a switching context. 
Dreisbach and Wenke (2011) already showed that shielding is reduced on a task switch. This 
reduction was now used to further assess whether shielding is an inhibitory function or whether it 
relies on preferred processing of task-related information. Subjects switched between two word 
categorization tasks meanwhile ignoring distracting pictures that were either related to one of the 
tasks or spatially oriented. Interference by these pictures on switch trials (i.e. when shielding 
supposedly was reduced) should help decide whether shielding reflects inhibition of distracters or 
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preferred processing of task-related information. More specifically, reduced inhibition and reduced 
preferential processing make different predictions regarding interference by task-related and spatial 
distracters on random switch trials: Reduced inhibition would amount to increased interference on 
switch trials, whereas a reduction of preferential processing should result in attenuated interference 
by task-related distracters.  
The last experiment of the present thesis was a follow-up study on Part III, which suggested 
that task activation is an important factor concerning the effectiveness of shielding. This was tested 
directly by employing the alternating runs paradigm rather than the unpredictable task switches used 
in Part III. The predictability of task order was expected to allow subjects to prepare the upcoming 
task. This preparation should have a beneficial effect on task activation. If shielding is indeed related 
to task activation this should show in the pattern of interference on task switches. In contrast to 
results from random task switching shielding should now not be reduced because advance 
preparation enables stronger task activation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the hallmarks of human cognition is our ability to react in accordance with any 
instruction sometimes even without prior practice. Thereby, we are often able to ignore distracting 
information and concentrate on the task at hand. The shielding function of task sets helps us focus 
on relevant aspects of the task, basically preventing interference from irrelevant information. But 
what if the distracting information is related to the task? Does the shielding function still prevent 
interference? Imagine – on the day before your little garden party – going grocery shopping. You 
would have no problem shopping for limes, mint, and soda by the rule Things I need for a cocktail if 
you intended to serve Mojitos the next day. When using this rule, shielding would presumably 
prevent other information such as cheese being on sale from interfering with your shopping. But 
what about groceries that fit the category, yet are not needed? For instance, you might have rum at 
home so there would be no need to buy any. However, rum fits the category things you need for a 
cocktail. How would the shielding function offered by rule use affect such a distracter? Would you 
briefly consider buying rum, maybe rethinking whether you really have enough at home? Or would 
you strictly stick to the cocktail-items on your list, ignore the rum, and not be affected if you saw it 
next to the check-out counter or in the cart in front of you? It seems likely that shielding would not 
keep you from distraction in such a case and that seeing the rum would affect you, at least for a short 
time. Consider this: the shielding function of task sets prevents interference by irrelevant 
information. But how does the system know which information is relevant and which is not? It would 
be sensible and economical that the instructions define response relevance. In the case of 
categorization rules the instructions provide two (or possibly more) permitted alternatives. 
Therefore, anything not matching these would be shielded against (e.g. cheese, not a cocktail 
ingredient). However, this would not apply to distraction that falls within the categories deemed 
relevant by the instruction (in this case things you need for a cocktail). The main question addressed 
in this set of studies is whether or not the shielding function of task sets prevents interference by 
task-related distracters in such a case. One possibility is that shielding is inhibitory and very selective, 
applying even to task-related information in an interference-preventing manner and failing only in 
the presence of stimulus-specific interference (i.e. related distracters in the study by Dreisbach & 
Haider, 2009). Only the shopping items on your list would affect your shopping behavior whereas 
related ingredients like the rum you already own would be ignored. Alternatively, the shielding 
function might reflect sensitivity to features deemed relevant by the instruction. Stimuli fitting this 
criterion would be categorized according to the rule. Although you do not need the rum, seeing it 
might distract you for a moment until you realize that there is no need to buy it. Note that in this 
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case the presence of interference would not indicate a lack of shielding. Rather, the shielding 
function of task sets would affect irrelevant (cheese) and related (rum) distraction in different ways. 
Interference from irrelevant information is prevented, whereas interference from related distracters 
might actually be promoted.  
As already mentioned above, it seems reasonable to assume that potentially relevant 
information is processed irrespective of whether it is part of a target or a distracter. I therefore 
hypothesized that shielding does not prevent interference from distracters that are related to the 
task by category. Instead, like the distracters corresponding to the target words in the study by 
Dreisbach and Haider (2009) they should result in a congruency effect caused by categorization 
according to the rule. In the present experiments distracters corresponding to Dreisbach and 
Haider’s related distracters will be referred to as target-related because they depict the objects that 
also serve as target words. The newly introduced distracters that can be categorized according to the 
task rule but are otherwise not related to the targets will be referred to as task-related distracters. In 
sum, the rule can be applied to both target-related and task-related distracters but only target-
related distracters correspond to the actual targets words.  
There is already evidence that instructions might be sufficient to evoke a response, indicating 
that rules might automatically be applied and shielding should not be expected. For instance, the 
idea of the prepared reflex (Woodworth, 1938; see also Hommel, 2000, for a more timely review of 
this metaphor) suggests that the mere instruction of a simple SR mapping is sufficient for automatic 
response activation once the target is encountered. Cohen-Kdoshay and Meiran (2007, 2009) were 
the first to provide unequivocal evidence for this idea of a prepared reflex by carefully excluding 
alternative interpretations. They showed that flanker interference already occurred in the very first 
trial following the instruction without any prior practice, indicating automatic response activation. 
Note that the authors specifically ruled out retrieval of response codes from LTM as an alternative 
explanation, since in the very first trial the task had never been executed before. Wenke, Gaschler, 
and Nattkemper (2007) also found evidence for instruction-based response activation. They 
developed a dual task paradigm in which arbitrary and new SR instructions given for task A 
influenced performance in a subsequent task B even if task A had not been executed yet. The authors 
concluded that binding between stimulus and response features can occur by mere instruction 
without actual response execution. Taken together these studies provide clear evidence for 
instruction-based response interference suggesting that task-related distracters might indeed 
interfere. However and importantly, so far results are limited to instances of stimuli that were 
introduced as potential targets at the beginning of the experiment. In contrast, here I investigated 
whether the same holds true for stimuli that are never introduced as targets. That is, is a task rule—
once instructed—automatically applied to distracter stimuli even if they never served or will serve as 
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target stimuli? Or does the shielding function prevent such interference? Findings from the task 
switching literature already suggest that task rules can automatically be activated as indicated by the 
TRCE. Unlike the prepared reflex, the TRCE is not affected by WM load (Kessler & Meiran, 2010; 
Kiesel et al., 2007; Meiran & Kessler, 2008), and it is not limited to stimuli that are presented in both 
tasks. A study by Kiesel et al. (2007) showed that the use of a task rule resulted in a TRCE even for 
targets that were uniquely presented in one of the two tasks. Similarly, Yehene, Meiran, and Soroker 
(2005) found a TRCE for subjects who expected to switch between tasks but in fact only performed 
one task throughout the experiment. Results from both studies indicate the possibility of automatic 
application of an instructed rule. However, in both studies instructions related to different features 
of the same set of stimuli (magnitude vs. parity and size vs. shape of an object, respectively). 
Accordingly, interference arose not from an irrelevant stimulus (i.e. a separate distracter), but from 
the currently irrelevant feature of an otherwise relevant stimulus (the target). Moreover, 
interference was caused by a currently irrelevant rule. In contrast, in this study I chose a paradigm 
that more or less excludes the possibility of stimulus-specific retrieval to provide more unequivocal 
evidence that a currently relevant task rule is automatically applied to irrelevant distracters and 
shielding therefore does not prevent interference by task-related distracters. To the best of my 
knowledge, the only evidence for the automatic application of task rules to non-target stimuli comes 
from priming studies. Congruency effects between primes and probes are found even if the stimuli 
used as primes never served as targets and hence were never consciously perceived or responded to 
(e.g. Klauer, Eder, Greenwald, & Abra ms, 2007; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001; Reynvoet, Gevers, & 
Caessens, 2005; van den Bussche, Notebaert, & Reynvoet, 2009; Van Opstal, de Lange, & Dehaene, 
2011; van Opstal, Gevers, Osman, & Verguts, 2010). Yet, these studies are not designed to examine 
the automaticity of rule application or specificity of shielding, but rather the depth of processing of 
subliminally presented stimuli. Here, I aim to extend these findings to consciously perceivable 
distracters that are shown simultaneously with a target in order to assess whether these are shielded 
against. In addition, in three of the experiments instead of using natural categories (e.g., odd/even) 
or separate, independent SR mappings, I employed a novel categorization rule that (a) can be applied 
and generalized to a large range of stimuli (b) encompasses stimuli that are otherwise not 
semantically related (i.e. are from different natural categories such animals, food, furniture, plants 
etc.), and (c) is not likely to be over-learned or practiced often in everyday life.  
Summing up, there is evidence that instruction of SR mappings is sufficient to cause response 
interference. So far the evidence is limited to specific, arbitrary SR mappings and does not extend to 
newly introduced categorization rules. Yet, studies on the TRCE and priming studies suggest that 
(natural) categorization rules can indeed be applied automatically. Here, I investigated whether novel 
categorization rules result in the automatic categorization of distracters, which would thereby lead to 
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interference despite shielding. This was done by looking into congruency effects (see Dreisbach & 
Haider, 2009). I hypothesized that shielding does not prevent interference from task-related 
distracters. Consequently, congruency effects should occur for both, target-related as well as task-
related distracters. The former would replicate findings by Dreisbach and Haider (2009), whereas the 
latter would show that information deemed relevant by the instruction is automatically categorized.  
EXPERIMENT 1  
The first experiment served as a pilot study. A simple number categorization rule was used to 
investigate whether distracters that were never presented as targets (and therefore never associated 
with a response via instruction or practice) would interfere with target processing. Participants had 
to make parity judgments on number words by pressing a right or left response key. The number 
words were superimposed on Arabic numerals. Half of the numerals depicted numbers that were 
part of the stimulus set (see Introduction). The other half consisted of numerals that were not part of 
the stimulus set but – like all numbers – could be categorized as being odd or even (task-related 
distracters). At the beginning of the experiment participants were informed which target words 
would appear and were asked to ignore the distracter numerals. If the shielding function prevents 
interference from task-related information a congruency effect would be expected only for target-
related distracters. In contrast, if shielding works differently on information related to the instructed 
task (as compared to completely irrelevant information), both target-related and task-related 
distracter numerals should result in congruency effects. At the same time, such a result would 
provide first empirical evidence for the automatic application of rules to irrelevant distracter 
pictures.  
METHOD  
PARTICIPANTS 
12 students from the University of Regensburg (7 women, mean age = 24 years, age range: 
19-45 years) participated for partial course credit. All had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Participants signed informed consent and were debriefed after the session.  
APPARATUS AND STIMULI 
Number words from one to nine excluding five served as target stimuli. Participants’ task was 
to decide whether the number word was odd or even by pressing a left or right response key, 
respectively. The target stimuli were superimposed on Arabic numerals which always served as 
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distracters. Such compound stimuli were either congruent (both, target and distracter were 
odd/even) or incongruent (the parity of target and distracter did not match; see Figure 4). In order 
to disentangle stimulus-specific from task-specific interference only half of the number words could 
appear as targets for a given group, whereas distracter numerals were always drawn from the entire 
stimulus set. More precisely, target stimuli were split into two sets of four number words each (Set 
A: one, two, eight, and nine; Set B: three, four, six, and seven). Subjects were randomly assigned Set 
A or Set B. Numerals from both sets served as distracters. In sum, using four number words and eight 
distracters per group, there were a total of 32 possible word-numeral compound stimuli. Half of 
them were congruent, the other half were incongruent. Half of the distracters were target-related 
(i.e., also shown as targets), the other half were task-related (never shown as targets but still 
odd/even).  
This and all the following experiments were programmed in E-Prime (Psychology Software 
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Subjects were seated in front of a monitor at a viewing distance of 
approximately 50 cm. Word-numeral compound stimuli appeared in the center of the screen, 
presented against a white background. Words were presented in size 18 Arial font and purple color, 
in order to make them easier to read in front of the black and white distracters. Responses were 
registered on a standard QWERTZ keyboard. Even numbers were mapped to a right response key (‘-‘-
key), odd numbers were mapped to a left response key (‘y’-key). This mapping was used because an 
advantage for the even-right/odd-left mapping over the odd-right/even-left mapping has been 
reported repeatedly (linguistic markedness association of response codes [MARC] effect; Cho & 
Proctor, 2007; Nuerk, Iversen, & Willmes, 2004)).  
 
  
Congruent Incongruent 
 
Figure 4. Examples for the compound stimuli from Experiment 1. The compound stimuli are 
illustrative and do not match the actual stimuli exactly in size and position. 
five eight 
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PROCEDURE 
Each trial started with a fixation cross for 400 ms followed by a blank screen for 400 ms. Then 
the imperative stimulus (word-numeral compound stimulus) appeared and stayed on the screen until 
a response was made. The ITI was 400 ms. In case of an error a red cross appeared for 1600 ms, 
prolonging the ITI to 2000 ms (see Figure 5). The experiment started with written instructions on 
the computer screen. Subjects were instructed to make parity judgments on the words only. Both 
accuracy and speed were stressed. In a short practice block of eight trials all number words from the 
relevant set were presented two times each in random order without distracters. After this short 
practice block four experimental blocks followed. Each block consisted of 64 trials (all 32 possible 
target-distracter compounds presented twice). Participants started each block by pressing the space 
bar. Trials were presented in pseudo-random order with word repetitions, distracter repetitions and 
negative priming trials (trials in which the current word matched the distracter presented in the 
previous trials) not being allowed.  
 
Figure 5. Trial procedure in Experiment 1.  
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DESIGN 
 A 2 (Distracter: target-related vs. task-related) X 2 (Congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) 
repeated measures design was used.  
RESULTS  
In the following four experiments, the same preprocessing procedure was applied: Only the 
experimental blocks were analyzed. Trials in which target and distracter were identical (Experiment 
1: 12.5 %, Experiment 3: 6.7 %; in Experiments 2 and 4 there were no such trials) were excluded from 
all analyses. Moreover, error trials and trials following an error were excluded from RT analysis 
(Experiment 1: 7.6 %, Experiment 2: 10.7 %, Experiment 3: 11.8 %, Experiment 4: 10.4 %). Post-error 
trials were removed to avoid noise due to post-error slowing (e.g. Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009). To 
correct for outliers, RTs exceeding two standard deviations from the individual cell mean were also 
excluded from RT analysis (Experiment 1: 4.8 %, Experiment 2: 5.5 %, Experiment 3: 4.4 %, 
Experiment 4: 1.9 %). A significance level of .05 was adopted for all analyses. For significant effects, 
individual p-values will not be reported in the text.  
RT DATA 
Individual cell means were entered into a 2 (Distracter: target-related vs. task-related) X 2 
(Congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures. The 
results are displayed in Figure 6 (see also Table 3). The main effect of Congruency was significant, 
F (1,11) = 34.74, η2 = .76. Congruent trials were answered faster than incongruent trials (583 ms vs. 
605 ms). Distracter did not prove reliable, F < 1, p = .86, but interacted significantly with Congruency, 
F (1,11) = 7.29, η2 = .40. Planned comparisons revealed significant congruency effects for both target-
related distracters, t(11) = 7.96, and task-related distracters, t(11) = 2.30, with the effect being 
stronger for target-related than for task-related distracters (31 ms vs. 14 ms).  
Table 3. Results from the main ANOVA conducted in Experiment 1. Significant results (p ≤ .05) are 
printed in bold.  
 RT (ms) Error rates (%) 
Effect F p η2 F p η2 
Distracter < 1 .86 .00 8.00 .02 .42 
Congruency 34.74 < .001 .76 7.08 .02 .39 
Distracter X Congruency 7.29 .02 .40 1.02 .34 .09 
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In order to determine whether congruency effects were significant from the beginning or 
only appeared as a consequence of extensive rule practice later on in the experiment, I ran a 
separate analysis on Block 1. A 2 (Distracter) X 2 (Congruency) ANOVA resulted in a main effect of 
Congruency, F (1,11) = 11.80, η2 = .52. Responses were faster in congruent trials than in incongruent 
trials (618 ms vs. 648 ms). The main effect Distracter, F < 1, p = .98, and the interaction Distracter X 
Congruency, F < 1, p = .34, were non-significant.  
ERROR RATES  
Error data are also depicted in Figure 6 (see also Table 3). A 2 (Distracter: target-related vs. 
task-related) X 2 (Congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) repeated measures ANOVA revealed 
significant main effects of Distracter, F (1,11) = 8.0, η2 = .42, and Congruency, F (1,11) = 7.08, η2 = .39. 
Participants made more errors in trials with target-related distracters than in trials with task-related 
distracters (3.8 % vs. 2.3 %), and were more error prone in incongruent than congruent trials (4.2 % 
vs. 2.0 %). The interaction Distracter X Congruency was not significant, F = 1.02, p = .34.  
An additional analysis on block 1 revealed no significant main effect or interaction, all F < 2.8, 
all p > .12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean response times (RTs) in ms and error rates in % as a function of Distracter and 
Congruency in Experiment 1. Error bars represent inferential confidence intervals (Tryon, 2001) based 
on comparisons of congruent and incongruent trials. 
DISCUSSION  
In line with the hypothesis, Experiment 1 brought up significant congruency effects for 
target-related distracters and distracters that never occurred as targets. Although subjects used a 
categorization rule, shielding did not have the interference-preventing effect is has on unrelated 
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information. Instead, congruence/incongruence with the target word always affected response 
times.  
It seems reasonable to assume that task-related distracters were categorized according to 
the rule because they matched the relevant categories. After all, for such task-related distracters SR 
associations can be excluded as the source of interference because these distracters were never 
presented as possible targets in the instruction nor were they practiced. Yet, the fact that odd/even 
is a natural and familiar categorization for numbers offers a possible alternative explanation. One 
might argue that task-related distracters were incidentally incorporated into the relevant stimulus 
set by semantic generalization. For example, in their action trigger hypothesis, Kunde, Kiesel, and 
Hoffmann (2003) propose that the impact of subliminal stimuli is determined by pre-stimulus 
intentions. Action trigger conditions are specified before the task is carried out and if a stimulus 
matches these action triggers it evokes a response. In the case of the present experiment this would 
imply that the numbers that were not presented as targets still could have been incorporated into 
the trigger set, thereby making interference stimulus-specific after all. Task-related distracters would 
match the action triggers and lead to activation of their respective responses without ever being 
targets themselves. However, first, the action trigger hypothesis refers to subliminally presented 
stimuli, not to distracters presented simultaneously with the target. And second, in the study by 
Kunde et al. (2003) incidental inclusion of numerals in the action trigger set was contingent on their 
being enclosed by the targets. More precisely, if the target numbers were 1, 4, 6, and 9, then the 
remaining numbers 2, 3, 7, and 8 could be incidentally incorporated. On the other hand, if the target 
range was narrow, for instance if it comprised the numbers 3, 4, 6, and 7, prime numbers outside of 
this range (i.e., 1, 2, 8, and 9) did not interfere. Consequently, the action trigger hypothesis would 
have predicted an effect of the factor Stimulus Set in our data: Half of the subjects in our experiment 
responded to the numbers 3, 4, 6, and 7 in which case the action trigger hypothesis would predict no 
congruency effect for the distracter numbers 1, 2, 8 and 9. Contrary to this prediction an additional 
analysis revealed no significant interaction between Stimulus Set and Congruency (RT: F < 1, p = .51; 
error rates: F = 1.23, p = .29). However, given that odd and even numbers from 1 to 9 represent a 
natural category of very limited range the instruction alone might have sufficed to create bindings 
between all possible stimuli and their respective responses (see e.g. Wenke et al., 2007). This gives 
rise to the possibility that the results are not due to automatic categorization but to mere stimulus-
specific interference due to SR associations after all. Experiment 2 was conducted to rule out this 
possibility.  
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EXPERIMENT 2 
In order to provide more unequivocal evidence for automatic rule application and the 
resulting interference by task-related distracters, in Experiment 2 an unfamiliar categorization rule 
was used instead of the odd/even judgment on numerals. Participants had to decide whether a word 
represented a moving or a non-moving object. The novelty of these categories should make advance 
SR bindings due to action trigger conditions or semantic generalization improbable. This should rule 
out the possibility that shielding merely did not prevent congruency effects in the presence of 
stimulus-specific interference. A replication of the results of Experiment 1 would corroborate the 
finding that shielding does not result in reduced interference from task-related information because 
the rule is automatically applied to distracters. In order to additionally control for any stimulus-
specific effects I now introduced a second group of subjects. Participants in this group did not receive 
the categorization rule but instead learned all SR mappings by heart (see also Dreisbach & Haider, 
2008, 2009). I expected to find congruency effects for both target-related and task-related distracters 
only in the group that received the categorization rule (TS [task set] group hereafter). In contrast, for 
the group that simply learned the SR mappings by heart (SR group hereafter) the congruency effect 
should only be present for target-related distracters. Such a data pattern would provide more 
compelling evidence for the involvement of task-specific interference effects with task-related 
distraction.  
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS  
40 students from the University of Regensburg (34 women, mean age = 22 years, age range: 
19-32 years) participated for partial course credit. All had normal or corrected to normal vision and 
were German native speakers. Participants signed informed consent and were debriefed after the 
session.  
APPARATUS AND STIMULI  
16 German words (swing, koala, tractor, spinning top, flag, scales, leg, tramcar, stool, cheese, 
chest, cactus, bottle, bet, vest, and mountain) and 16 picture stimuli depicting the same objects 
(Cycowicz, Friedman, Rothstein, & Snodgrass, 1997; Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980) were used. 
Words were presented in size 18 bold Arial font and purple color, in order to make them easier to 
read in front of the black and white line-drawings (see Figure 7). These compound stimuli appeared 
in the center of the screen against a white background. Words always served as targets and pictures 
always served as distracters. In the TS group, the task was to decide whether the word represented a 
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moving or a non-moving object. In the SR group, participants had to learn the assignments by heart. 
Only half of the words actually appeared as target words in a given sub-group. That is, the 16 target 
stimuli were split in two sets of eight words containing four moving and four non-moving objects 
each. In both sets, the moving and non-moving object words were matched for length and initial 
letter of the German word. Half of the subjects responded to the words of Set A (swing, koala, 
tractor, spinning top, stool, cheese, chest, and cactus), the other half received stimulus set B (flag, 
tramcar, scales, leg, bottle, belt, vest, and mountain). Target stimuli were superimposed on pictures 
of the corresponding set (target-related distracters) or pictures corresponding to the set of words not 
in use (task-related distracters). With 8 words and 16 pictures there were a total of 128 possible 
word-picture combinations for each stimulus subset. Only 120 of these possible combinations were 
presented in the experiment. The eight compound stimuli consisting of identical target and distracter 
stimuli (e.g. the word flag presented on the picture of a flag) were not used.  
 
  
 
  
Congruent Incongruent  Congruent Incongruent 
Target-related distracters  Task-related distracters 
 
Figure 7. Examples for compound stimuli used in Experiment 2. In this case, the words swing, cheese, 
and spinning top are from set A, whereas leg is from set B. The compound stimuli are illustrative and 
do not match the stimuli used in the experiment exactly in size and position. 
PROCEDURE 
Each trial started with a fixation cross for 500 ms followed by a blank screen for 500 ms. Then 
the imperative stimulus (word-picture compound stimulus) appeared and stayed on the screen until 
a response was given. A 500 ms feedback was given on every trial: Correct responses were followed 
by a green fixation cross, a red fixation cross indicated an error (see Figure 8).  
Participants were assigned to the SR and the TS group according to their position of entry in 
the experiment. Subjects read that we were interested in how fast they assigned words to specific 
response keys (SR condition) or categories (TS condition). They were asked to respond to the words 
only by pressing the left or right response key. Both speed and accuracy were stressed. Words were 
swing cheese swing cheese 
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then introduced stepwise two per block until in block 4 all eight word stimuli were presented. This 
stepwise introduction was chosen in order to prevent participants in the SR condition from 
generating their own task rule (see Dreisbach & Haider, 2009). The introduction of new words was 
always accompanied by three practice trials per word without a distracter followed by seven 
compound stimuli with target-related distracters. Additionally, in each of these practice blocks the 
words that had already been introduced were presented again four times as a compound stimulus 
with a target-related picture. This procedure resulted in four practice blocks consisting of 20, 28, 36, 
and 44 trials, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 8. Trial procedure in Experiment 2. 
After the practice blocks three experimental blocks of 120 trials followed, including 56 trials 
with target-related pictures (8 words X 7 pictures; identical target-distracter stimuli were not 
presented) and 64 trials with task-related pictures (8 words X 8 pictures). 56 trials per block consisted 
of congruent compound stimuli (both word and picture depicted moving objects, or both depicted 
non-moving objects). The remaining stimuli were incongruent compound stimuli (moving object 
word and non-moving object picture, or non-moving object word and moving object picture). In a 
post-experimental interview, participants in the SR condition were asked whether and – if yes – what 
kind of rule or strategy they had used to memorize the SR mappings. Participants in the TS condition 
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were asked whether they had found the task rule useful, or whether they had used an alternative 
rule or strategy.  
DESIGN  
A 2 (Instruction: SR vs. TS) X 2 (Distracter: target-related vs. task-related) X 2 (Congruency: 
congruent vs. incongruent) design with the within-subjects factors Distracter and Congruency was 
used. Instruction was manipulated between participants.  
RESULTS 
None of the participants in the SR condition guessed the underlying task set or generated 
their own rule. Participants in the TS group all found the rule useful. Thus, all subjects were included 
in the analysis. The preprocessing procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. In addition, word 
repetition trials, picture repetition trials, and negative priming trials (the word in the current trial 
matches the picture in the preceding trial) were excluded from the analysis (M = 29.8 % per 
participant). Results are reported for the three experimental blocks.  
RT DATA  
An ANOVA involving the between-subjects factor Instruction (SR vs. TS), and the within-
subjects factors Block (1-3), Distracter (target-related vs. task-related), and Congruency (congruent 
vs. incongruent) was conducted (see Table 4).  
The main effects of Block, F (2,76) = 19.16, ηp
2 = .34 and Congruency, F (1,38) = 14.78, 
ηp
2 = .28 were significant. Congruent trials were answered faster than incongruent trials (760 ms vs. 
884s). The linear trend of Block was significant F (1,38) = 32.31, ηp
2 = .46. RTs declined with increasing 
block number (806 ms vs. 768 ms vs. 743 ms). Block interacted significantly with Instruction, 
F (2,76) = 7.52, ηp
2 = .17. The practice benefit was greater for subjects in the SR group than for 
subjects in the TS group (SR: 867 ms vs. 811 ms vs. 764 ms; TS: 744 ms vs. 725 ms vs. 721 ms). There 
was a marginally significant interaction Block X Congruency, F (2,76) = 2.82, ηp
2 = .07, indicating that 
the congruency effect was largest in block 1, and smallest in block 2 (block 1: 45 ms, block 2: 10 ms, 
block 3: 21 ms). Most important, Distracter interacted significantly with Congruency, F (1,38) = 12.88, 
ηp
2 = .25, and this result was qualified by the predicted higher order interaction Instruction X 
Distracter X Congruency, F (1,38) = 5.05, ηp
2 = .11. This higher order interaction is depicted in Figure 
9: The main effect Congruency was significant in the TS group, F (1,19) = 24.64, ηp
2 = .57, but not in 
the SR group, F (1,19) = 3.20, p = .09. Distracter and Congruency interacted significantly in the SR 
group, F (1,19) = 12.34, ηp
2 = .41, but not in the TS group, F = 1.32, p = 27. No other effects reached 
significance, all F < 2.3, all p > .1. 
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ERROR RATES  
Error data are also depicted in Figure 9 (see also Table 4). An ANOVA including Block (1-3), 
Instruction (SR vs. TS), Distracter (target-related vs. task-related) and Congruency (congruent vs. 
incongruent) revealed a significant main effect of Congruency, F (1,38) = 10.19, ηp
2 = .21. Errors were 
more frequent in incongruent trials than in congruent trials (6.4 % vs. 4.9 %). Also, Congruency 
interacted significantly with Distracter, F (1,38) = 5.24, ηp
2 = .12. The difference between error rates 
in congruent trials and incongruent trials was greater for target-related distracters than for task-
related distracters (2.3 % vs. 0.8 %).  
Table 4. Results from the main ANOVA conducted in Experiment 2. Significant results (p ≤ .05) are 
printed in bold.  
 RT (ms) Error rates (%) 
Effect F p η2 F p η2 
Instruction 3.33 < .001 .08 2.61 .12 .06 
Block 19.16 < .001 .34 2.64 .09 .06 
Distracter 1.52 .23 .04 < 1 .97 .00 
Congruency 14.78 < .001 .28 10.19 < .01 .21 
Block X Instruction 7.52 < .01 .17 1.36 .26 .04 
Distracter X Instruction 1.09 .30 .03 3.04 .09 .07 
Congruency X Instruction < 1 .52 .01 2.50 .12 .06 
Block X Distracter < 1 .40 .02 1.02 .37 .03 
Block X Distracter X Instruction < 1 .91 .00 1.39 .26 .04 
Block X Congruency 2.82 .07 .07 < 1 .96 .00 
Block X Congruency X Instruction < 1 .69 .01 < 1 .44 .02 
Distracter X Congruency 12.88 < .01 .25 5.24 .03 .12 
Distracter X Congruency X Instruction 5.05 .03 .12 1.86 .18 .05 
Block X Distracter X Congruency 2.26 .11 .06 < 1 .69 .01 
Block X Distracter X Congruency X Instruction 1.31 .28 .03 < 1 .55 .02 
 
DISCUSSION 
The results obtained in Experiment 2 again support the hypothesis that shielding does not 
prevent interference from task-related information but that task rules result in automatic 
categorization. Target-related and task-related distracters alike caused significant congruency effects 
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when a task rule was applied. Subjects in the TS group responded faster when target and distracter 
were mapped to the same response, that is, when they belonged to the same category, than when 
their categories did not match. This effect occurred irrespective of whether the distracter was part of 
the target set or not. In contrast, in the SR group only target-related distracters interfered.  
 
 
Figure 9. Mean response times (RTs) in ms and error rates in % as a function of Instruction, Distracter, 
and Congruency in Experiment 2. Error bars represent inferential confidence intervals (Tryon, 2001) 
based on comparisons of congruent and incongruent trials. 
The interference that was observed for target-related distracters could have been due to 
retrieval of SR mappings from LTM. The distracters depicted objects that were part of the target set 
and therefore responded to repeatedly (albeit as words and not as pictures). In contrast, task-related 
distracters were not part of the target set. They were pictures of objects that were never responded 
to in the course of the experiment. They equally often accompanied targets that afforded a right 
hand response and a left hand response. Therefore, any incidental binding between a task-related 
distracter and a specific response due to mere co-occurrence of distracter and response is unlikely. 
Moreover, if any such stimulus-specific effects were to cause interference, the same would have 
been expected for task-related distracters in the SR condition. Yet, in that group of subjects task-
related distracters did not interfere with target processing. In sum, Experiment 2 replicates the 
findings of Experiment 1: task-related distracters are categorized according to the rule and thereby 
interfere despite of (or possibly because of) shielding.  
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EXPERIMENT 3 
One shortcoming of Experiment 2 is that the task was practiced extensively before the 
experimental blocks started. Target-related distracters were already shown during practice blocks, 
whereas task-related distracters were only introduced in the experimental blocks. Therefore, they 
might have attracted attention due to their novelty and might have motivated participants to expect 
them as upcoming targets. Experiment 3 served to remove the difference in time point of 
introduction as a possible confound. This time, all participants were informed about the task rule (TS 
condition only), which made it possible to skip the practice blocks and start the experiment with all 
possible compound stimuli from the very beginning. Note that at the beginning of the experiment 
participants were informed about all eight target words and the corresponding response keys. This 
should make it rather unlikely for them to expect irrelevant distracter pictures to appear as targets. 
In addition, in Experiment 2 I had opted for a completely random order of trial presentation, which 
resulted in almost a third of all trials being stimulus repetitions or negative priming trials that had to 
be excluded before analysis. Also, congruent compound stimuli where word and picture were 
identical were not shown in Experiment 2, so incongruent trials were slightly more frequent. 
Although I do not believe that these shortcomings influenced the results of Experiment 2 in favor of 
the hypothesis (for instance, a high frequency of incongruent trials usually reduces interference; see 
e.g. Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979), I revised them in Experiment 3. Now all possible word-picture 
compound stimuli including identical words and pictures were shown in a pseudo-random order.  
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS  
12 students from the University of Regensburg (12 women, mean age = 25 years, age range: 
20-35 years) participated for partial course credit. All had normal or corrected to normal vision and 
were German native speakers. Participants signed informed consent and were debriefed after the 
session.  
APPARATUS AND STIMULI  
The same apparatus and stimuli as in Experiment 2 were used.  
PROCEDURE 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2 with the following exceptions: First, all 
participants were instructed to use the categorization rule. There was no SR group in Experiment 3. 
Second, words were not introduced stepwise and not practiced before the experimental blocks. 
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Instead, after announcement of the rule all targets and corresponding mappings were introduced on 
one slide. Three experimental blocks followed directly after this introductory slide without 
intervening practice trials. Last, compound stimuli where target and distracter depicted the same 
objects were not excluded from the experiment but removed before analysis. This ensured that 
congruent and incongruent compound stimuli occurred with the same probability. Trials were 
presented in pseudo-random order. Word repetitions, picture repetitions and negative priming trials 
were not allowed during the experiment. 
DESIGN  
A 3 (Block) X 2 (Distracter: target-related picture vs. task-related picture) X 2 (Congruency: 
congruent vs. incongruent) within-subjects design was used.  
RESULTS 
The preprocessing procedure was the same as in Experiment 1.  
RT DATA 
 Results are depicted in Figure 10, and displayed in Table 5.  
Table 5. Results from the main ANOVA conducted in Experiment 3. Significant results (p ≤ .05) are 
printed in bold. 
 RT (ms) Error rates (%) 
Effect F p η2 F p η2 
Block 16.72 < .001 .60 1.72 .20 .14 
Distracter 1.78 .21 .14 12.32 < .01 .53 
Congruency 91.23 < .001 .89 46.55 < .001 .81 
Block X Distracter < 1 .46 .07 < 1 .93 .01 
Block X Congruency < 1 .68 .03 < 1 .47 .07 
Distracter X Congruency 3.18 .10 .22 29.03 < .001 .73 
Block X Distracter X Congruency < 1 .92 .01 < 1 .94 .01 
 
A 3 (Block) X 2 (Distracter) X 2 (Congruency) repeated measures ANOVA revealed significant 
main effects of Block, F (2,22) = 16.72, ηp
2 = .60, and Congruency, F (1,11) = 91.23, ηp
2 = .89. RTs 
decreased with practice (block 1: 710 ms, block 2: 670 ms, block 3: 662 ms). As expected, congruent 
trials were answered faster than incongruent trials (657 ms vs. 705 ms). No other effects were 
significant, all F < 3.2, all p > .1.  
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ERROR RATES  
Error data are also depicted in Figure 10 (see also Table 5). A 3 (Block) X 2 (Distracter) X 2 
(Congruency) repeated measures ANOVA was performed. I found significant main effects of 
Distracter, F (1,11) = 12.32, ηp
2 = .53, and Congruency, F (1,11) = 46.55, ηp
2 = .81. Errors were more 
frequent with target-related distracters than with task-related distracters (7.2 % vs. 4.2 %), and 
subjects were more error-prone in incongruent than in congruent trials (8.3 % vs. 3.1 %). The two 
main effects were accompanied by a significant interaction Distracter X Congruency, F (1,11) = 29.03, 
ηp
2 = .73. Additional analyses revealed, that the congruency effect was significant for target-related 
distracters, t(11) = 6.65, but not for task-related distracters, t(11) = 1.22, p = .25. 
 
 
Figure 10. Mean response times (RTs) in ms and error rates in % as a function of Distracter and 
Congruency in Experiment 3. Error bars represent inferential confidence intervals (Tryon, 2001) based 
on comparisons of congruent and incongruent trials. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 3 again replicate those of Experiments 1 and 2. A significant RT 
congruency effect was observed for target-related and task-related distracters. This time targets 
were not practiced and the distracters were all introduced simultaneously. The only difference 
between target-related and task-related distracters was whether they had an equivalent among the 
target words or not. At no time during the experiment were the task-related distracters specifically 
highlighted or responded to. Like in the previous experiments I suggest that interference for task-
related distracters occurred because all distracters were categorized according to the task rule. The 
shielding function does not have the same effect on task-related distracters as it does on completely 
irrelevant information.  
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EXPERIMENT 4 
One possible alternative explanation of the results of Experiment 3 is that categorization of 
the distracters was strategic rather than involuntary. 25 % of the distracters were target-related and 
congruent so one might argue that participants strategically relied on distracter information to speed 
up responses. Therefore, in Experiment 4 I tried to replicate the results of Experiment 3 with task-
related distracters only. Using only distracters that were new to subjects should prevent strategic use 
of distracter information. 
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS  
18 students from the University of Regensburg (13 women, mean age = 24 years, age range: 
20 - 33 years) participated for partial course credit or 4 €. All had normal or corrected to normal 
vision and were German native speakers. Participants signed informed consent and were debriefed 
after the session. 
STIMULI AND PROCEDURE 
24 German words and corresponding pictures were used. The words were split into three 
target sets of 8 words (4 moving and 4 non-moving objects each). Target set was counterbalanced 
across subjects. Pictures of the objects from the remaining two sets served as distracters. Thus, 
distracters were always task-related but never target-related. This resulted in 128 possible word-
picture combinations (8 target words x 16 distracter pictures). Trial procedure was the same as in 
Experiment 3. After the instruction, subjects completed 3 blocks of 128 trials each. 
DESIGN 
A 3 (Block) X 2 (Congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) repeated measures design was used.  
RESULTS 
One subject was excluded from all analyses due to an error rate of almost 40 % (mean error 
rate was below 6 %). 
RT DATA 
A 3 (Block) X 2 (Congruency) ANOVA was conducted (see Table 6). Both main effects were 
significant. RTs decreased significantly with practice, F (2,32) = 8.94, ηp
2 = .36 (block 1: 771 ms, block 
2: 725 ms, block 3: 690 ms). Most important, congruent trials were again answered faster than 
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incongruent trials (721 ms vs. 737 ms), F (1,16) = 5.21, ηp
2 = .25. The interaction Block X Congruency 
failed to reach significance, F = 1.7, p = .20. An additional analysis revealed that congruent trials were 
answered significantly faster than incongruent trials already in block 1, t(16) = 2.16 (752 ms vs. 
790 ms). 
Table 6. Results from the ANOVAs conducted in Experiment 4. Significant results (p ≤ .05) are printed 
in bold. 
 RT (ms) Error rates (%) 
Effect F p η2 F p η2 
Block 8.94 < .01 .36 2.04 .15 .11 
Congruency 5.21 .04 .25 9.30 .01 .37 
Block X Congruency 1.71 .20 .10 < 1 .56 .04 
ERROR RATES  
A 3 (Block) X 2 (Congruency) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Congruency, 
F (1,16) = 9.30, ηp
2 = .37. Subjects committed more errors in incongruent trials than in congruent 
trials (6.5 % vs. 4.4 %). The main effect of Block and the interaction Block X Congruency were not 
significant, both F < 2.1, both p > .14. 
DISCUSSION 
Experiment 4 replicated the results of experiments 1-3. The distracters interfered with target 
processing although none of them had ever been part of the target set. Subjects responded faster 
and more accurately when word and picture belonged to the same category than when they 
belonged to different categories. This time, it can be ruled out that participants made strategic use of 
congruent distracters by presenting only task-related pictures.  
CONCLUSIONS 
In four experiments I found that in a two-choice categorization task irrelevant but task-
related distracters interfered with target processing. Using word-picture compound stimuli where 
subjects had to categorize the word only I consistently found significant congruency effects for two 
types of distracters: pictures that were part of the target set and had an equivalent among the target 
words (target-related distracters), and pictures that were never presented as words but could be 
categorized according to the rule (task-related distracters). With both kinds of distracters subjects 
THE SHIELDING FUNCTION OF TASK SETS IN THE PRESENCE OF TASK-RELATED DISTRACTERS Part II 69 
 
 
 
responded faster when target and distracter belonged to the same (novel) category than when they 
did not. Experiments 3 and 4 ruled out that expectations of future relevance or strategic use of the 
pictures produced the observed effects.  
A congruency effect with target-related distracters has previously been reported (Dreisbach 
and Haider, 2009), but it did not allow to disentangle stimulus-specific from task-specific effects. 
Here, especially Experiment 2 provided evidence that the interference (at least for task-related 
distracters) cannot be ascribed to stimulus-specific effects since no interference was found in the SR 
condition. The result was taken as evidence for the automatic application of categorization rules. The 
shielding function of task sets which has previously been shown to affect information not related to 
the task seems to result in costs when the to-be-ignored distracters are members of the relevant 
categories. Put differently, shielding does not affect task-related distracters in the same way that it 
affects unrelated distracters.  
The results presented here might seem to suggest that the interference Dreisbach and Haider 
(2009) observed for related distracters (which correspond to the target-related distracters in the 
present experiments) was also caused by erroneous rule application rather than being stimulus-
specific. Yet, I want to emphasize that interference effects due to the erroneous categorization of 
irrelevant distracters does not mean that congruency effects such as the TRCE are generally task-
specific. The effect I observed for target-related pictures might at least partly be stimulus-specific. 
Although the pictures themselves never served as targets, the objects they depicted were part of the 
target set and as such were part of the instruction and practiced with the corresponding mapping. 
Recently, Frings, Möller, and Rothermund (2013) found that responses can be retrieved from 
memory even if the modality of the target changes, showing that conceptual information can be 
integrated into an event file. Consequently, encountering the same conceptual information in a 
different presentation format (e.g. first as a target word and then as a picture) would lead to the 
retrieval of the corresponding response from LTM although the picture itself had never been reacted 
to. And in fact Experiment 1 brought up significantly higher congruency effects for target-related 
than for task-related distracters (31 ms vs. 14 ms). In the TS group of Experiments 2 and in 
Experiment 3 the interaction between Distracter and Congruency in RT was there descriptively but 
failed to reach significance (although in Experiment 3 the interaction was reliable for error rates). 
Hence, stimulus-specific interference due to retrieval of previously established SR episodes very 
probably added to the congruency effect I observed for target-related distracters. Yet, I want to 
emphasize again that they cannot explain the congruency effect for task-related distracters. 
One limitation of the specific procedure used here should be addressed. In almost all 
Experiments (the only exception is Experiment 1) pictures served as distracters and words served as 
targets. This might be considered problematic concerning the interpretation and generalization of 
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the results because semantic categorization is faster for pictures than for words (Glaser & Glaser, 
1989; Smith & Magee, 1980). One might argue that the privileged access of pictures to semantic 
information alone accounts for the observed results. In fact, I do not believe that distracters that are 
categorized more slowly than targets would lead to similar congruency effects. It would arguably not 
be adaptive for the cognitive system to wait for the completion of distracter processing when the 
target has already been categorized. Therefore, I believe that the differences in speed of word and 
picture categorization allowed the paradigms employed for this thesis to work. Generalization to 
situations in which targets are processed faster than distracters might therefore be problematic. 
However, the interpretation of the results is not compromised by this limitation. Even if distracter 
pictures were processed faster than target words in the present experiments, the fact remains that 
the pictures interfered in some cases but not in others. Basing the current interpretations on 
different patterns of interference by picture distracters should be considered problematic only if the 
conditions were interference was expected differed in speed. More precisely, fast picture 
categorization might have differential effects on slow or fast response times. That is, if the conditions 
in which I found interference were all slower or faster than the conditions in which I did not find 
interference, the speed of picture categorization might account for the results. This is not the case2. 
Therefore, speed of processing does not refute the interpretations of the current results in terms of 
shielding. 
In conclusion, the experiments presented here brought up clear evidence that novel 
categorization rules are applied to targets and distracters alike as indicated by congruency effects 
from task-related distracters. Accordingly, the shielding function of task sets works differently on 
distracters that can be categorized according to the rule. In order to decide what is shielded against, 
the shielding function seems to rely on the categories deemed relevant by the instruction. Anything 
pertaining to those categories might be considered potentially relevant (albeit not necessarily 
intentionally) and categorized, and is therefore a source of interference. Relevance – in this case – 
might be defined as getting access to the response system. Shielding is only selective insofar as 
distracting information does not fall into the instructed categories. Whenever information fitting 
these categories is offered, shielding does not prevent interference. This seems reasonable assuming 
that outside the rather artificial experimental context task-related information is likely to be relevant. 
Being distracted by the rum in the grocery store when shopping for cocktail ingredients might be 
unnecessary, but more often than not when a stimulus offers potentially significant attributes it is 
                                                          
2 This is best illustrated later on by repetition trials in Experiments 5 and 6 (Part III). In 
Experiment 5, subjects were faster in the noun task than in the adjective task, whereas in Experiment 
6 it was the other way around. Still, in both experiments I found congruency effects in the noun task 
but not in the adjective task. 
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actually behaviorally relevant. After all, one of the great advantages of rule use is their 
generalizability (remember the child learning that it should not eat green fruit).  
On a different note, together with previous results the findings presented here allow one to 
hypothesize about the mechanism underlying the shielding function. They suggest that an activated 
task rule leads to enhanced processing of task-related information thereby causing interference from 
information that fits this criterion. So far, no indication of shielding as an inhibitory function (which 
leads to the suppression of irrelevant distracters) has been found. The second set of studies served 
to directly test the hypothesis that shielding is served by enhanced processing of task-related 
information rather than an alternative strategy such as inhibition of irrelevant distracters.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Investigations on the shielding function of task sets were first motivated by results from the 
task switching literature. At first, in order to unveil potential benefits of rule use the switching 
paradigm was abandoned and the use of a single rule was compared to an SR strategy (Dreisbach & 
Haider, 2008, 2009). Only in 2011 did Dreisbach and Wenke return to task switching. They found that 
shielding is only intact on task repetitions but reduced on switch trials. A conclusion that can be 
drawn from this finding is that the level of rule activation plays a crucial role in shielding. The fact 
that irrelevant stimulus features were successfully shielded against on task repetitions but got access 
to the response system on task switches suggests that the shielding function critically depends on the 
degree of activation of the current task. Because in the study by Dreisbach and Wenke the task was 
only indicated with the onset of the univalent target (i.e. without previous knowledge or pre-cues), 
activation of the relevant task was presumably lower on task switches than it was on task repetitions. 
Activation from the preceding trial could have been carried over into the next trial thereby providing 
an activation advantage on task repetitions (e.g. Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994). In this vein, in the 
present thesis it was assumed that shielding is reduced on task switches when the task-rule has not 
been fully activated. In contrast, shielding is intact with full task activation on task repetitions. The 
idea that the shielding function is a consequence of task activation might appear trivial. Yet, it is not: 
remember that there is no shielding when participants are not informed about a common, response-
defining stimulus feature but instead apply arbitrary SR mappings. That is, the activation of the SR 
mappings alone does not result in reduced susceptibility to irrelevant information. Only with a 
categorization rule can irrelevant information successfully be shielded against.  
In the present two studies the reduction of shielding was used as a means for uncovering the 
mechanisms underlying the shielding function. More precisely, the reduction of shielding on task 
switches was used to assess whether shielding is a consequence of advantages in processing of task-
related information (shieldingADV hereafter), or of the suppression of distracting information 
(shieldingSUP hereafter). Let us return to your grocery shopping for cocktail ingredients. Your 
shopping is not affected by seeing cheese or flour. It is solely based on your need for cocktail 
ingredients. But why is that? Is it because the rule enables you to suppress any irrelevant information 
such as cheese or flour? Or is it because you now preferentially look for any cocktail ingredient? In 
this example common sense would indicate the latter. Yet, the concept of inhibition is very popular 
in many fields of psychology and should therefore not be discarded easily. For instance, in the 
domain of memory it is often assumed that retrieval induced forgetting is caused by the inhibition of 
competing representations (M. C. Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). Likewise, intention formation (e.g. 
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Press the spacebar whenever the word elephant or lion appears) can result in the inhibition of 
distracting information. In this case, distracters would be words that are semantically related to 
elephant and lion, for instance giraffe (Veling & van Knippenberg, 2008). Another example with more 
relevance regarding the present thesis is the assumed inhibition of abandoned task sets that was 
addressed in the theoretical background (see Part I, e.g. M. Hübner et al., 2003; Mayr & Keele, 2000). 
In sum, inhibition is a popular explanation for a variety of phenomena and has repeatedly been 
found to affect performance when task rules are used. Yet, there is already empirical evidence 
indicating that – roughly put – common sense might be right in the case of your shopping experience. 
Dreisbach and Wenke (2011) found that changes of an irrelevant stimulus feature interacted with the 
response on task switch trials but not on task repetitions. However – so they argued – in order to 
know whether a feature was switched or repeated on a task switch it must have been processed on a 
preceding repetition trial, too. That is, although shielding was intact on task repetitions, the 
irrelevant feature was processed to a degree that allowed assessing whether it switched or repeated 
on the subsequent trial. Additional evidence for the shieldingADV account comes from Experiments 1 -
 4 of the present thesis. The fact that task-related distracters were not shielded against suggests an 
advantage for potentially relevant information rather than suppression of distraction. However, 
direct evidence for the shieldingADV account is still missing and is the aim of the present experiments. 
In addition to the mechanism underlying the shielding function, the following experiments 
allowed the investigation of the strength of shielding in a switching context. The question was, 
whether an active task can prevent interference from a recently activated but currently inactive rule. 
Until now shielding had only been investigated with completely irrelevant distracters (e.g. spatially 
oriented animals) or with distracters that were associated with the currently active task rule (target-
related and task-related distracters). But what if subjects switch between tasks and the distracters 
are not related to the currently relevant but to the currently irrelevant task? How does the shielding 
function affect such information?  
In the following experiments I applied the task switching paradigm. Again, participants had to 
respond to target words that were superimposed on distracter pictures. They switched between a 
noun categorization task and an adjective categorization task. The type of target word (noun vs. 
adjective) directly indicated the task. With such univalent targets no further task cues were 
necessary. Distracter pictures were line drawings that depicted either objects used as target words in 
the noun task (noun distracters) or new objects that could be categorized according to the noun task 
but never appeared as target words (noun-related distracters)3. This setup allows to measure effects 
                                                          
3 In the noun task this corresponds to the target-related and task-related distracters used in 
Experiments 1 - 4. This is not true for the adjective task, to which none of the distracters bore 
reference. 
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of distracter interference separately for trials in which the distracters belong to the currently active 
task rule (in the noun task) and for trials in which they do not belong to the currently active task rule 
(in the adjective task). Differences between noun distracters and noun-related distracters will inform 
about the source of the interference as will be outlined below. Moreover, interference in conditions 
with reduced shielding (i.e. task switch trials) can be looked into. My predictions are as follows:  
PREDICTIONS FOR TASK SWITCHES AND TASK REPETITIONS 
The expected outcomes are depicted in Figure 11. From inspection of the figure it is apparent 
that predictions do not differ for task repetitions but that shieldingADV and shieldingSUP make different 
predictions for switches to the noun task. Therefore, the hypotheses will be introduced separately 
for task repetitions and task switches.  
 
 
Figure 11. Predictions from a) the shieldingADV account and b) the shieldingSUP account. 
For task repetitions, a congruency effect is expected in the noun task, but not in the adjective 
task. In the noun task, congruency effects for both kinds of distracters would replicate results from 
Experiments 1 - 4. There I argued that distracters with task-related features are automatically 
categorized, thereby interfering with target categorization and resulting in congruency effects. As 
was outlined above, the fact that noun-related distracters interfere on noun task repetitions already 
points to preferred processing of task-related information. Still, because this result was obtained in 
the preceding experiments I considered it as a given and included it in the predictions for both 
accounts. In the adjective task, the distracters do not have any task-related attributes. Therefore – if 
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shielding is indeed a function of rule use and activation – noun distracters and noun-related 
distracters should not interfere on adjective task repetitions according to shieldingADV as well as 
shieldingSUP. According to shieldingADV they would not interfere because adjective task information is 
preferentially processed, whereas according to shieldingSUP they should be inhibited on adjective task 
repetitions. 
For task switches, shieldingADV and shieldingSUP make the same predictions regarding the 
adjective task. Noun distracters should interfere, whereas no congruency effect is expected for noun-
related distracters. Noun-related distracters should not be categorized in the adjective task simply 
because the rule they are related to is currently not relevant. On the other hand, noun distracters 
can interfere by way of episodic retrieval of event files (Hommel, 1998; Logan, 1988). That is, while 
performing the noun task, targets are bound to their respective responses which then can be 
retrieved automatically whenever the target is encountered again. When shielding is reduced on 
switches to the adjective task, this stimulus-specific retrieval of event files should result in 
congruency effects for noun distracters because either preferential processing is not yet strong (, 
shieldingADV) or because they are not yet efficiently inhibited (shieldingSUP). This argument gets 
further support from the fact that stimulus-specific effects are often increased on task switches (e.g. 
Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Yamaguchi & Proctor, 2011). Note though that in order for pictures to lead 
to the retrieval of a response associated with a corresponding word, it must be assumed that event 
files include conceptual information (Frings et al., 2013).  
 Finally and most important, shieldingADV and shieldingSUP predict different outcomes for 
switches to the noun task. According to shieldingSUP, a reduction of shielding is tantamount to a 
reduction of suppression of irrelevant information. Consequently, when distracters are less 
efficiently suppressed interference should be increased. Put differently, regarding any distracter, in 
the case of shieldingSUP the strength of shielding is inversely related to the strength of interference. 
That is, strong shielding results in a lack of interference, whereas an increase in interference is 
attributed to a reduction of shielding. Therefore, shieldingSUP predicts that both noun-related 
distracters and noun distracters should interfere more on task switches when shielding is reduced. In 
contrast, shieldingADV assumes that a reduction of the shielding function goes along with a reduced 
processing advantage for task-related information. This should mainly affect congruency effects 
caused by noun-related distracters. Since their task-relevant features are now not as preferentially 
processed they should not interfere. Hence, the shieldingADV account predicts a congruency effect for 
noun distracters (for the same reasons as on switches to the adjective task, see above) but not for 
noun-related distracters.  
Overall, statistically, I predict an interaction Task X Congruency for task repetitions, with 
congruency effects in the noun task but not in the adjective task. For task switches, an interaction 
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Distracter X Congruency would indicate shieldingADV: Noun distracters should interfere in both tasks, 
noun-related distracters in neither task. In contrast, a significant triple interaction Task X Distracter X 
Congruency would be indicative of shieldingSUP: In this case, the interaction Distracter X Congruency 
should be significant in the adjective task, but not in the noun task. 
EXPERIMENT 5 
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
Thirty-two students from the University of Regensburg (26 women, mean age = 23 years, age 
range: 18 - 47 years) participated for partial course credit. All had normal or corrected to normal 
vision and were German native speakers. Participants signed informed consent and were debriefed 
after the session. 
STIMULI AND PROCEDURE 
Sixteen German nouns and eight adjectives served as target stimuli (see Table 7). Sixteen line 
drawings depicting the nouns served as distracters.  
Table 7. German nouns and adjectives used in Experiments 5-7. English translations are added in 
parentheses. 
Nouns Set A Nouns Set B Adjectives Exp 5 Adjectives Exp 6/7 
 
Schaukel (swing) 
Koala (koala) 
Wolke (cloud) 
Kreisel (spinning top) 
Schemel (stool) 
Kamm (comb) 
Weste (vest) 
Kaktus (cactus) 
 
Jojo (yoyo) 
Glocke (bell) 
Traktor (tractor) 
Bein (leg) 
Jacke (jacket) 
Gürtel (belt) 
Truhe (chest) 
Berg (mountain) 
 
trocken (dry) 
rot (red) 
alkoholisch (alcoholic) 
flüssig (fluid) 
rockig (rocking) 
laut (loud) 
feierlich (ceremonial) 
melodisch (melodic) 
 
warm (warm) 
glühend (glowing) 
schwül (hot and humid) 
kochend (boiling) 
eisig (icy) 
frierend (freezeing) 
kühl (cool) 
klirrend (crisp cold) 
 
The line drawings were taken from the Snodgrass collections (Csycowicz, Friedman, 
Rothstein, & Snodgrass, 1997; Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980). Target words were superimposed on 
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distracter pictures (see Figure 12). They were presented in size 18 Arial font and purple color. 
Compound stimuli appeared in the center of the screen against a white background. Subjects 
switched randomly between a noun and an adjective task. If a noun appeared, it had to be 
categorized as a moving or a non-moving object. Adjectives had to be categorized as describing wine 
or music.  
 
Noun task 
  
 
  
Congruent Incongruent  Congruent Incongruent 
Noun distracters  Noun-related distracters 
 
Adjective task 
  
 
  
Congruent Inongruent  Congruent Incongruent 
Noun distracters  Noun-related distracters 
Figure 12. Examples for the compound stimuli from Experiment 5. In this case nouns representing 
moving objects and adjectives describing wine are mapped to the same response. The compound 
stimuli are illustrative and do not match the stimuli used in the experiment exactly in size and 
position. 
Subjects responded by pressing a left or a right response key on a standard QWERTZ-
keyboard (“y”- and “m”- key). Category-response mappings were counterbalanced across subjects. 
The 16 nouns were split into two sets of eight nouns. For a given subject, only the nouns from one 
set were used as targets. Accordingly, half of the distracter pictures depicted objects that were also 
used as target words in the noun task (noun distracters). The other half of the distracters depicted 
swing cheese swing cheese 
red melodi
c 
red melodic 
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objects that never appeared as target words but still were related to the noun task inasmuch as they 
could be categorized as moving or non-moving objects (noun-related distracters). None of the 
distracters were related to the adjective task. Target and distracter could be response-congruent or 
incongruent, depending on the category they belonged to and the associated responses. For 
instance, the target word melodic and the distracter picture of a stool would be response-congruent 
if the categories describing music and non-moving object were mapped to the same response key. If 
they were mapped to different response keys, the word melodic and the picture of a stool would be 
response incongruent.  
A trial started with a fixation cross (500 ms) followed by a blank screen (500 ms). Then the 
imperative word-picture compound stimulus appeared and remained on the screen until a response 
was given. A 500 ms feedback appeared on every trial: A correct response was followed by a green 
fixation cross, a red fixation cross indicated an error (see Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 13. Trial procedure in Experiment 5. In the figure, two consecutive trials are depicted, one noun 
task trial, and one adjective task trial, respectively.  
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Subjects were informed about the tasks and the corresponding mappings via written 
instructions and saw a slide showing all 16 potential targets (eight nouns and eight adjectives). Both 
speed and accuracy were stressed. Before the Experiment proper, subjects completed two short 
single task blocks and one mixed task block for practice. In the single task blocks every target was 
presented twice in random order without any distracters, resulting in a block length of 16 trials per 
task. In the mixed task practice block, subjects randomly switched between the noun task and the 
adjective task. Half of the trials were task repetitions. In this mixed block, target words were already 
superimposed on the distracter pictures. Every possible word-picture combination was shown once, 
resulting in 256 trials ([8 nouns + 8 adjectives] x 16 distracter pictures). Word repetitions, picture 
repetitions and negative priming trials were not allowed. After the mixed practice block two 
experimental blocks with the same specifications followed.  
DESIGN  
A 2 (Task: nouns vs. adjectives) X 2 (Sequence: switch vs. repeat) X 2 (Distracter: noun vs. 
noun-related) X 2 (Congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) repeated measures design was used. 
RESULTS 
In this and the following experiment the same preprocessing procedure was applied: Only 
the two experimental blocks were analyzed. The first trial of a given block and trials where target and 
distracter depicted the same object were excluded from all analyses (3.5 %). Moreover, error trials 
and trials following an error were excluded from RT analysis (Experiment 5: 9.2 %; Experiment 6: 
7.4 %). To correct for outliers, RTs exceeding two standard deviations from the individual cell mean 
were also excluded from RT analysis (Experiment 5: 5.6 %; Experiment 6: 5.6 %). I adopted a 
significance level of .05 in all analyses. Individual p-values for significant effects are not reported in 
the text. 
In Experiment 5, two subjects were excluded from analysis. One committed errors in more 
than 20 % of the trials (mean error rate was below 5 %). The other participant reported having 
combined the two rules into one superordinate rule, making switching unnecessary. One subject 
completed only one experimental block due to a software error. Overall, data from 30 participants 
were included in the final analyses.  
2 (Task: nouns vs. adjectives) X 2 (Sequence: switch vs. repetitions) X 2 (Distracter: noun vs. 
noun-related) X 2 (Congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) repeated measures Analyses of Variance 
(ANOVAs) were conducted on RT and error rates. Table 8 lists the results of these ANOVAs. For 
specific values of F, p, and η2 the reader is referred to this table. In the text, I will mostly focus on RT 
results. The error pattern did not contradict RT results.  
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Table 8. Results from the main ANOVAs conducted in Experiment 5. One overall ANOVA included the 
factors Task, Sequence, Distracter, and Congruency. Separate ANOVAs were then conducted for 
repeat trials only and switch trials only. Significant results (p ≤ .05) are printed in bold.  
  overall repeat trials only switch trials only 
Effect  F p η2 F p η2 F p η2 
Task 
RT (ms) 12.64 < .01 .30 5.50 .03 .16 12.48 < .01 .30 
Errors (%) < 1 .55 .01 < 1 .37 .03 < 1 .85 .00 
Sequence 
RT (ms) 3.73 .06 .11 - - - - - - 
Errors (%) 5.95 .02 .17 - - - - - - 
Distracter 
RT (ms) < 1 .42 .02 < 1 .81 .00 1.08 .31 .04 
Errors (%) 8.78 < .01 .23 4.40 .05 .13 3.87 .06 .12 
Congruency 
RT (ms) 20.91 < .01 .42 18.24 < .01 .39 9.09 < .01 .24 
Errors (%) 41.03 < .01 .59 15.33 < .01 .35 26.36 < .01 .48 
Task X Sequence 
RT (ms) 4.78 .04 .14 - - - - - - 
Errors (%) < 1 .53 .01 - - - - - - 
Task X Distracter 
RT (ms) < 1 .88 .00 < 1 .33 .03 1.47 .24 .08 
Errors (%) < 1 .42 .02 < 1 .44 .02 < 1 .55 .01 
Sequence X Distracter 
RT (ms) < 1 .46 .02 - - - - - - 
Errors (%) < 1 .91 .00 - - - - - - 
Task X Sequence X Distracter 
RT (ms) 2.44 .13 .08 - - - - - - 
Errors (%) < 1 .96 .00 - - - - - - 
Task X Congruency 
RT (ms) 12.52 < .01 .30 8.23 < .01 .22 4.89 .04 .14 
Errors (%) 3.87 .06 .12 < 1 .34 . 3 5.72 .02 .17 
Sequence X Congruency 
RT (ms) 1.18 .29 .04 - - - - - - 
Errors (%) < 1 .56 .01 - - - - - - 
Task X Sequence X Congruency 
RT (ms) < 1 .90 .00 - - - - - - 
Errors (%) 1.26 .27 .04 - - - - - - 
Distracter X Congruency 
RT (ms) 11.85 < .01 .29 < 1 .95 .00 10.95 < .01 .27 
Errors (%) 11.10 < .01 .28 3.12 .08 .10 9.21 < .01 .24 
Task X Distracter X Congruency 
RT (ms) .22 .64 .01 < 1 .1 .00 < 1 .51 .02 
Errors (%) 13.03 < .01 .31 10.43 < .01 .27 6.31 .02 .18 
Sequence X Distracter X Congruency 
RT (ms) 4.80 .04 .14 - - - - - - 
Errors (%) 1.07 .31 .04 - - - - - - 
Task X Sequence X Distracter X 
Congruency 
RT (ms) < 1 .59 .01 - - - - - - 
Errors (%) < 1 .99 .00 - - - - - - 
 
As can be seen in Table 8 the four-way interaction was non-significant. Still, because the 
predictions regarding repetition trials and switch trials were very specific I split the data and 
conducted two separate three-way ANOVAs including the factors Task, Distracter, and Congruency. 
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The results are also listed in Table 8 and depicted in Figure 14. For the sake of clarity, in the text I will 
focus on the specific interactions that are important with respect to my predictions.  
 
 
 
Figure 14. Mean response times (RTs) in ms and error rates in % as a function of Task, Sequence, 
Distracter and Congruency in Experiment 5. Error bars represent inferential confidence intervals 
(Tryon, 2001) based on comparisons of congruent and incongruent trials. 
For task repetitions, the predicted interaction Task X Congruency was significant. Additional 
contrasts showed that the overall congruency effect was present in the noun task, F (1,29) = 30.39, 
η2 = .51, but non-significant in the adjective task, F (1,29) = 1.85, p = .18. On task switch trials, the 
Distracter X Congruency interaction predicted by the shieldingADV account was significant. There was 
a significant congruency effect for noun distracters, t(29) = 4.85, whereas no such effect was found 
for noun-related distracters, t(29) < 1, p = .54. The higher order interaction involving Task that would 
have supported the shieldingSUP account failed to reach significance in RTs, F < 1, p > .5. Interestingly, 
for error rates the interaction Task X Distracter X Congruency was significant, F (1,29) = 6.31, η2 = .18. 
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However, this triple interaction did not resemble the pattern predicted by the shieldingSUP account. 
Descriptively, Distracter and Congruency interacted in both tasks, yet the interaction was only 
significant in the noun task, F (1,29) = 13.03, η2 = .31. Remember that shieldingSUP would have 
predicted the interaction to be significant only in the adjective task. 
DISCUSSION 
In the discussion I will focus on RT data. Subjects made few errors and error data did not 
counteract the RT data pattern. RT results of Experiment 5 show that in a switching context task 
shielding is present on task repetitions but reduced on task switches thereby confirming previous 
results (Dreisbach & Wenke, 2011). When the adjective task was repeated, shielding was intact and 
prevented interference from distracters related to the competing task: Distracter pictures that were 
semantically related to the noun task did not lead to congruency effects in the adjective task. In 
contrast, when the noun task was repeated I found significant congruency effects for noun 
distracters and noun-related distracters. Subjects responded faster when the target word and the 
distracter picture were from the same category than they were from different categories. The results 
from noun task repetitions thus replicate the findings from Experiments 1-4. Even distracters that 
never occurred as targets were automatically categorized according to the currently active task rule. 
In Part II of the present thesis I already ruled out that the interference by noun-related distracters 
was due to stimulus-specific retrieval processes and the results presented here support this finding. 
So, here I could show again that the shielding mechanism does not prevent but actually may cause 
interference from distracters that are related to the task that is currently executed.  
On switches, Distracter and Congruency interacted without a significant mediating effect of 
Task. That is, on switches, noun distracters interfered, whereas noun-related distracters did not. For 
the adjective task, this suggests stimulus-specific interference effects on switch trials caused by 
retrieval of event files or episodes acquired during the noun task (Hommel et al., 2001; Logan, 1988). 
Note that I can rule out that erroneous rule-application caused the interference when switching to 
the adjective task. If this had been the case, noun-related distracters should have interfered, too. It 
should be stated though, that although categorization according to the noun rule was not the reason 
for the observed congruency effect, I cannot rule out entirely that it occurred. The distracter pictures 
might have been categorized by mistake, but simply might not have resulted in strong enough 
evidence for the particular response associated with that category to interfere (Schneider & Logan, 
2005, 2009).  
Even though the interference from noun distracters on switches to the adjective task is 
indicative of reduced shielding, it is not suited to decide between shieldingSUP and shieldingADV. Both, 
reduced suppression of the noun distracters (shieldingSUP) as well as less preferred processing of 
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adjective task information (shieldingADV) might have resulted in the observed interference. However, 
for switches to the noun task, shieldingADV predicted that the processing advantage for task-related 
information should attenuate interference from noun-related distracters relative to noun task 
repetitions. And indeed, on task switch trials, noun-related distracters interfered less than noun 
distracters, as can be seen from the significant interaction Distracter X Congruency. No such 
interaction was found on task repetitions, in which both noun and noun-related distracters 
interfered to the same extent. This is taken as evidence for the shieldingADV account. Remember that 
the shieldingSUP account would have predicted increased interference from the distracters on task 
switches as a consequence of reduced distracter suppression.  
A possible problem for the interpretation of the results in terms of the shieldingADV account is 
that interference by noun distracters might have been expected to be greater on task repetitions 
than on task switches. On task switches, supposedly, episodic retrieval alone produces interference 
effects. On the other hand, on task repetitions both retrieval and categorization should add up to 
produce even stronger congruency effects for noun distracters. However, as can be inferred from the 
lack of interference from noun distracters on adjective task repetitions, automatic episodic retrieval 
does not appear to be a strong source of interference on task repetitions where shielding is intact. 
Consequently, if – on task repetitions – interference by episodic retrieval is less effective while 
interference due to automatic categorization is enhanced, this might in sum produce comparable 
congruency effects for task repetitions and task switches for noun distracters.  
The fact that I found no congruency effect for either of the distracters on adjective task 
repetitions is contrary to typical findings in the task switching paradigm when looking at the TRCE. 
When subjects switch between two tasks with bivalent stimuli (e.g. switching between two digit 
categorization tasks), performance mostly is not only affected by task sequence (repetition vs. 
switch) but also by SR mappings related to the competing task. According to such findings one might 
have expected that task shielding would not prevent interference from information that is related to 
a competing task (in this case the noun task). However, the TRCE is typically found with bivalent 
stimuli where both tasks can be applied to different features of a single target, whereas task 
shielding has mostly been observed for stimulus features that are unrelated to the currently active 
task rule (e.g. stimulus color) or separate distracter stimuli that never become task relevant (e.g. 
background pictures).  
 The entire interpretation of the results so far rests upon the assumption that participants 
switched between task rules. This, however, might be called into question because switch costs were 
very small (10 ms). A closer inspection of the results shows that switch costs were present in the 
adjective task (21ms), and only their absence in the noun task resulted in the overall non-significant 
cost. Furthermore, the differential interference effects found for switch and repeat trials and the 
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significant switch costs in error rates clearly speak in favor of separate rule application. The issue of 
the small switch cost will be discussed further in the Conclusions of Part III.  
In sum, the results of Experiment 5 support the assumption of a shielding function of task 
sets that prevents interference from distracters related to a competing task on task repetitions, and 
is reduced on task switches. The fact that this reduced shielding resulted in attenuated interference 
from noun-related distracters in the noun task is taken as evidence for the shieldingADV account.  
EXPERIMENT 6 
Experiment 6 served two purposes. First, I wanted to replicate the results of Experiment 5 
with respect to noun distracters. Since the TRCE is a robust finding with bivalent stimuli, my intention 
was to replicate the lack of interference from noun distracters on task repetitions in the adjective 
task. Second, I wanted to gain further evidence for the shieldingADV account. In Experiment 6 I 
therefore replaced the noun-related distracters with pictures of spatially oriented animals. They 
served to further investigate interference on task switches. Dreisbach and Haider (2009) found that 
without shielding (i.e. when subjects used individual SR mappings but no task rule) spatially oriented 
animal distracters produced significant congruency effects whereas no such effect occurred when 
participants applied a categorization rule (which was not related to the animals). So, from previous 
studies it is known that pictures of spatially oriented animals do interfere in the absence of task 
shielding. Therefore, I used these spatially oriented animal distracters instead of noun-related 
distracters in Experiment 6. Note that animal distracters are always moving objects and therefore 
categorically congruent with half of the noun stimuli (orthogonally to being spatially response 
congruent with a given target stimulus, see Methods). Therefore, I will restrict the predictions to the 
adjective task. Both, the shieldingADV and the shieldingSUP account predict no interference by any of 
the distracters on task repetitions. Also, both predict distracter interference for noun distracters on. 
So far, the data pattern would mirror the results from Experiment 5. However, for animal distracters 
the shieldingADV and the shieldingSUP account make different predictions: The reduced processing 
advantage for task-related information should not have any effect on the processing of spatially 
oriented animal distracters, because their spatial orientation is still not related to any of the tasks. 
Consequently, even reduced shielding (as opposed to completely absent shielding) should not result 
in interference effects. On the other hand, shieldingSUP would predict interference by spatially 
oriented animals as observed previously (e.g. Dreisbach & Haider, 2009). Less efficient suppression of 
the spatial information conveyed by the animals should result in a congruency effect.  
Statistically, for the adjective task, the shieldingADV account predicts a three-way interaction 
Sequence X Distracter X Congruency. On the other hand, the shieldingSUP account predicts an 
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interaction Sequence X Congruency only. For the noun task, no predictions regarding spatial 
distracters are made for the reason mentioned above. 
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
Thirty-two students from the University of Regensburg (27 women, mean age = 21 years, age 
range: 18–26 years) participated for partial course credit. Participants signed informed consent and 
were debriefed after the session. 
 
Noun task 
  
 
  
Congruent Incongruent  Congruent Incongruent 
Noun distracters  Spatial distracters 
 
Adjective task 
  
 
  
Congruent Inongruent  Congruent Incongruent 
Noun distracters  Spatial distracters 
   
Figure 15. Examples for the compound stimuli used in Experiment 6. The compound stimuli are 
illustrative and do not match the actual stimuli exactly in size and position. 
STIMULI AND PROCEDURE 
Stimuli and procedure were the same as in Experiment 5 with two exceptions. First, instead 
of categorizing adjectives as describing wine or describing music, subjects had to categorize eight 
adjectives according to the rule describes heat vs. describes cold (see Table 7) because subjects 
reported that the adjective task used in Experiment 5 was subjectively very hard. Second, instead of 
swing stool swing stool 
warm cool warm cool 
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noun-related distracters I now used spatially oriented animals (four animals looking to the right or to 
the left; see Figure 15). Noun-related distracters were not used in Experiment 6. In the noun task, 
animal distracters were always categorically congruent when the word was a moving object, and 
always categorically incongruent when the word was a non-moving object. Moreover, in both cases, 
half of the distracters were spatially congruent, the other half were spatially incongruent. Last, 
feedback was now only given after incorrect responses. In case of an error the word “Fehler!” 
(German for error) was displayed for 2000 ms (see Figure 16).  
 
 
Figure 16. Trial procedure in Experiment 6. 
DESIGN 
A 2 (Task: nouns vs. adjectives) X 2 (Sequence: switch vs. repeat) X 2 (Distracter: noun vs. 
spatial) X 2 (Congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) repeated measures design was used. 
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RESULTS 
One subject was excluded from all analyses due to keeping to forget the instructions and 
constantly asking questions throughout the Experiment. Results for the 2 (Task) X 2 (Sequence) X 2 
(Distracter) X 2 (Congruency) ANOVAs are reported in Table 9 and depicted in Figure 17. Again, in the 
text, I will focus on RT results.  
Table 9. Results from the main ANOVAs conducted in Experiment 6. The overall ANOVA included the 
factors Task X Sequence X Distracter X Congruency. A separate ANOVA with the factors Sequence X 
Distracter X Congruency was conducted for the adjective task only. Significant results (p ≤ .05) are 
printed in bold.  
 RT (ms) Error rates (%) 
 overall adjective task overall adjective task 
Effect F p η2 F p η2 F p η2 F p η2 
Task 10.04 < .01 .25 - - - < 1 .86 .00 - - - 
Sequence 23.50 < .01 .44 35.79 < .01 .54 5.20 .03 .15 6.83 .01 .19 
Distracter 9.12 < .01 .23 9.18 < .01 .23 3.89 .06 .12 < 1 .38 .03 
Congruency 6.77 .01 .18 1.27 .27 .04 16.40 < .01 .35 12.60 < .01 .30 
Task X Sequence 19.68 < .01 .40 - - - 5.13 .03 .15 - - - 
Task X Distracter < 1 .88 .00 - - - 1.00 .33 .03 - - - 
Sequence X Distracter 1.75 .20 .06 < 1 .39 .03 < 1 .92 .00 < 1 .33 .03 
Task X Sequence X Distracter < 1 .66 .01 - - - 1.73 .20 .06 - - - 
Task X Congruency 1.59 .22 .05 - - - < 1 .34 .03 - - - 
Sequence X Congruency < 1 .86 .00 < 1 .77 .00 1.52 .23 .05 3.37 .08 .10 
Task X Sequence X Congruency < 1 .43 .02 - - - < 1 .38 .03 - - - 
Distracter X Congruency 15.46 < .01 .34 2.98 .09 .09 19.80 < .01 .40 4.45 .04 .13 
Task X Distracter X Congruency 4.25 .05 .12 - - - 6.59 .02 .18 - - - 
Sequence X Distracter X Congruency 8.08 < .01 .21 6.26 .02 .17 < 1 .80 .00 < 1 .50 .02 
Task X Sequence X Distracter X Congruency < 1 .81 .00 - - - 2.43 .13 .08 - - - 
 
Like in Experiment 5, the four-way interaction was non-significant. However, the predictions 
only concerned the adjective task. Therefore, I conducted a second ANOVA for the adjective task 
only. The results are also displayed in Table 9. The interaction Sequence X Distracter X Congruency 
proved significant. Additional analyses revealed that on task repetitions only the main effect 
Distracter was significant, F (1,30) = 11.34, η2 = .28. In contrast, on task switches to the adjective task 
the interaction Distracter X Congruency proved reliable, F (1,30) = 7.29, η2 = .20. The congruency 
effect was significant for noun distracters, t(30) =2.3, but not for animal distracters, t(30) = .82, 
p = .42.  
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Figure 17. Mean response times (RTs) in ms and error rates in % as a function of Task, Sequence, 
Distracter and Congruency in Experiment 6. Error bars represent inferential confidence intervals 
(Tryon, 2001) based on comparisons of congruent and incongruent trials. 
DISCUSSION 
Experiment 6 replicated the results of Experiment 5 with respect to noun distracters. On task 
repetitions, shielding was intact and strong in the adjective task so that neither noun distracters nor 
spatial distracters interfered. Moreover, on switches to the adjective task there was a significant 
congruency effect for noun distracters. Again, this is attributed to a reduction of shielding because 
the shielding function typically prevents interference from irrelevant information. Importantly, 
spatial distracters did not interfere on task switches. This is taken as additional evidence for the 
shieldingADV account. A reduction in suppression of irrelevant information (shieldingSUP) should have 
resulted in interference by the spatially oriented animals. Instead, the fact that the animals were in 
no way related to the adjective task seems to have prevented any interference with the (also spatial) 
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response. This is in line with the assumption that shielding is indeed an advantage for the processing 
of any information that is related to the task rule.  
The results from the noun task are harder to interpret (but were not in the focus of our 
hypotheses in the first place). Spatial distracters were not only response-congruent or incongruent 
according to their spatial orientation, but also according to their belonging to the response-category 
moving object. In the ANOVA reported above, results were analyzed with respect to spatial 
congruency and did show effects on task repetitions. This seems to indicate that even an irrelevant 
feature has the potential to interfere if it is combined with a task-related feature (like with bivalent 
stimuli in TRCE studies). That is, the spatial orientation of the pictures might have interfered because 
the picture was task-related by way of its category-membership. However, the interpretation is 
speculative, since the experiment was not designed to dissociate between spatial and categorical 
congruency in the noun task. 
CONCLUSIONS 
I investigated two aspects of the shielding function of task sets in two experiments: the 
specific cognitive processes underlying the shielding function and the dynamics of the shielding 
function in the course of task switching. Subjects switched between categorizing nouns and 
categorizing adjectives, both of which were superimposed on distracter pictures. All distracters were 
related to the noun task in that they could be categorized according to the instructed rule moving 
object vs. non-moving object. Whether or not shielding was strong and effective on adjective task 
repetitions was assessed through the presence or absence of distracter interference. On noun task 
repetitions I did not expect shielding to prevent interference from the pictures because they had 
features that were related to the currently active task rule (see Part II). However, shieldingSUP and 
shieldingADV made different predictions regarding interference from noun-related distracters on 
switches to the noun task. More specifically, shieldingSUP predicted increased interference on task 
switches because a reduction of shielding would mean less efficient suppression of distracting 
information. In contrast, according to shieldingADV, interference from noun-related distracters should 
be attenuated on task switches because the processing advantage for task-related information is not 
as strong as on task repetitions.  
The main results can be summarized as follows: I replicated previous results showing that (1) 
distracters that are related to the currently relevant rule are automatically categorized (Part II of the 
present thesis) and (2) task shielding is reduced on task switches (Dreisbach & Wenke, 2011), as 
indexed by the interference of noun distracters on switches to the adjective task (and the lack 
thereof on repetitions). Noun-related distracters and spatial distracters did not interfere in the 
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adjective task even when shielding was reduced. These results suggest that interference from noun 
distracters on switches to the adjective task worked by way of automatic retrieval of responses from 
memory (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Yamaguchi & Proctor, 2011) because such episodes did not exist for 
noun-related and spatial distracters.  
In addition to replicating and extending previous findings, I gained more insight into the 
mechanisms underlying the proposed shielding function of task sets. First, I found that task shielding 
is powerful enough to prevent interference from distracters that are associated with a competing but 
currently inactive task. When shielding is intact on task repetitions, distracter pictures belonging to 
the response categories relevant for the noun task did not interfere in the adjective task. There, 
neither noun distracters nor noun-related distracters interfered, whereas on noun task repetitions all 
distracters resulted in significant congruency effects.  
The second main result concerns the mechanism underlying the shielding function of task 
sets. When switching to the noun task, noun-related distracters interfered less than noun distracters, 
whereas on task repetitions, both kinds of distracter produced congruency effects (Experiment 1). In 
addition, even when shielding was reduced on switches to the adjective task, spatial distracters did 
not cause significant congruency effects. These results are taken as further evidence for the 
shieldingADV account. In the remainder of the discussion I will elaborate on these main findings.  
STRENGTH OF SHIELDING  
I found no significant congruency effects on task repetitions in the adjective task. This is in 
sharp contrast to findings on the TRCE (e.g. Kessler & Meiran, 2010; Kiesel, Wendt, & Peters, 2007; 
Meiran & Kessler, 2008; Sudevan & Taylor, 1987; Waszak, Wenke, & Brass, 2008). Note that in task 
switching experiments with bivalent stimuli responses are typically faster when both features of a 
given target stimulus are associated with the same response in the two tasks, than when they are 
associated with different responses. Comparing the present results with studies on the TRCE 
illustrates how important the distinction between bivalent stimuli with distracting features and 
separate distracter stimuli is. When subjects switch between different features of the very same 
target stimulus, interference from information related to (and practiced in) the competing task 
results in response congruency effects. Here, with separate target and distracter stimuli this effect 
was reduced or even eliminated by task shielding. Distracters were automatically categorized in the 
noun task but no interference occurred in the adjective task. Note that I found no response-
congruency effects but that I cannot rule out interference at a more abstract level of task set. Results 
from a study by Waszak, Wenke, and Brass (2008) suggest that stimulus features that are instructed 
but never practiced in a competing task still slow response times compared to a neutral condition 
(albeit they do not produce response congruency effects; but see also Liefooghe, Wenke, & De 
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Houwer, 2012; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003). Accordingly, noun and noun-related distracters 
alike would slow response times in the adjective task compared to a neutral condition without 
distracters (which was not included in the present experiments). In Experiment 5 I found no effect of 
Distracter in the adjective task. Although one might expect noun distracters to prime the noun task 
more strongly than noun-related distracters, overall response times for noun and noun-related 
distracters did not differ significantly. So, either both distracters primed the noun task to the same 
degree, or no interference at the level of task set took place. As was already mentioned above, the 
fact that switch costs were greater for the adjective task than for the noun task (irrespective of 
whether the adjective task was easier – as in Exp 6 – or harder – as in Exp 5 – than the noun task) 
suggests that all pictures might have primed the noun task, making switching to the adjective task 
harder or switching to the noun task easier, respectively. Moreover, in Experiment 6 the main effect 
of Distracter was significant. Responses were faster with spatial distracters than with noun 
distracters. This might also be taken as evidence for some task-level interference. However, the 
experiments were not designed to study interference at the level of task set. 
THE MECHANISM UNDERLYING THE SHIELDING FUNCTION OF TASK SETS: SUPPORT FOR THE 
SHIELDINGADV ACCOUNT 
On switches to the noun task, noun-related distracters interfered less than noun distracters. 
This is important with respect to the two opposing hypotheses regarding the mechanism underlying 
the shielding function of task sets. ShieldingSUP and shieldingADV make different predictions regarding 
the strength of interference from noun-related distracters on task switches. If a reduction of 
shielding was a reduction of distracter suppression as predicted by the shieldingSUP account, one 
would have expected increased interference from all distracters because they should have been less 
efficiently suppressed. In contrast, shieldingADV predicted that a reduction of shielding would result in 
a reduction of the processing advantage for task-related information and – as a consequence – in 
reduced interference by noun-related distracters. Results clearly support the shieldingADV account 
that has been suggested before (Dreisbach & Wenke, 2011; Part II of the present thesis). Experiment 
6 added even more evidence in favor of the shieldingADV account. On switches to the adjective task 
shielding was reduced but still no congruency effects for spatial distracters were found. The 
shieldingSUP account would have predicted that attenuated suppression of interfering information 
should have resulted in a spatial congruency effect for animal distracters.  
The interpretation of the results in terms of preferred target-processing is also related to 
results reported by Egner and Hirsch (2005). In an fMRI study with compound word-face Stroop 
stimuli they manipulated cognitive control sequentially and found that high control resulted in 
enhanced target processing rather than reduced distracter processing. I suggest that the use of a task 
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rule results in a similar overall adjustment of settings that affect every trial in the experiment 
through enhanced processing of rule-relevant information. In other words, enhanced processing of 
task-related information helps prevent interference from task-unrelated information but – on the 
downside – increases the risk of interference by task-related (yet irrelevant) information. Given that 
in real life task-related information more often than not is also relevant, such a mechanism seems 
adaptive.  
A final remark concerns the amount of switch costs in both experiments presented here. 
Significant switch costs were only found in the adjective task and were small or nonexistent in the 
noun task in both experiments (Experiment 5: –1 ms; Experiment 6: 8 ms). This might call into 
question whether subjects actually switched between tasks. Several reasons speak for task switching: 
First of all, although I acknowledge that subjective reports are not the most reliable of sources, in the 
post-experimental questionnaire only one subject reported having combined the two rules. This 
subject was excluded from all analyses. Second, the differential results for switch and repeat trials 
(e.g., the interaction Sequence X Distracter X Congruency in both experiments) are indicative of the 
presence of task switching. If subjects had not switched but instead had represented the rules as one 
single, superordinate task then interference in switch and repeat trials should not have differed. 
Third, switch costs were always significant in the adjective task (Experiment 1: 21 ms; Experiment 2: 
77 ms). Interactions between switch and task type (smaller or no switch costs in one of the tasks) are 
not a rare finding in the task switching literature if results are reported separately for both tasks (e.g., 
Rogers & Monsell, 1995, Experiments 3, 4). Moreover, with univalent stimuli, small switch costs have 
been reported before. For instance, Wylie and Allport (2000, Experiment 1), found switch costs of 
only 20 ms, when subjects switched between naming the color of colored Xs and reading a color-
word written in black. In the present experiments, the small switch cost to the noun task might be 
explained by the fact that the distracters were always related to the noun task and were presented 
on adjective task trials, too. They might have generally primed the noun task to a certain degree (e.g. 
Koch & Allport, 2006) and thereby might have reduced the switch cost. In sum, I am confident that 
subjects switched between tasks. In any case, the small switch costs do not call into question the 
interpretation in terms of intact and reduced shielding as the most plausible explanation for the 
results. 
In the introduction to Part III I pointed out that that task activation most likely plays a crucial 
role in the shielding function. Assuming that task repetitions offer an activation advantage over task 
switches, the results so far support this view. Again, shielding was intact on task repetitions but 
reduced on task switches. Part IV served to further test the importance of task activation by looking 
into predictable switches, where task activation is presumably higher than on unexpected switches.  
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PART IV 
SHIELDING IN THE CONTEXT OF PREDICTABLE 
TASK SWITCHING 
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INTRODUCTION 
Switching between tasks is the rule rather than the exception. Oftentimes such switches are 
unexpected. Imagine sitting at the table with friends again (serving as an example so patiently in this 
thesis) concentrated, talking or playing a game of cards. You are able to rapidly switch tasks when 
there is a knock on the door or the telephone starts ringing, even if you had not anticipated this kind 
of interruption. At other times you might expect to be interrupted and know which task to attend to 
next but you might not know the exact time point of interruption. For instance, you might know that 
within the next half hour another friend will be arriving or at some point you will have to prepare 
more drinks. But only when seeing an empty glass would you know that you will now have to 
abandon your current task and refill it. In an experimental context, this resembles random task 
switching. Subjects know that they are expected to switch and are capable of remembering and 
applying all tasks, but they cannot fully prepare for a switch because task order is unpredictable. Only 
the appearance of a stimulus indicates which task to perform next. Previous results have shown that 
task shielding in these cases is only effective on task repetitions: You might not be affected by 
irrelevant groceries if you shop uninterruptedly (i.e. on task repetitions). But if you were to return to 
shopping after an interruption (say, meeting someone you know; i.e. a task switch), cheese or flour 
might temporarily distract you. But of course switching is not necessarily unpredictable. There are 
circumstances where you are able to prepare. By analogy, preparation also is possible in the task 
switching paradigm. The upcoming task can be indicated in advance by pre-cues (e.g. Meiran, 1996). 
Alternatively, task order can be fixed and therefore predictable (e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 1995). In both 
cases preparation of the upcoming task is possible to some degree.  
From the task switching literature it is known that such preparation affects task performance 
in a beneficial way (see Part I of the present thesis). For instance, switch costs are often reduced 
when subjects are given time to prepare for the upcoming task. Yet, preparation effects are not 
necessarily switch specific. Even task repetitions can benefit from advance knowledge (e.g. Poljac et 
al., 2006; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Therefore, preparation seems to positively affect task activation 
in general (Koch, 2005). This assumed activation advantage of prepared tasks (compared to tasks 
where preparation was not possible) was used in the present study to look into the effects of task 
activation on the shielding function. Findings from Dreisbach and Wenke (2011) as well as from 
shielding in the context of unpredictable task switching (Part III of the present thesis) suggest that 
rule activation plays a crucial role concerning the shielding function. Following this logic, if the 
shielding function is indeed reduced on task switches because it depends on task activation, 
performance on a prepared task switch should differ from performance on a random, unprepared 
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switch (like in Experiments 5 and 6). That is, increased task activation on a prepared task switch 
should lead to shielding that is stronger than on an unexpected switch. 
 A popular method to enable preparation is the cued task switching paradigm, where a cue 
indicates the next task. This approach is mostly used with bivalent targets, which means that the cue 
is not only helpful but in fact necessary to determine which task to apply. With such cues the time 
between cue and stimulus-onset, the CSI, can be varied as a means of manipulating task activation 
(e.g. Koch & Allport, 2006). Another possibility is to cue the type of transition rather than the specific 
task (e.g. Schneider & Logan, 2007). Supposing that only two tasks are used, cuing subjects whether 
to expect a task repetition or a task switch is sufficient information to enable preparation of the 
correct task (the same does not hold true if more than two tasks are used and a switch is indicated). 
A third possibility to enable task preparation is to use predictable, alternating runs (e.g. Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995). Subjects know the order of tasks and can anticipate the next task correctly (e.g. 
AABBAA). This paradigm was chosen in the present experiment. The reason is that I wanted to keep 
the procedure as similar as possible to Experiments 5 and 6, since results will be discussed with 
respect to these supposedly unprepared conditions. I used univalent targets so cues were not 
necessary to determine the task. In addition, I opted for the alternating runs paradigm rather than 
cued task switching because the use of cues introduces the new element of cue encoding and 
processing, which sometimes is considered problematic for the interpretation of task switching 
results (see Logan & Bundesen, 2003). Last, it has been shown that cued task switching produces 
asymptotic performance effects after a switch, whereas a predictable sequence allows for full 
preparation on the first trial following a switch (Monsell, Sumner, & Waters, 2003; but see also 
Tornay & Milán, 2001). More precisely, with an unpredictable sequence, subjects seem to not fully 
commit to the task after a switch, most probably because they cannot foresee whether they have to 
switch back to the previous task on the following trial. Their performance gets asymptotically better 
(i.e. faster and less prone to interference) the more repetitions of the same task they get. In contrast, 
with the alternating runs paradigm, subjects know that after a switch the same task will be relevant 
for a given number of trials. Therefore, presumably they fully commit to the task on the first trial 
after a switch. Subsequent repetitions show no improvement in performance since the first 
repetition was supposedly already fully prepared. As a consequence, working with the alternating 
runs procedure allows predicting full task activation (i.e. intact shielding) on all repetition trials, 
whereas with the cueing procedure differences in shielding across more than one repetition would 
have to be taken into account.  
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EXPERIMENT 7 
Experiment 7 served to learn more about the flexibility of the shielding mechanism, its 
cognitive origin, and the role of task activation. More specifically, I reasoned that shielding in terms 
of enhanced processing of task-related information should not be reduced on task switches if 
subjects knew which task to expect and prepare. If knowing which task to expect allows for intact 
task activation and shielding, interference from noun and noun-related distracters should be present 
on task switches in the noun task. Moreover, by the same logic, interference from noun distracters in 
the adjective task should be attenuated or absent even on task-switches. Therefore, in Experiment 7, 
the noun and adjective task were presented in alternating runs (AAAABBBB) so that shielding could 
be analyzed on predictable task switches. Always presenting four tasks in a row further allowed me 
to investigate interference over the course of more than one task repetition. However, given that 
with a predictable sequence commitment to the task very probably is already at its fullest on the first 
repetition (Monsell et al., 2003), no effect of position in run (i.e. 1st, 2nd, or 3rd repetition) was 
expected. 
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
Twenty-four students from the University of Regensburg (20 women, mean age = 22 years, 
age range: 18–33 years) participated for partial course credit. None of them had participated in 
Experiments 5 or 6. Participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. They signed informed 
consent and were debriefed after the session. 
STIMULI AND PROCEDURE 
Like in Experiments 5 and 6, 16 German nouns and eight adjectives served as target stimuli 
(see Table 7). Sixteen line drawings depicting the nouns served as distracters. The line drawings were 
taken from the Snodgrass collection (Csycowicz, Friedman, Rothstein, & Snodgrass, 1997; Snodgrass 
& Vanderwart, 1980). Target words were superimposed on distracter pictures. They were presented 
in size 18 Arial font and purple color. Compound stimuli appeared in the center of the screen against 
a white background.  
Subjects again switched between a noun task and an adjective task. The tasks were 
presented in a fixed order (AAAABBBB etc.). If a noun appeared, it had to be categorized as a moving 
or a non-moving object. Adjectives had to be categorized as describing heat or cold. Subjects 
responded by pressing a left or a right response key on a standard QWERTZ-keyboard (“y”- and “m”-
 key). Category-response mappings were counterbalanced across subjects. Half of the distracter 
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pictures depicted objects that were also used as target words in the noun task (noun distracters). The 
other half of the distracters depicted objects that never appeared as target words but still were 
related to the noun task inasmuch as they could be categorized as moving or non-moving objects 
(noun-related distracters). None of the distracters were related to the adjective task. Target and 
distracter could be response-congruent or incongruent, depending on the category they belonged to 
and the associated responses.  
A trial started with a fixation cross (500 ms) followed by a blank screen (500 ms). Then the 
imperative word-picture compound stimulus appeared and remained on the screen until a response 
was given. In case of an error the word “Fehler!” (German for error) appeared on the screen for 
2000 ms. 
Subjects were informed about the tasks and the corresponding mappings via written 
instructions and saw a slide showing all 16 potential targets (eight nouns and eight adjectives). Both 
speed and accuracy were stressed. Before the Experiment proper, subjects completed two short 
single task blocks and one mixed task block for practice. In the single task blocks every target was 
presented twice in random order without any distracters, resulting in a block length of 16 trials per 
task. In the mixed task practice block, subjects predictably switched between the noun task and the 
adjective task. Half of the trials were task repetitions. In this mixed block target words were already 
superimposed on the distracter pictures. Every possible word-picture combination was shown once, 
resulting in 256 trials. Word repetitions, picture repetitions and negative priming trials were not 
allowed. Subjects were not specifically informed about the predictable order. Instead, it was 
assumed that they would (implicitly) pick up on the order during the practice block. The reason I 
opted for this approach is that I wanted to keep the paradigm as close as possible to Experiments 5 
and 6. After the mixed practice block two experimental blocks with the same specifications followed.  
DESIGN 
A 2 (Task: nouns vs. adjectives) X 4 (Sequence: switch vs. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd repetition) X 2 
(Distracter: noun vs. noun-related) X 2 (Congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) repeated measures 
design was used. 
RESULTS 
The following preprocessing procedure was applied: Only the two experimental blocks were 
analyzed. The first trial of a given block and trials where target and distracter depicted the same 
object were excluded from all analyses (3.5 %). Moreover, error trials and trials following an error 
were excluded from RT analysis (7.1 %). To correct for outliers, RTs exceeding two standard 
deviations from the individual cell mean were also excluded from RT analysis (5.5 %). I adopted a 
SHIELDING IN THE CONTEXT OF PREDICTABLE TASK SWITCHING Part IV 99 
 
 
 
significance level of .05 in all analyses. Individual p-values for significant effects are not reported in 
the text. 
 RT DATA 
First, I conducted a 2 (Task) X 3 (Repetition: 1st, 2nd, 3rd ) X 2 (Distracter) X 2 (Congruency) 
repeated measures ANOVA, to check whether the first, second and third task repetition had a 
differential effect on any other factor. There was neither a main effect nor any significant interaction 
involving the factor Repetition, all F < 2.1, all p > .14, so data were collapsed over all repetition trials 
and a 2 (Task) x 2 (Sequence: switch vs. repeat) X 2 (Distracter) X 2 (Congruency) repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted. Results are depicted in Figure 18 (see also Table 10). The main effects of 
Task, F (1,23) = 10.92, η2 = .32, Sequence, F (1,23) = 24.16, η2 = .51, and Congruency, F (1,23) = 5.69, 
η2 = .20, were significant. Subjects were faster in the adjective task (702 ms vs. 757 ms). Repeat trials 
were again answered faster than switch trials (696 ms vs. 762 ms) and congruent trials were 
answered faster than incongruent trials (720 ms vs. 738 ms). The only significant interaction was 
between Task and Congruency, F (1,23) = 19.97, η2 = .47. Additional analyses revealed that the 
congruency effect was significant in the noun task, F (1,23) = 13.67, η2 = .37, but not in the adjective 
task, F < 1, p > .68. No other effects were significant, all F < 2.7, all p > .11. 
ERROR DATA 
Error data are also depicted in Figure 18 (see also Table 10). A 2 (Task) X 3 (Repetition) X 2 
(Distracter) X 2 (Congruency) ANOVA revealed that again the factor Repetition did not result in a 
main effect or any significant interaction, all F < 2.6, all p > .09. Therefore, all repetition trials were 
collapsed and a 2 (Task) X 2 (Sequence) X 2 (Distracter) X 2 (Congruency) ANOVA was conducted. The 
main effect of Sequence was significant, F (1,23) = 9.05, η2 = .28. Subjects made more errors on 
switch trials (4.8 %) than on repeat trials (2.8 %). The main effects of Distracter, F (1,23) = 3.62, 
η2 = .14, p =.07, and Congruency, F (1,23) = 3.08, η2 = .12, p = .09, were only marginally significant . 
However, Distracter interacted significantly with Congruency, F (1,23) = 5.64, η2 = .20. There was a 
congruency effect for noun distracters, F (1,23) = 4.91, η2 = .18, but not for noun-related distracters, 
F < 1, p > .98. No other effects were significant, all F < 2.4, all p > .13. 
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Table 10. Results from the main ANOVAs conducted in Experiment 7. An overall ANOVA included the 
factor Sequence. Separate ANOVAs were then conducted for repeat trials only and switch trials only. 
Significant results (p ≤ .05) are printed in bold. 
  overall repeat trials only switch trials only 
Effect  F p η2 F p η2 F p η2 
Task 
RT (ms) 10.92 < .01 .32 2.74 .11 .11 38.58 < .001 .42 
Errors (%) < 1 .34 .04 < 1 .73 .01 4.80 .04 .17 
Sequence 
RT (ms) 24.16 < .001 .51 - - - - - - 
Errors (%) 9.05 < .01 .28 - - - - - - 
Distracter 
RT (ms) < 1 .35 .04 1.95 .18 .08 < 1 .52 .02 
Errors (%) 3.62 .07 .14 2.92 .10 .11 < 1 .70 .01 
Congruency 
RT (ms) 5.69 .03 .20 1.53 .23 .06 16.53 < .001 .42 
Errors (%) 3.08 .09 .12 1.35 .26 .06 5.15 .03 .18 
Task X Sequence 
RT (ms) 1.37 .25 .06 - - - - - - 
Errors (%) < 1 .63 .01 - - - - - - 
Task X Distracter 
RT (ms) < 1 .66 .01 < 1 .52 .02 < 1 .75 .01 
Errors (%) < 1 .38 .03 1.49 .24 .06 < 1 .86 .00 
Sequence X Distracter 
RT (ms) 2.11 .16 .08 - - - - - - 
Errors (%) 1.72 .20 .07 - - - - - - 
Task X Sequence X Distracter 
RT (ms) < 1 .51 .02 - - - - - - 
Errors (%) 1.09 .31 .05 - - - - - - 
Task X Congruency 
RT (ms) 19.97 < .001 .47 10.56 < .01 .32 8.89 < .01 .28 
Errors (%) 2.31 .14 .09 3.59 .12 .10 < 1 .49 .02 
Sequence X Congruency 
RT (ms) < 1 .84 .00 - - - - - - 
Errors (%) < 1 .89 .00 - - - - - - 
Task X Sequence X Congruency 
RT (ms) 2.69 .11 .11 - - - - - - 
Errors (%) 2.16 .16 .09 - - - - - - 
Distracter X Congruency 
RT (ms) < 1 .63 .01 < 1 .66 .01 10.04 < .01 .30 
Errors (%) 5.64 .03 .20 2.86 .11 .11 3.73 .07 .14 
Task X Distracter X Congruency 
RT (ms) < 1 .52 .02 < 1 .82 .00 1.68 .21 .07 
Errors (%) < 1 .84 .00 < 1 .83 .00 < 1 .99 .00 
Sequence X Distracter X Congruency 
RT (ms) 1.74 .20 .07 - - - - - - 
Errors (%) < 1 .41 .03 - - - - - - 
Task X Sequence X Distracter X 
Congruency 
RT (ms) < 1 .86 .00 - - - - - - 
Errors (%) < 1 .86 .00 - - - - - - 
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Figure 18. Mean response times (RTs) in ms and error rates in % as a function of Task, Sequence, 
Distracter and Congruency in Experiment 5. Error bars represent inferential confidence intervals 
(Tryon, 2001) based on comparisons of congruent and incongruent trials. 
DISCUSSION 
The discussion of the results will focus on RT data. Errors were few and did not counteract RT 
results. Moreover, results will be discussed with respect to switches and repetitions in general. They 
were not affected by whether subjects repeated the task for the first, second, or third time. This fits 
well with results from Monsell et al. (2003), who found that with a predictable task sequence full 
preparation is reached on the first trial following a switch. In contrast, with random switching these 
authors found a decrease in RT following more than one repetition after a switch. This was attributed 
to the fact that with alternating runs subjects’ commitment to the task is complete after a switch 
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because they know how many repetitions will follow. In contrast, such knowledge is impossible with 
random switching. A switch back to the just abandoned task is just as likely as a repetition. Therefore, 
commitment to the task only gradually increases with the number of repetitions.  
One might argue that the alternating runs paradigm was not the most suitable approach to a 
manipulation of task activation. Activation is more commonly manipulated by prolonging the CSI (e.g. 
Koch & Allport, 2006): A long interval between cue and task presumably allows subjects to prepare 
the upcoming task more fully than a short CSI. Introducing alternating runs might seem like a rather 
conservative manipulation since subjects might not pick up on the sequence (remember that they 
were not explicitly told about the AAAABBBB sequence). However, first and foremost, results 
indicate that the manipulation was effective. In Experiment 7 I obtained results different from those 
of Part III, where task order had been random. More precisely, task sequence affected distractibility 
in Experiments 5 and 6, but had no impact on the pattern of interference in Experiment 7. In 
addition, as already stated above, the use of cues might have led to a gradual increase of task 
activation over the course of more than one repetition (Monsell et al., 2003). This additional factor 
would have complicated an already elaborate 4-factorial design.  
In Experiment 7 I found the typical switch cost but no interaction between Sequence and any 
other factor. With a predictable task order, switches and repetitions showed the same pattern of 
interference: All of the distracters interfered in the noun task and no significant interference was 
found in the adjective task. So, in accordance with the hypothesis, shielding was not reduced on 
switch trials if subjects knew the upcoming task. Interference from noun distracters and noun-related 
distracters was not affected by whether the task switched or repeated. This is in sharp contrast to 
Experiments 5 and 6, where task sequence interacted with distracter congruency. More precisely, in 
Experiment 5, the pattern of results indicated that shielding was reduced on task switches because 
interference by noun-related distracters was attenuated. Here, there was no indication of a 
reduction of shielding. Hence, the predictability of the task order presumably made it possible to 
enable full task activation on task switches. As a consequence, shielding for the upcoming task was 
intact on a task shift. In the adjective task the chance to prepare (and hence intact shielding on 
switch trials) resulted in performance that was not affected by distracters related to the noun task. 
Neither noun nor noun-related distracters interfered on task switches and on task repetitions. In 
contrast, in Experiments 5 and 6 noun distracters had interfered on switches to the adjective task.  
In sum, the results can be interpreted as follows: Preparation enables enough task activation 
for intact shielding even on switch trials. Both task repetitions and task switches are characterized by 
preferred processing of information that is related to the currently relevant task. Preparation thus 
prevents interference from the currently irrelevant task, even on a switch.  
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I explained the difference in results between Experiments 5 and 6, and Experiment 7 in terms 
of task activation and relaxed vs. fully active shielding. In Experiments 5 and 6, shielding was 
presumably relaxed on task switches, whereas Experiment 7 allowed for the preparation of the 
upcoming task and therefore offered the possibility of full shielding even on task switches. However, 
there is a potential alternative explanation for the different patterns of interference found for noun-
related distracters in the adjective task. Hübner, Dreisbach, Haider, and Kluwe (2003) found that 
when subjects switched between three tasks interference from a recently abandoned task was 
reduced compared to interference from a task that had been abandoned less recently (see also 
Kuhns, Lien, & Ruthruff, 2007; Li & Dupuis, 2008). More precisely, flanker interference in trial N was 
reduced when the flankers were associated with the task executed in trial N-1 compared to 
interference from flankers from a task that had been executed in trial N-2 or earlier. Hübner et al. 
attributed this reduction of interference to backward inhibition of the preceding task set (Mayr & 
Keele, 2000). However, like the classical n-2 repetition costs reported by Mayr and Keele, the 
reduction of interference was only found for predictable tasks (by way of pre-cues or predictable task 
order). Along the lines of Hübner and colleagues, one could explain the current results of Part III and 
Part IV in terms of backward inhibition, too. In Experiments 5 and 6, where task order was random 
the noun task was not inhibited after its execution because subjects did not know which task to 
expect next. Accordingly, on task switches to the adjective task SR mappings from the noun task 
were still active enough to interfere. In contrast, in Experiment 7 the noun task could be inhibited 
because subjects knew that the adjective task would follow. As a consequence, interference from the 
inhibited noun task was non-significant in the adjective task. Although I cannot and do not want to 
rule out that inhibition contributed to the results, I do not think that it is the sole reason for the 
different results of Experiments 5 and 6, and Experiment 7. Although in the study of Hübner and 
colleagues interference from the competing task was reduced by inhibition it was still significant, 
whereas congruency effects in the present study completely disappeared on predictable task 
switches. Note though that Hübner et al. investigated task interference, not response-congruency 
effects. Moreover, an inhibitory account might partly explain the results in the adjective task, but it 
cannot account for the differential results obtained in the noun task of Experiments 5 - 7. Inhibition 
of the adjective task is unlikely to have affected interference from noun-related distracters in the 
noun task. Still, interference was attenuated on switches to the noun task when task order was 
random. I therefore conclude that although backward inhibition may have contributed to the results, 
the entire data pattern of Experiments 5 - 7 can hardly be explained without the assumption of 
relaxed shielding in Experiments 5 and 6, and intact shielding in Experiment 7. 
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SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT FINDINGS 
The present thesis addressed questions concerning the shielding function of task sets first 
described by Dreisbach and Haider (2008, 2009). This shielding function is a consequence of rule use, 
more specifically the application of categorization rules. It is a mechanism that allows one to attend 
to relevant information by reducing the impact of distraction on target processing. Put differently, 
applying categorization rules instead of SR mappings enables the system to discard irrelevant 
information and focus on features that are important to the task at hand. This can be seen, for 
instance, in reduced distracter interference in subjects using task sets (as opposed to arbitrary 
mappings). More specifically, studies by Dreisbach and Haider (2008, 2009) were the first to show 
that subjects applying categorization rules are not affected by spatially oriented distracters or 
changes in an irrelevant target feature such as color or font. In contrast, subjects using SR mappings 
showed binding effects between irrelevant target features and the response as well as congruency 
effects for spatially oriented animal distracters. In 2011, Dreisbach and Wenke extended findings on 
the shielding function by showing that shielding is fully intact on task repetitions but relaxed on task 
switches.  
The present thesis addressed specific aspects of the shielding function of task sets, especially 
with respect to the underlying mechanism. Table 11 lists the aforementioned results of previous 
studies and offers an overview of the findings reported in this thesis.  
Table 11. Summary of the results of the early and current studies on the shielding function of task 
sets.  
Study Paradigm Task rule(s) Distraction Results and Interpretation 
Dreisbach, 
Goschke, and 
Haider (2007) 
early 
information 
TS vs. late 
information 
TS 
vs. SR 
red stimulus 
consonant/vowel 
 
green stimulus 
animal/no animal 
 
 
Target color 
 
Interaction Information condition X Block X 
Task type: 
 
Early information condition: switch costs from 
the beginning (Block 1) 
 
Late information condition: switch costs after 
mention of the rules (Block 5) 
 
SR condition: no switch costs 
 
 
Task rules – once they are known – are 
preferred over the use of SR mappings, even 
though they result in switch costs. 
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Study Paradigm Task rule(s) Distraction Results and Interpretation 
Dreisbach 
and Haider 
(2008) 
SR 
vs. 1TS 
vs. 2TS 
1 TS 
Moving/non-moving 
 
2TS 
red stimulus 
consonant/vowel 
 
green stimulus 
animal/no animal 
 
Target color 
SR condition: Interaction Color X Response 
 
2TS condition: Interaction Color X Response 
 
1TS condition: no interaction Color X Response 
 
 
Binding between color and response happens 
only in the SR condition. The use of a single 
task rule shields against the irrelevant stimulus 
feature color. 
Dreisbach 
and Haider 
(2009) 
SR vs. 1TS 
covering part of the 
leg/not covering the 
leg 
Line drawings 
(related 
distracters 
and spatially 
oriented 
animals) 
 
SR condition: Congruency effects for related 
and spatial distracters 
 
1TS condition: Congruency effects only for 
related distracters. 
 
 
Task rules shield against the irrelevant spatial 
orientation of distracters. 
 
Dreisbach 
and Wenke 
(2011) 
Task switching 
Numeral 
odd/even 
 
Letter 
Consonant/vowel 
Target color 
or Target font 
 
Task switches: Interaction Color/Font X 
Response 
 
Task repetitions: No interaction Color/Font X 
Response 
 
 
Shielding is intact on task repetitions, but 
relaxed on task switches. 
 
↑↑↑ Studies conducted before the present thesis ↑↑↑ 
↓↓↓ Studies conducted for the present thesis ↓↓↓ 
Summary Part II 
When subjects use a rule, task-related distracters are automatically categorized accordingly. 
This indicates that the mechanism underlying shielding is enhanced processing of task-related information. 
Part II 
Experiment 1 
1TS odd/even 
Arabic 
numerals 
(target-
related and 
task-related) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Congruency effects for target-related and task-
related distracters 
 
 
Task-related distracters are automatically 
categorized according to the rule. 
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Study Paradigm Task rule(s) Distraction Results and Interpretation 
Part II 
Experiment 2 
SR vs. 1TS moving/non-moving 
Line drawings 
(target-
related and 
task-related) 
 
1TS condition : congruency effects for target-
related and task-related distracters 
 
SR condition : congruency effect for target-
related distracters only 
 
 
Task-related distracters are automatically 
categorized according to the rule. 
Stimulus-specific effects can be excluded as 
the source of interference. 
Part II 
Experiment 3 
1TS moving/non-moving 
Line drawings 
(target-
related and 
task-related) 
 
Congruency effects for target-related and task-
related distracters 
 
 
Task-related distracters are automatically 
categorized according to the rule, even if they 
are not expected as future targets. 
 
Part II 
Experiment 4 
1TS moving/non-moving 
Line drawings 
(task-related 
only) 
 
Congruency effect for task-related distracters 
 
 
Task-related distracters are automatically 
categorized according to the rule, but this 
categorization is not strategic. 
 
Summary Part III 
When shielding is relaxed, interference by task-related information is attenuated. This is taken as evidence, that the 
mechanism underlying the shielding function relies on preferred processing of task-related information. 
Part III 
Experiment 5 
Random task 
switching 
Noun task 
moving/non-moving 
 
Adjective task 
wine/music 
Line drawings 
(noun and 
noun-related) 
 
Task repetitions 
Interaction Task X Congruency: 
Congruency effect in the noun task, but not in 
the adjective task 
 
Task switches 
Interaction Distracter X Congruency: 
Congruency effects in both tasks for noun 
distracters, but not for noun-related 
distracters 
 
 
When shielding is fully active (task 
repetitions), information related to the 
current task interferes, whereas information 
from the competing task does not interfere. 
When shielding is relaxed (task switches), 
interference from task-related information is 
reduced, while at the same time SR mappings 
from the competing task can interfere. 
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Study Paradigm Task rule(s) Distraction Results and Interpretation 
 
Part III 
Experiment 6 
Random task 
switching 
Noun task 
moving/non-moving 
 
Adjective task 
hot/cold 
Line drawings 
(noun and 
spatial) 
 
Adjective task 
Interaction Sequence X Distracter X 
Congruency: 
Noun distracters interfere on task switches 
only, spatial distracters never interfere 
 
 
When shielding is fully active, information 
related to the competing task and spatially 
oriented animals do not interfere. 
When shielding is relaxed, SR mappings from 
the competing task interfere, whereas the 
spatially orientation animals still do not 
(presumably because it is not related to any of 
the tasks and therefore not preferentially 
processed) 
 
Summary Part IV 
Task activation plays a crucial role for the shielding function. When a switch is predictable, shielding is not relaxed. 
Part IV 
Experiment 7 
Predictable 
task 
switching: 
AAAABBBB 
Noun task 
moving/non-moving 
 
Adjective task 
hot/cold 
Line drawings 
(noun and 
noun-related) 
 
Noun task: overall congruency effect 
 
Adjective task: no congruency effect 
 
No effect of Sequence 
 
 
The shielding function of task sets depends on 
task activation. With full preparation, task-
shielding is not relaxed on task switches. 
 
SHIELDING AND TASK-RELATED DISTRACTERS 
All experiments presented in this thesis were designed to uncover the processes serving the 
shielding function of task sets. They unequivocally show that the use of rules enhances the 
processing of relevant features, that is, the discriminative characteristic (i.e. category membership) 
that determines the response.  
The first part of the present work addressed the effect of the shielding function in the 
presence of task-related distracters. In Experiments 1-4 I could show that distracter pictures that can 
be categorized according to the current rule interfere with target-processing. The congruency effect I 
observed for distracters that were related to the task is a first indication that shielding reflects a 
preference for features that are related to the instructions insofar as they determine the response. In 
the artificial setup of an experimental paradigm the observed effect might be considered 
unnecessary or disruptive. Yet, it shows that when subjects are instructed to use a rule, they do. 
Although the correct response is determined in most trials (meaning that subjects are very well able 
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to discriminate between targets and distracters) rule application affects all stimuli, thereby resulting 
in congruency effects. This rigorous rule use is certainly adaptive in a non-experimental environment. 
Real life situations in which information is task-related but nevertheless irrelevant seem far more 
unlikely than the opposite case: If something fits a category, criterion, or rule, it more often than not 
is worth further examination.  
In sum, Part II brought up evidence that the shielding function is not an indiscriminating 
inhibitory mechanism. Instead of suppressing anything that is not a target (which would seem a 
rather effortful way of shielding) a preference for related features allows the system to be 
susceptible to potentially relevant information. Put differently, what kind of information gets access 
to the response system or not critically depends on the categories regarded as relevant by the 
instruction. Information that falls within those categories is automatically processed and classified, 
and – in the paradigm employed here – results in the congruency effects that indicate preferential 
treatment of task-related information. The effect of this (involuntary) categorization of distracter 
stimuli was significant even in the first block. Therefore, it does not seem to depend on excessive rule 
practice. However, I cannot rule out that at least some trials of rule application are required. Looking 
at the first block only still comprised more than 100 trials in Experiments 1 - 4. Therefore, a gradual 
increase of the effect over the first few trials is possible. Considering that the rule moving object vs. 
non-moving object was chosen because it was most probably new to subjects it even seems 
reasonable to assume that a few practice trials might have been necessary. In contrast, with natural 
categorization rules such as odd/even (Experiment 1) shielding might be strong from the very 
beginning. Yet, overall, the effect of practice on the shielding function was not the subject of interest 
in the present thesis, and it seems negligible when more than 100 trials are considered (which is 
usually the case). Interestingly, on a side note, the lack of shielding in subjects using SR mappings can 
be prevented by practice. Dreisbach and Haider (2009) found that spatial congruency effects could 
be diminished in the SR group if practice trials before the experiment proper did not involve 
distracting pictures. That is, if subjects were able to practice the relevant SR mappings without any 
interfering spatial information their performance on subsequent experimental trials was not affected 
by the animal distracters. This result will be addressed again later. 
SHIELDING IN A SWITCHING CONTEXT 
Part III and Part IV offer an appealing explanation regarding the shielding function of task 
sets. They brought up evidence that the shielding function is served by advantages in processing for 
task-related information and that it critically depends on the degree of task activation.  
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Experiments 5 and 6 directly showed that the mechanism underlying the shielding function is 
preferential processing of task-related information rather than inhibition of irrelevant distraction. 
This mainly can be inferred from the attenuated congruency effects for task-related distracters on 
task switches. If a relaxation of shielding meant a relaxation of inhibition then interference should be 
increased on task switches. Instead, I found that task-related distracters interfered less on switch 
trials when shielding was relaxed. This indicates that fully intact shielding usually reflects a processing 
advantage for task-related features. Of course I cannot rule out that inhibition added to the effect. 
But the shielding function seems to be primarily supported by prioritized processing of task-related 
material, although irrelevant information most likely is also processed to a certain degree. As 
Dreisbach and Wenke (2011) already pointed out, binding effects on switch trials could not occur if 
target color/font had not been processed on the preceding trial. However, access to the response 
system seems to be granted only to relevant information which is (not necessarily consciously) 
determined through the instructed categories. As a consquence, distracters are also considered 
during response selection if they match the instructed categories and therefore affect response 
times.  
The second conclusion that can be drawn from Parts III and IV is that shielding depends on 
task activation, i.e. the degree of activation of the relevant and/or the irrelevant mappings. Task 
activation is typically assumed to be lower on a switch trial than on a repetition trial (e.g. Allport et 
al., 1994; for a review see Vandierendonck et al., 2010). This activation advantage presumably led to 
the difference in results for switch and repeat trials in Experiments 5 and 6. Full task activation on a 
repetition enabled intact shielding, whereas the shielding function was relaxed on task switches (see 
also Dreisbach & Wenke, 2011). Experiment 7 offered more compelling evidence for the involvement 
of task activation in the shielding function. When task activation on switch trials was manipulated by 
allowing subjects to prepare the upcoming task through the use of a predictable sequence, switch 
and repeat trials did not differ regarding the pattern of interference. Although mechanisms other 
than shielding (e.g. inhibition of the previous task set, see Discussion of Experiment 7) might have 
contributed to this result, overall in my opinion an activation-dependent shielding mechanism offers 
the best explanation. 
One particular aspect of the results specific to Experiment 6 has not been discussed so far. 
The spatial animal distracters that interfered in the SR group of Dreisbach and Haider (2009) did not 
interfere on switches to the adjective task in Experiment 6. This result suggests that even with a 
relaxation of shielding on a task switch performance with a task set in the face of distraction is still 
not at the level of (easily disrupted) performance with SR mappings. In contrast to Dreisbach and 
Haider’s SR group where spatial congruency effects occurred, no such effect was found on switches 
to the adjective task in Experiment 6 of the present thesis. Consequently, the relaxation of shielding 
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does not necessarily mean susceptibility to disruption in general. The spatial orientation of the 
animals was not related to any of the tasks that could have been activated on a switch trial (i.e. 
residual activation of the previous task and activation of the current task) and should therefore not 
be expected to interfere. In fact, so far interference on task switches always has been linked to the 
competing task in one way or the other. In Part III and Part IV of the present thesis the distracters 
were related to the noun task, whereas in the study by Dreisbach and Wenke (2011) the irrelevant 
feature may have been linked to the competing task on a switch trial. Therefore, the conclusion that 
the relaxation of shielding is merely a consequence of relevant task activation must be amended by 
the assumption that irrelevant task activation (i.e. task set inertia; Allport et al., 1994) might also 
contribute. Interference by noun distracters on task switches in Experiments 5 and 6 could be due to 
both weaker activation of the relevant task, as well as residual activation of the irrelevant task. 
Likewise, the lack of interference in Experiment 7 might be caused by the already strong activation of 
the current task and by the inhibition of activation of the preceding task. Yet, it was already stated in 
the Discussion of Experiment 7 that an account solely based on inhibition is unsuited to explain all 
the results of Experiments 5 -7 (e.g. interference in the noun task). 
The notion that relaxed shielding is not increased susceptibility to interference in general fits 
well with recent results from Wendt, Kiesel, Mathew, Luna-Rodriguez, and Jacobsen (2013). The 
authors found that task sequence (i.e. repetition vs. switch) modulated interference that was due to 
between-task competition. However, an effect unrelated to both tasks was not modulated by the 
type of transition. Between-task interference was stronger on task switches, whereas the magnitude 
of the SNARC effect (spatial-numerical association of response codes; Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 
1993) was not affected by the type of transition. Wendt et al. concluded that task switches do not 
lead to an overall increased distractibility because this should have resulted in an increased SNARC 
effect, too. Instead, they proposed that proactive interference from the preceding task is greater on 
task switches, resulting in increased susceptibility merely to competing mappings but not to 
irrelevant information in general. Yet, even if one is to assume that – contrary to what Wendt et al. 
proposed – reduced shielding does not result in a greater susceptibility to all kinds of distracters, one 
aspect of the study still seems to be at odds with the idea of a shielding mechanism: the SNARC 
effect was not only reliable on task switches, but also on task repetitions. The presence of this effect 
might be taken as evidence against a shielding function because the subjects had used categorization 
rules. However, in contrast to binding effects or spatial congruency effects evoked by animals, the 
SNARC effect is a basic and strong source of interference. With another well known effect, namely 
the Simon effect, shielding has been found to not prevent interference before (Metzker & Dreisbach, 
2009, 2011). It seems that the shielding function is not a global, unrelenting mechanism that 
prevents just any distraction from interfering with performance. Instead, whether categorization 
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rules are useful in the face distraction seems to depend on the paradigm and must be established 
separately for different distracting features, qualities or setups. This constraint seems adaptive, since 
rule use should certainly benefit performance but not at the cost of complete and utter rigidity. 
Taken an example to the extremes, sorting their fruit by color might keep a caveman from getting 
distracted by their shape, but an orienting reaction to an approaching snake might still be in order. 
Categorizing helps shield from distraction to a certain degree. However, when the strength of 
interference exceeds a certain (to be established) point or, the shielding mechanism can be 
overcome.  
THE MECHANISM UNDERLYING THE SHIELDING  
 FUNCTION 
So far, it has been established that the effect of the shielding function on unrelated and task-
related distracters differs. Moreover, shielding most probably relies on enhanced target processing 
and depends on task activation. In that respect, shielding works in favor of the stability of behavior 
when it comes to cognitive control. At the same time, flexibility in general does not seem to be 
greatly impaired. But what exact processes might underlie this shielding function and the suggested 
processing advantage for task-related information? Remember that task rules differ from single SR 
rules in that they provide subjects with a common response-defining stimulus feature, for instance 
category membership. That is, task rules create an association between that category/defining 
feature and the response.  
The advantage in processing might then simply be allocation of attention to the relevant 
feature. With regard to simple visual features, Folk, Remington, and Johnston (1992) suggested that 
spatial attention is involuntarily allocated to features that are critical to performance of the target 
task (but see Gronau, Cohen, & Ben-Shakhar, 2009). They used onset cues (prior to the target, a cue 
appears at one of four possible locations) and color cues (prior to the target, cues appear at all four 
locations, but one differs in color), and combined these with an onset task (i.e. judging at which of 
the four locations a stimulus appears) and a color task (i.e. at which location does the stimulus 
appear in a different color). Results showed that a cue validity effect (i.e. better performance on 
correctly cued trials than on incorrectly cued trials) was reliable only when the cue shared the 
feature property of the target task. More precisely, onset cues resulted in a cue validity effect in the 
onset task, but not the color task. On the other hand, a cue validity effect for color cues was only 
found in the color task. Folk et al. (1992) suggested that exogenous orientation of spatial attention is 
contingent on the relationship between features of the cue and features critical to the target task. 
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This means that attentional control settings can be set in accordance with task demands. If one were 
to extend this contingent involuntary orienting account to semantic information, shielding might 
simply be an attentional bias. If task-related features capture attention, they might gain access to the 
response system more easily. This preference might be realized in computational models such as the 
Executive Control of Visual Attention (ECTVA) theory by Logan and Gordon (2001), where a bias 
toward specific response categories is implemented. In fact, in 2009, Dreisbach and Haider had 
already suggested that applying rules might guide attention towards relevant aspects or features – 
for instance by simply reducing information – and thus result in attenuated vulnerability to 
distraction. One problem with this account is the bold step from spatial attention to static (e.g. color) 
or dynamic (e.g. sudden onset) discontinuities suggested by Folk et al. to the attentional selection of 
semantic categories required in the shielding function. In addition, Gronau et al. (2009) claim that 
task-related interference is not accompanied by attentional capture of the distracting stimuli. They 
used the personal significance effect (i.e. slowed response times when a personally significant word 
like the subject’s own name is presented inside the focus of attention) to assess whether distracting 
stimuli capture attention. Subjects had to name the color of rectangle presented in the centre of the 
screen. A colored word denoting either a personally significant or a neutral meaning served as the 
distracter. When this distracter was presented within the focus of attention (i.e. within the colored 
rectangle) both the color congruency effect and the personal significance effect were significant but 
they did not interact. In contrast, when the distracter was presented outside the focus of attention 
(i.e. above or below the rectangle) only a color congruency effect was found. The authors took this 
result as an indication that the interfering qualities of task-related stimuli are not accompanied by 
attentional capture. If the distracter outside the focus of attention had capture attention, a personal 
significance effect should have occurred. Another problematic result for an attentional account 
comes from a study by Hommel (2005). He found that attention does not seem to be necessary for 
the formation of event files. Consequently, explaining shielding by proposing an attentional bias 
against irrelevant information such as target color would not explain the lack of binding effects 
reported by Dreisbach and Haider (assuming, of course, that binding effects are caused by event 
files). Overall, although a distinction must be drawn between attentional capture and an attentional 
bias or selective attention in general, a purely attentional account of shielding would certainly prove 
problematic.  
An alternative explanation of the shielding function of task sets is based on the strength of 
activation of response category representations. Meiran and Kessler (2008; Kessler & Meiran, 2010) 
suggested that the TRCE is not caused by the representation of task rules in working memory (WM) 
because WM load does not affect the TRCE. Instead, they proposed that representations of well 
established response categories in activated LTM (Cowan, 1988; Oberauer, 2001) are the reason for 
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such congruency effects. They backed their hypothesis with the finding that a TRCE only appeared 
with familiar response categories but not with novel response representations. More specifically, in a 
2 x 2 grid a TRCE was found when the response categories up/down or left/right relative to the 
dissecting lines of the grid were used. However, when the grid was rotated by an angle of 45°, the 
locations relative to the dissecting lines could no longer be represented as up/down and left/right. In 
that case, a TRCE did not occur (see Part I). Along the lines of Meiran and Kessler, one could assume 
that with a binary categorization rule response categories are more strongly activated in LTM and 
hence more accessible than with eight individual SR mappings. This accessibility, in turn, might 
promote categorization according to the rule and reduce interference. This explanation would 
presume that the number of response categories activated in LTM is inversely related to the 
activation of said categories: the more response categories there are, the weaker each of them is 
activated. 
I prefer a third, slightly different explanation that focuses on associative strength rather than 
the strength of response representations only. When subjects use a binary categorization rule the 
mapping is biunique. One category is mapped to one response and the other category is mapped to 
the other response. Conversely, each response is associated with a single category only (one-to-one 
mapping). Irrespective of how many different exemplars are used in the task, the association with 
the response is established via the category (see Figure 1). In contrast, when subjects use two 
response keys but more than two SR mappings these mappings are not biunique. Instead, several 
separate stimuli are mapped to one response (many-to-one mapping). Without a mediating category 
many different targets elicit the same response and each response is associated with more than one 
stimulus (see also Metzker & Dreisbach, 2009; 2011). I assume that the one-to-one mapping results 
in a strong association between a category (e.g. moving object) and a response (e.g. left). This 
strength allows efficient response selection that simply overpowers interference by irrelevant 
distracters.  
The interpretation of shielding in terms of strong associations between categories and 
responses would fit well with the notion that shielding is dependent on task activation. That is, if a 
task is not fully activated (e.g. on an unexpected switch trial, then shielding is also reduced because 
the associations between target categories and responses are not fully activated. Then, one might 
conclude that on task switches – where task activation and therefore shielding is relaxed – stimulus-
specific interference effects can more easily occur because they compete with associations that are 
not as strongly activated as on task repetitions. On the other hand, on task repetitions task shielding 
prevents stimulus-specific interference from weaker links at the cost of interference by task-related 
information due to automatic rule application (i.e. automatic use of the strong link between category 
and response). Such an account allows for an impact of the strength of activation of competing 
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mappings. More precisely, the stronger competing associations are (e.g. strong residual activation of 
the competing mappings on a task switch, or strong effects such as in the Simon task) the more likely 
they are to interfere.  
The idea that strong associations between stimulus categories and responses are the reason 
for shielding is related to findings from Metzker and Dreisbach (2009, 2011). The authors originally 
sought to investigate the shielding function in the Simon task, assuming that shielding might 
decrease or eliminate the Simon effect. Unexpectedly, Metzker and Dreisbach repeatedly found 
greater spatial compatibility effects in the TS group than in the SR group. Remember that shielding in 
the TS group had previously been found to prevent spatial interference by animal distracters 
(Dreisbach & Haider, 2009). Metzker and Dreisbach came up with an appealing explanation for their 
results. Usually, the Simon effect is explained by dual-route models. The identity of the target 
activates the correct response through the indirect route, whereas the irrelevant spatial location 
activates the corresponding spatial response via the direct route. If these two routes activate 
conflicting responses, reaction times are slowed. Adding to these two routes from stimulus features 
to response features, Metzker and Dreisbach proposed a third route that connects the spatial 
response code to the associated stimulus categories (see also Part I). This route allows the spatial 
location of the target to prime target identity if the location matches the target category. If, say, 
moving objects were associated with pressing the left key then presenting the target on the left hand 
side of the screen would not only activate the response left via the direct route, but also prime the 
category moving objects. In contrast, the identification of non-moving objects would profit from a 
target presented on the right. Metzker and Dreisbach proposed that the one-to-one mapping 
achieved by categorizing the targets allows for strong priming activation from the response code to 
the related category. On the other hand, with many-to-one mappings like in an SR condition, this 
priming effect suffers due to the fan effect (J. R. Anderson, 1974). The activation spreading from a 
spatial code to three associated targets (many-to-one, e.g. left banana, left  lemon, left  pear) 
is reduced due to the fan effect and the priming ends up weaker than with only one associated target 
(one-to-one; e.g. left  yellow fruit).  
The strong associations account is certainly well suited to explain why the (presumably rather 
weak) spatial information conveyed through the animals is shielded against, while other effects occur 
despite of shielding (e.g. the Simon effect, Metzker & Dreisbach, 2009; the SNARC effect, Wendt et 
al., 2013). If one were to assume that the latter are themselves served by strong (possibly natural) 
associations between a feature and a spatial response shielding might not be enough to overpower 
them as suggested. On another note, linking shielding to strong associations offers an explanation to 
results Dreisbach and Haider (2009) obtained in the SR group with extensive practice. If subjects 
practiced the separate mappings without the presence of distracters spatially oriented animals did 
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not interfere later. Assuming that distracter-free practice led to a strengthening of the relevant 
associations, this might explain the lack of spatial congruency effects at a later point.  
However, when it comes to the question of how shielding can prevent binding effects, the 
explanation is more difficult. First, based on the existent studies on shielding it cannot be decided 
whether a) binding simply does not occur, or whether b) binding and subsequent retrieval both occur 
but for some reason do not show in RTs. Consequently, how the shielding function works concerning 
binding effects depends on what assumptions are made about the occurrence of binding (yes or no) 
in the first place.  
On the one hand, Dreisbach and Wenke (2011) interpreted their findings in terms of a lack of 
binding. The irrelevant feature (color/font) is not bound to the response. As a consequence, on task 
repetitions no interaction between feature and response is found. In this case, the fact that on task 
switches the interaction becomes significant is explained by assuming that a color switch (but not a 
color repetition) loosens the existing binding between the formerly relevant feature and the 
response (Spapé & Hommel, 2008). Therefore, on task switches the usual response repetition cost is 
found for color repetitions (because the response is still bound to the previously relevant category), 
but not for color switches (because the binding responsible for the effect is loosened by the color 
switch). Based on this explanation, the shielding mechanism should be able to prevent bindings 
between irrelevant features and responses. For this, associative strength between categories and 
responses does not seem sufficient. Rather, one would have to assume that an additional mechanism 
such as intentional weighting (Hommel, 2005, 2009; see also Dreisbach & Haider, 2008) prevents 
irrelevant features from being bound and that intentional weighting is more refined in subjects using 
task rules than in subjects using SR mappings. If this is true, shielding would consist of more than one 
underlying mechanism (unless one assumed that intentional weighting itself is served by strong 
associations). Shielding, the preferential treatment of task-related information, would be served by 
a) strong associations due to a biunique mapping and b) refined intentional weighting.  
On the other hand, the results from Dreisbach and Wenke (2011) as well as previous results 
(Dreisbach & Haider, 2008) could alternatively be explained by assuming that the irrelevant feature is 
indeed bound to the response and retrieved later on, but does not lead to a strong enough trace to 
result in significant interference. That is, an event file is created that contains information concerning 
the task, the response, and features such as color or font. The subsequent presentation of the color 
then would lead to a retrieval of the corresponding response. However, in this case, the strong 
association between a category and a response is suited to explain why a comparably weak binding 
between color and response does not appear in RTs on task repetitions. At the same time, it explains 
why binding effects are found when shielding is relaxed on a task switch because now the retrieval of 
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the response associated with the irrelevant feature competes with an association that is weaker than 
on task repetitions. 
The proposal that shielding relies on the associative strength between categories and 
responses (due to the one-to-one mapping) has several implications. First, it is assumed that the 
locus of shielding is response selection (e.g. Glaser & Düngelhoff, 1984) rather than perceptual 
encoding4 or response execution. The correct response is selected efficiently because the relevant 
association between target category and response is strong. Second, performance with a single SR 
mapping for each response should not differ from performance when a binary categorization rule is 
used. That is, rules are only useful if they reduce information (e.g. to one relevant feature or 
category). Likewise, using more than one category per response should weaken the shielding 
function.  
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHIELDING FUNCTION 
The use of rules offers obvious advantages in real life. Information is reduced, important 
features are highlighted, and the possibility of generalization and transfer to novel situations or 
stimuli is offered. The present thesis showed that rule use offers another noteworthy advantage. By 
defining which features are relevant with regard to the response, the impact of distraction can be 
reduced. This finding – first and foremost – has implications for studies using rule-based instructions 
that base their interpretations on the existence or size of interference effects. The definition of a task 
is not straightforward and varies depending on the study (see Part I of the present thesis). However, 
as has been illustrated before and now again in this thesis, important aspects of performance, 
namely vulnerability to interference and stability of performance depend on how a task is 
represented. Although both SR mappings and categorization rules are sufficient for subjects to 
determine a correct response, these representations have different effects on cognitive control in 
the presence of distracting stimuli or features. Therefore, whenever the interpretation of an 
experiment is based on the absence, presence or magnitude of interference, a close look at how 
subject represent the task is necessary, especially when comparisons are made between groups. 
Depending on the distracter (irrelevant or related to the task), the representation of a task in terms 
of a categorization rule can reduce or enhance distractibility compared to SR representations. As a 
consequence, the quality of cognitive control in situations involving distraction depends on the type 
of task representation. This might affect measures such as the switch cost, binding effects, the Simon 
                                                          
4 In line with this assumption, preliminary, unpublished results from recent experiments 
show that perceptual implicit memory for distracter stimuli does not differ in subjects using rules and 
subjects using SR mappings. 
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effect, the flanker effect, the SNARC effect, or the Stroop effect. Note that the representation of a 
task depends on more than mere instruction. Dreisbach and Haider (2009) showed that even with 
identical instructions the mode of introduction of targets led to the formation of categorization rules 
in some subjects but not in others. Specifically, when eight targets were introduced simultaneously 
instead of stepwise some subjects created their own rule for categorizing and showed the same 
pattern of results as subjects that were instructed to use a categorization rule (namely, no spatial 
congruency effects from animal distracters). Therefore, if different instructions are used or the 
instructions leave the possibility of interpretation concerning task representation, post-experimental 
interviews assessing subjects’ strategy would be advised.  
Moving away from cognitive control and task switching, the functionality of rule-based 
processing is also connected to other fields of psychological research. A preference for categorization 
rather than an exemplar-based strategy is not only found in experiments on task switching or 
shielding. In memory research, for instance, the possibility to use semantically related rather than 
unrelated stimuli has been shown to benefit performance when it is offered during encoding, as well 
as during recall (Epstein, Johnson, & Phillips, 1975; Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). Another useful 
dissociation between rule-based manipulations (TS) and idiosyncratic exceptions (SR) comes from the 
area of linguistic studies, more precisely the English past tense (e.g. Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1998). 
Regular past tense is formed by adding the suffix –d, -ed, or –t to the word stem (e.g. succeed  
succeeded), whereas irregular verbs diverge from this rule (e.g. go  went). It has been found that 
aphasic patients suffering from agrammatic speech are selectively impaired with regard to either 
irregular, or regular past tense, while the respective other tense and semantic priming are not 
affected. This dissociation between rule-based and irregular past tense can be used to address 
questions regarding the nature of mental computations (rule-based vs. operating without syntax) 
and bears some resemblance to the functional dichotomy between the use of task sets and SR 
mappings.  
In a vein more similar to the kind of rule use applied in this thesis, Dreisbach (2012) pointed 
out that in developmental psychology differences in performance on the ability to switch and rule-
based tasks are found in children of varying ages (e.g. Kharitonova et al., 2009; see also Part I). These 
are attributed to differing representations caused by developmental changes within the PFC. 
Functional differences in PFC and other brain areas of course can also be observed in patients 
suffering from lesions or particular diseases. Children with autism spectrum disorder, for example, 
are impaired in the formation of conceptual connections and therefore necessarily in rule-learning 
(Jones, Webb, Estes, & Dawson, 2013). This might be due to an atypical development of the PFC in 
such patients.  
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The implication of the effects of shielding on everyday life situations amounts to a simple and 
comprehensible advice: shop for cocktail ingredients, not limes, mint, and soda. You might end up 
buying rum, but it is still the better strategy.  Phrased in more general terms, whenever you do not 
want to be distracted, use rules. Reduce information by categorizing your relevant targets, items, or 
bits of knowledge and thus shield yourself from irrelevant input. Of course, as was shown in Part I, 
rules can also enhance distractibility when the distraction is task-related. However, in real life it is 
safe to assume that task-related information is in fact relevant and is therefore most welcome to 
affect performance. On a more general level, social interactions can be affected by rule use. For 
instance, stereotyping might be considered an example of a task rule. People often stereotype to 
simplify or justify their opinions and behavior. They attribute traits considered typical for a certain 
group to a member of said group (TS) before finding out about individual habits and characteristics 
(SR). Telling you that I am German might prompt you to assume that I am punctual, like all sorts of 
sausages, and have no sense of humor. Only if you got to know me and looked beyond the category 
German you might find out that I like laughing, dislike some types of sausage, and that I am indeed 
punctual. Many factors, including motivational and emotional states have been shown to influence 
stereotyping (for a review see Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). But if stereotyping is viewed as a type of 
categorization rule, it might also offer a shielding function that contributes to its persistence. Based 
on the premise that shielding leads to preferential processing of related information, one might 
easily conclude that such a process contributes to the stability of stereotyping. Watching me arrive 
on time might make you strengthen your stereotype because you expected it. On the other hand, my 
pronounced gesticulation might go unnoticed seeing as it is not seen as typically German. Of course, 
this example is taking matters further than current results allow. Further research is necessary to 
allow for such transfer.  
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The present thesis addressed questions regarding the scope and mechanism of the shielding 
function of task sets. I could show that shielding is most probably a preference for task-related 
information and critically depends on task activation. An implication of the interpretation of shielding 
in terms of strong associations between target categories and responses is that perceptual and 
conceptual processing of distracter stimuli should not be affected. Even if subjects use rules and are 
therefore immune to interference by unrelated distracters, these should still be processed to the 
same degree as in subjects using SR mappings. Originally, Dreisbach and Haider (2009) had proposed 
“a global shielding mechanism that prevents the occurrence of response conflicts because the 
presumably interfering information is not being processed in the first place” (Dreisbach & Haider, 
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2009, p. 477). However, later research suggested “that the shielding function of task sets prevents 
irrelevant information from entering the response system” (Dreisbach & Wenke, 2011, p. 154). This 
latter account fits better with the favored explanation in this thesis. If shielding is indeed located at 
the stage of response selection, identification of distracter stimuli should not suffer. Goschke (2000) 
proposed that in order to enable flexible behavior, information currently considered distracting 
should still be processed to a level that allows identification. Otherwise, higher-level goals such as 
simple survival might be missed. The fact that task-related (noun-related) and target-related (noun) 
distracters always interfered in the current thesis already suggests that distracting information is not 
ignored when it comes to processing. However, proof is missing concerning unrelated distracters. 
Whether or not such distracter stimuli are processed to a perceptual and even a conceptual level 
might be investigated with the help of implicit memory tests. For instance, subjects could be asked to 
complete fragments of pictures previously presented as distracters (perceptual implicit memory; e.g. 
Ballesteros, Reales, García, & Carrasco, 2006). Conceptual implicit memory tests such as category 
exemplar generation (e.g. Bruss & Mitchell, 2009) might be used to assess whether the distracters 
were processed to a semantic level: if subjects name category exemplars that were earlier presented 
as distracters more often than comparable exemplars, previous conceptual processing of said 
distracters is likely. And in fact, concerning perceptual priming, preliminary data from unpublished 
studies support this assumption, whereas data on conceptual priming are still somewhat mixed. 
Further research is necessary to determine to what level distracters are processed.  
The limitations of the procedures used so far are also a starting point for future research. 
Shielding has been investigated with word targets and distracting pictures or feature changes. 
Therefore, the procedure offers the possibility for expansion to enable more general conclusions. For 
instance, the temporal (speed of processing as well as time point of introduction) and spatial 
relationship between targets and distracters could be looked into. Recently, efforts have been made 
to broaden the scope of application of the shielding function. Studies using spoken words as targets 
and gender (word spoken by a man or a woman) or emotional state (e.g. word spoken by an angry or 
a happy voice) as an irrelevant feature found the very same binding effects between voice and 
response that Dreisbach and Haider (2008) had reported for written words and colors (Bogon, 
Eisenbarth, Landgraf, & Dreisbach, in preparation). Importantly, as before, these binding effects were 
only found in the SR group, not the TS group. This research opens up the possibility of transferring 
findings on the shielding function to social interaction. Interestingly, some results indicate that there 
might be a gender-specific component to shielding. However, direct investigation of this effect has 
not yet been attempted.  
In sum, the shielding function of task sets as a means of promoting cognitive stability is 
simple, yet effective: Rules reduce information and thereby help with the execution of a task by 
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allowing enhanced processing of what is relevant. However, when task activation is attenuated this 
advantage is temporarily reduced. The simplicity of this mechanism is appealing and holds the 
promise that future research will be rewarding. The extension of the paradigm and its applications 
will certainly yield interesting results. Alas, these are for others to unveil.  
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